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Are South Africa's water service delivery policies and strategies equitable, accessible,
affordable, efficient, effective and sustainable for Msunduzi low-income households?
The primary objective of this study was to elicit the community experience of South
Africa's water service delivery policies and strategies and link these experiences to a
broader analysis of policy and strategy to locate water service delivery contraventions,
inconsistencies and inadequacies. The secondary objective was to initiate community-
based platforms for engagement with water-related issues and build capacity within
local community task teams to initiate lobbying and advocacy strategies to support
community-suggested and research-outcome reforms thereby returning popular control
to the locus ofcommunities.
The study was conducted in Kwa-Zulu Natal, within the Msunduzi municipal
jurisdiction, under the uMgungundloYU district municipality (DC22) in the period from
October 2002-ApriI2003. Households in five low-income urban areas were included in
the study: Imbali (units 1 and 2), Sobantu, Haniville and Thembalihle. The study
employed a community action research design usmg non-probability sampling.
Surveys, conducted by community researchers, were complemented by broad
community engagement approaches, informal interviews with external stakeholders and
the initiation ofplatforms for information sharing and fundamental debate.
The study revealed two significant findings. The first finding found that South Africa's
water service delivery policies, strategies and implementation mechanisms were
inconsistent with the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry's sector goals of equity,
affordability, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability. They contained serious
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scientific and social inadequacies, inequitably promoted economic considerations above
social and environmental·considerations; lacked regulation and monitoring systems to
identify and address implementation contraventions; were not receptive to the socio-
economic situations of low-income households and should be fundamentally re-worked.
Policies and strategies purported to ensure that the basic water service requirements of
low-income households were met, essentially compounded socio-economic constraints
and compromised human rights, justice and equity. The second finding was related to
popular involvement and engagement. Community consultative processes for input into
local and national policies and strategies were inadequate and often
pseudoparticipatory; political platfonns (local and national) for communities to engage
and influence decision-makers were inadequate or lacking; and the community control, .
ownership and acceptance of the Msunduzi water service delivery institution and its
mechanisms were low.
Recommendations for the refonn of policy, strategy and implementation of such
refonns were advocated through the vehicle of reviews, evaluations and audits, to
infonn the necessary amendments, adjustments and intensification of local and national
regulation and monitoring mechanisms. Lobbying and advocacy strategies, to support
the implementation of refonns, were promoted through community-based approaches of
popular engagement with water-related issues, infonnation dissemination; community
mobilisation and popular control ofpublic processes.
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CHAPTER 1
THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING
1.1 Introduction
The emergence of the new South African democracy (1994) brought with it the
assurance of making clean drinking water and sanitation accessible to all South Africans
(Human Sciences Research Council [HSRC], 2002; Rural Development Services
Network [RDSN], 2002). The 1994 Reconstruction and Development Programme
(RDP), the African National Congress's (ANC) election manifesto, ensured that
advances were made in the rollout of service infrastructure and the redressing of South
Africa's skewed water distribution and consumption legacy (HSRC, 2002; RDSN,
2002). However, in 1996, the neo-liberal Growth, Employment and Redistribution
strategy (GEAR) replaced the RDP, subsequently steering South Africa away from a
developmental state, to a state whose aim was to facilitate profitability and investment
in the private sector (Pauw, 2003; HSRC, 2002). 'The effects of GEAR cascaded
downward to local government and service delivery regimes' (HSRC, 2002 pI).
GEAR's policy of fiscal discipline resulted in a reduction of direct subsidies from
national government to municipalities (HSRC, 2002). As many municipalities had a
limited tax-base or alternative source of income, 'unfunded mandates' were created
concurrently with changing policy guidelines and legislation, pressurising local
authorities to recover costs (HSRC, 2002; McDonald, 2002). These pressures were
transferred to citizens and their households (HSRC, 2002).
Despite progressive policy reforms, as indicated in the White Paper on National Water
Policy for South Africa (1997), affordability constraints prevented the majority of low-
income households from accessing sufficient water to meet basic domestic needs (Bond,
2001). In 2001, a Human Science Research Council survey found that across the
country, impoverished residents were forced into a position where they could not afford
basic services or payment of arrears, 'no matter how hard they tried' (HSRC, 2002 pI).
This was consistent with the findings from a national survey, involving 2520
households, which found that basic municipal service charges typically represented a
quarter to a half of total household income for 57 percent of the households surveyed
(Bond, 2001). Median costs for water, electricity, sewage and refuse removal ranged
from R224-R400 per month. Municipal service expenditures left little monies for other
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necessities, such as food, school fees, transport and medical expenses (Bond, ·2001).
While many government and business leaders blamed arrears on a "culture of non-
payment" (emanating from the boycott on services during the struggle against
apartheid) the reality was that poverty, HIV/AlDS and the loss of 500 000 jobs
(between 1996-2001) made it increasingly difficult for households to afford basic
service expenditures (HSRC, 2002; Bond, 2001; Fiil-Flynn, 2001; Ralo et al, 2000).
Households became increasingly vulnerable as they struggled to secure basic services
(HSRC, 2002; Bond, 2001; Fiil-Flynn, 2001; Ralo et aI, 2000). Instead of
acknowledging the affordability challenges of low-income households and responding
in a proactive manner, national and local government implemented punitive measures
for any inability to pay and arrears on service accounts (HSRC, 2002). This resulted in
the disconnection of water services and the eviction of millions of low-income
households from their homes with the implications of compromising health, livelihoods
and policy objectives (Bond, 2002; HSRC, 2002; Fiil-Flynn,2001). Such actions, based
on the economic considerations of full-cost recovery and a stable financial bottom line,
failed to acknowledge the benefits of affordable and accessible basic service coverage,
which include the following: a net improvement in the immediate local environment of
the poor; improved public health standards; fewer hazards associated with fire;
increased gender equity; improved productivity on the part of workers; improved
capacity to learn on the part of youth; greater chances for class desegregation; and many
economic spin-offs from those who used services for income-generating purposes (Fiil-
Flynn, 2001). Failure to integrate the social benefits of universal basic services into
cost-benefit analyses was, in light of the above benefits, shortsighted and socially
irresponsible (Fiil-Flynn, 2001).
A landmark victory in the case of Irene Grootboom, a shack dweller in Cape Town,
challenged the government to provide the poorest sectors of society with at least a
lifeline supply of basic services:
"A society must seek to ensure that the basic necessities oflife are provided to all ifit is
to be a society based on dignity, freedom and equality...For a person to have access to
adequate housing depends on context ...Some may need access to land and no more;
some may need access to land and building materials; some may need access to
finance; some may need access to services such as water, sewage, electricity and
roads" (Grootboom v Republic of South Africa, 2000; cited by Fiil-Flynn, 2001).
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The Grootboom case together with increasing pressure from low-income groups and
social movements in South Africa forced the government to review the rights afforded
to South African citizens as stated in the constitution and White Paper on National
Water Policy for South Africa (1997)'. The implementation of the free basic water
policy followed, in 2001, which was envisioned as ensuring the access of lifeline
services to low-income households. The free basic water policy was, in the eyes of
social justice proponents, a positive step towards addressing basic water affordability
and accessibility objectives (in respect of basic human needs and consistent with the
White Paper on National Water Policy for South Africa, 1997). The free basic water
policy is consistent with the Constitutional Court, Reconstruction and Development
Programme (RDP) and the Bill of Human Rights; where only the water required for
meeting basic human needs and maintaining environmental sustainability will be
guaranteed as a right (Fiil-Flynn, 2001; Ralo et aI, 2000; White Paper on National
Water Policy for South Africa, 1997). This is known as the 'reserve' or 'minimum core
right' and in the case of free basic water represents the entirety of the right itself
(Calland, 2002; White Paper on National Water Policy for South Africa, 1997).
However, despite being heralded internationally, the free basic water policy has not
been implemented in the spirit in which it was conceived. It falls short of policy
.'"
objectives and has nUmerous policy flaws (NGO, 2003). Free basic water is allocated
per household and not per_person; the allocation of 6 kilolitres (Id) of free water per
household per month does not meet basic water requirements per person per day and
ignores household size and the special water requirements of children, the aged and
people living with HIV/AIDS (Alternative Information and Development Centre
[AIDC], 2002; Public Citizen, 2002a; Fiil Flynn, 2001; Ralo et al, 2000; Gleick, 1996).
Because the free basic water allocation fails to meet basic water requirements, it is
conceivable that households may need to use more than the 6kl allocation. According
to the policy, if more than 6Id is consumed then the full 6kl must be paid for and any
additional water consumed is charged at a higher stepped tariff. Hence, free basic water
I The South African constitution guarantees all peo~ right to access adequate and
affordable potable water to meet basic domestic needs and water and sanitation services should
be delivered equitably. affordably. effectively, efficiently and sustainably to satisfy sector goals
(DWAF, 2002; De Waal et ai, 2001; White Paper on National Water Policy for South Africa, 1997).
Government is instructed to "take reasonable legislative and other measures within its available
resources to achieve the progressive realisation" of these rights (White Paper on National Water
Policy for South Africa, 1997).
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is neither free nor basic and low-income households remain in a position whereby they
struggle to access and afford the basic life-line of water necessary for survival (AIDC,
2002). Free basic water is based on a cost-recovery model, which is prominent in the
water delivery paradigm. Such mechanisms if applied to water, may undermine its
affordability, access and compromise the objectives of national policies and strategies
(RDSN,2002).
This research challenges the discrepancies between legislation, policy, strategy and
safeguarding of basic human rights in respect to the affordability and accessibility of
basic water services. It questions the appropriateness and effectiveness of pro-poor
policies in upholding the minimum core rights as recognised in the South African
Constitution. It contests that the economic bottom-line is being driven, regardless of
social justice, equity and the realisation of basic human rights, by promoting full-cost
recovery and profit margins. It is acknowledged that service delivery does carry a cost.
However, this cost should not be unfairly and inequitably transferred to low-income
households. National and local government have a role in ensuring that mechanisms are
implemented to safeguard the rights and livelihoods of low-income households.
Primarily, this research seeks appropriate pricing mechanisms, public sector reforms,
and policy and strategy amendments to ensure that municipal service delivery is
equitable, accessible, affordable, efficient, effective and sustainable to low-income
households.
1.2 Importance of the study
The study's importance is divided into two objectives: that of (1) assessing the equity,
accessibility, affordability, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability of South Africa's
water service delivery policies and strategies and (2) the role of community engagement
and action in supporting policy and strategy reforms.
There exists a "national crisis in the affordability of basic municipal services" (Bond,
200I). This has been illustrated by mass mobilisations of citizens across South Africa
advocating reformed pricing strategies, especially in the outlying regions of Cape Town,
Durban and Soweto. Households simply cannot afford to pay for their basic municipal
service charges (Bond, 2001; Fiil-Flynn, 2001; Ralo et al, 2000). The importance of
this study is therefore located within the pocket of low-income households and asks the
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question: what can households afford to pay in order to secure their water service
delivery? It draws critical links between water service affordability, user-satisfaction
with water service delivery and the degree of participation by communities in water
service delivery strategies. It challenges the appropriateness and efficiency of water
service delivery tools. It challenges the lack of infonnation provided to households in
being able to read meters and water bills. It questions the Msunduzi municipality's
water demand management strategy. It contests the municipality's commitment and
prioritisation to ensure the delivery of free basic water to low-income households, and
advocates that the national free basic water allocation of 6kl per household per month is
inadequate for a lifeline supply of water. The study asks, "is disconnection or restricted
access of services an acceptable fonn of credit control?" It advocates the integration of
public health benefits into cost benefit analyses of universal service coverage. It
highlights options and alternatives for improving and extending public service delivery
refonns. The study also highlights the need for a progressive and redistributive tariff
system if the government is to succeed in its affordability, accessibility and
sustainability mandate. Lastly, it is valuable in assessing if national and local
government policies and strategies are fundamentally entrenched in social justice and
equity.
Community engagement and action is reflected in every stage of the research and fonns
the locus in the importance of the study. Efforts were made to build organisational and
knowledge capacity in community researchers and to engage in debate on fundamental
water issues and water-related policies and strategies. Platforms were created (where
they were absent) or optimised (where they already existed), to support this process and
ensure that community voices were heard. Community engagement and action is
essential to take the outcomes of the research forward and to contribute to popular
alternatives in the water service delivery framework.
The study area was within the Msunduzi municipal jurisdiction, under the
uMgungundlovu district municipality (DC22). The study targets households in five
low-income urban areas: Imbali (units 1 and 2), Sobantu, Haniville and Thembalihle.
Community researchers were purposively selected and engaged in methodological
compilation, data collection, data analysis and strategising, to provide suggestions for
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the reform of policies, strategies and implementation processes and to advocate the .
implementation of the envisioned reforms.
1.3 Value of research
The expected value of the research is provided to ensure that the results address and
satisfy the research objectives.
The expected value of the research is the following:
• Gain input into assessing whether South Africa's water service delivery policies and
strategies are equitable, accessible, affordable, efficient, effective and sustainable
for Msunduzi low-income households
• To ascertain how much low-income households are willing and able to pay to secure
water access
• Gain insight into the experience of low-income households to the free basic water
policy
• Gain insight into how a progressive redistributive tariff system should be structured
• Gain insight into how communication between communities, councillors, ward
committees and municipal officials could be improved
• To provide recommendations for public sector reform
• Gain insight into advocacy channels for communities to engage ill and take
outcomes forward
The major expected value of the research is to capacitate community committees, to
encourage advocacy, to feed in to policy and local strategy so that low-income
households are not disadvantaged. In order to achieve this goal, the results of the study
will be discussed with households included in the study, as well as with the wider
communities. Community task teams will be set up to include community researchers,
households (included in the study) and their wider communities. Additional
information on major issues pertaining to the results of the study will be disseminated
and discussed through community task teams. Communities will identify advocacy
channels and joint community advocacy strategies will be adopted. Community
advocacy strategies will be fed into national advocacy networks (through social
movement campaigns) to support and strengthen advocacy at local and national levels.
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The wider value of the research is expected to be the amendment or transformation of
local and national policies to promote social water justice in the water service delivery
to low-income households. Furthermore, the water service delivery experiences of
Msunduzi low-income households are to be shared with other low-income communities
to mobilise for the advocacy of receptive and appropriate policies for the improved
service delivery of water.
1.4 Statement of the problem
Are South Africa's water service delivery policies and strategies equitable, accessible,
affordable, efficient, effective and sustainable for Msunduzi low-income households?
1.5 Sub problems
Sub problem 1: What is the experience of Msunduzi low-income households to




Are local and national water service delivery policies and
strategies equitable, accessible, affordable, efficient, effective and
sustainable in servicing Msunduzi low-income households?
What reforms can be made to national and local water service
delivery strategies to ensure the equitable, accessible, affordable,
efficient, effective and sustainable water service delivery to low-
income households?
What strategies can be adopted to support the implementation of
the necessary reforms to South Africa's water service delivery
policies and strategies?
1.6 Hypothesis
South Africa's water service delivery policies and strategies are not equitable,




The study is guided by the following principles (consistent with the Global People's
Forum, Water Commission Statement, 2002):
(1) Access to water and sanitation are basic human rights. Everyone should have
secure access to sufficient safe water and sanitation to meet their basic human
needs.
(2) Water is a public necessity. It should not be commodified or privatised.
1.8 Study parameters
The impact of national and local water-related policies and strategies on communities
was limited to the experiences of Msunduzi low-income households and not to low-
income households nationally, with the implication that the study results could not be
applied nationally. Individual household municipal consolidated bills were not accessed
thereby demanding the reliance on Municipal average household consumption statistics.
There was no differentiation between the seasonal usage of water services: this could
have a significant effect on the quantities of water utilised as well as the available
household income and expenditures. Only low-income peri-urban households were
included in the study; which excluded the comparison of national and local policies and
strategies on rural low-income households. Industrial and commercial water
consumption and the potential for cross subsidisation between different categories of
users was not included in the study. Municipal documents and statistics were not
readily accessible thereby compromising the triangulation of municipal data with
community obtained data. The researcher's own position has been expounded earlier
(consistent with section 1.7) yet positions will be stated and efforts made to remain
objective.






not restricted or constrained; easy to obtain by all
no one is excluded from access to basic services because
of the service cost (Draft White Paper on Water Services,
2002 p8)
used to refer to mutually acceptable or favourable tenns
water, electricity, sanitation and waste removal services
adequate services to all people, fairly (Draft White Paper











the job is well done (Draft White Paper on Water
Services, 2002 pS) and physically reaches all people
resources are not wasted (Draft White Paper on Water
Services, 2002 pS)
a free lifeline of 6 kilolitres per household per month
includes all costs relating to operating, maintenance,
capital and extending service delivery
targeted subsidy, which provides limited free basic
services to low-income households
a range of private sector activities, including outsourcing
and introduction of private sector principles, such as
performance-based management and full-cost recovery
into service delivery reforms. Corporatisation of services
is also included in this defInition (McDonald, 2002 pI)
there are adequate resources to operate, maintain,
rehabilitate and expand services in the future (Draft White
Paper on Water Services, 2002 pS)
municipalities
municipalities, parastatals, non-governmental
organisations or community-based organisations
1.10 Abbreviations
Abbreviations for the study are provided below.
ANC African National Congress
CAR Community action research
CRs Community researchers
DPLG Department ofProvincial and Local Government
DWAF Department of Water Affairs and Forestry
FBW Free Basic Water
GEAR Growth, employment and redistribution strategy
IMF International Monetary Fund
Nepad New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO Non-governmental organisation











No political interference will occur in the research during the period of data collection.
Although, community researchers are purposively selected on the criteria of community
activism, data will be objectively collected. Community researchers will engage with
the research process and take the research outcomes forward using community
identified channels. Government and municipal officials will be accessible and willing
to participate in interviews and provide relevant data.
1.12 Summary
This study aims to assess' whether South Africa's water service delivery policies and
strategies are equitable, accessible, affordable, efficient, effective and sustainable for
Msunduzi low-income households. The background and objectives of the study has
been captured through the problem and its setting; the importance of the study; the
value of the research; the statement of the research problem; the four sub problems; and
the guiding principles. Further development for the social justification of equitable,
accessible, affordable, efficient, effective and sustainable policies and strategies are
presented in chapter two. The study methodology, data collection techniques and
capacity building anticipated, are described fully in chapter three. The characteristics of
study areas, households, water consumption patterns, community researchers and
external stakeholders are presented in chapter four. The results and discussions of the
study are laid out in chapters five, six, seven and eight. Chapter nine presents the
conclusions and recommendations for the study and possible improvements and
implications for further research.
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
2.1 Introduction
Water is a social and ecological necessity and it is essential for life. Access to water is a
fundamental human right to meet human needs and sustain livelihoods. It is public trust to
be guarded by all levels of government and enshrined in national constitutions and
international agreements (Bond 2002; Global People's Forum, Water Commission
Statement, 2002). These principles govern the argument for the social, equitable and
common trust of water presented in this research. The impact of global neo-liberal policies
and international institutions on national and local policies and strategies are explored and
the instruments of privatisation, corporatisation and cost recovery are considered in light of
the increasing push towards the non-state delivery of water. Economic variables and
market forces, promoted by the dominant global economic paradigm, applied to the
resource and service delivery of water are expounded on through their impact on social
justice and equity imperatives. The responsibilities and accountabilities of government to
its citizens are considered in relation to the privatisation and takeover of public sector
delivery systems. Core to the discussion is the issue of national and international finance
options, which include the pricing and subsidisation of water delivery. The research
engages the South African context, in relation to the dominant paradigm, with particular
reflection on the structure and regulation of water service delivery systems, financial
frameworks, policy initiatives and water disconnections. Public sector alternatives and
strategies for challenging the inflexible global paradigm and national policies are examined.
2.2 Right to water
The South African constitution guarantees all people the right to access adequate and
affordable potable water to meet basic domestic needs; and 'water and sanitation services
should be delivered equitably, affordably, effectively, efficiently and sustainably to satisfy
sector goals' (Draft White Paper on Water Services, 2002 p8; De Waal et ai, 2001; White
Paper on National Water Policy for South Africa, 1997). Rights, as argued by Calland
(2002), often represent a minimum core (tangible minimum that is available to all, without
contest), which often represents the entirety of the right itself. "The right to water is not an
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absolute right- it is subject to specific obligations such as payment for services (over and
above the basic amount) and the limitation or disconnection of the services in certain
circumstances" (Draft White Paper on Water Services, 2002 p33). The South African
government "is to take reasonable legislative measures within its available resources to
achieve the progressive realisation of these rights' (Draft White Paper on Water Services,
2002 p33). It is argued, that "progressive realisation of these rights' provides leeway for
government to implement the rights in the time frame that they see fit, as well as on the
condition of resource availability (South African Municipal Workers Union [SAMWU],
2003). However, the duty to "take steps' together with the obligation to guarantee the right
to non-discrimination and equality, mutual respect and protection (Office of the High
,
Commissioner for Human Rights, 2002 Art. 2.2), constitute obligations of immediate effect
(Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2002). Retrogressive measures taken
in relation to the right, or failure to exercise due diligence to prevent retrogressive measures
taken by third parties, are prohibited under the Economic, Social and Cultural Covenant
(Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2002).
2.3 Global neo-liberal policies and institutions
Globalisation implores us to view water service delivery and water resources within the
current international paradigm as it has implications for national and local water service
delivery strategies. The pressure exerted on South Africa by the World Trade Organisation
(WTO) to ratify the General Agreement on Trade in Services; the provision of funding by
the Bretton Woods Institutions on condition of privatising public services; South Africa's
economic policy: the Growth, employment and redistribution strategy (GEAR) and the
New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) which are based on cost-recovery
mechanisms; as well as transnational corporations eager to win service contracts in South
Africa, have implied that profit-motives are increasingly attached to water services. "The
immediate effect of the world now implementing privatisation programmes or vast global
sell-off of public services, is the creation of a global buyer's market." Hence, in a neo-
liberal environment, water is anyones' business, public control is declining and the rights to
ownership and management of basic resources are equal for local and international entities
(Keet, 2000b p16).
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The Doha Declaration, arising from the November 2001 round of WTO negotiations, calls
for the inclusion of all 'environmental services' in the WTO trade rules (Blue Planet
Project, 2002 pI). This means that water services will be targets for transnational
companies wanting to use WTO rules to force the privatisation of water services (all
countries that fall under the WTO are obliged to conform and accept WTO rules and
agreements). Under the WTO, water is seen as a commodity in the global market place, a
tradable good, and as a private business (Blue Planet Project, 2002). The WTO can
therefore promote the privatisation of public water services, economic considerations may
compromise human rights or environmental protections, and 'unfavourable' local laws that
govern transnational corporations can be overturned and adapted (Blue Planet Project, 2002
pI). Incoming WTO Director General Supachai Panitchpakdi was quoted as saying, "We
are now approaching a new era. The WTO is used to dealing with only external issues and
now is the time to deal with the domestic regulations that impede trade liberalisation" (Blue
Planet Project, 2002 p2). Hence, laws that ensured social services and the safeguarding of
water can now be ruled as 'non-trade barriers' and abandoned. This includes subjecting
domestic laws (municipal laws) to the power of the WTO. Hence, the implications of
macro-economic or tight fiscal constraints place direct adverse pressures both on capital
investment and operating budgets of public services (Keet, 2000a). Furthermore, WTO
rules provide for the transfer of public water services into private hands, thereby decreasing
public control of an essential resource (Blue Planet Project, 2002 p2).
World Bank and International Monetary Fund policies are at the forefront of instituting
private sector water delivery (Blue Planet Project, 2002). The International Monetary Fund
frequently makes water privatisation and cost recovery a requirement of its structural
adjustment loans, and these requirements then become conditions for additional loans (Blue
Planet Project, 2002; Hall, date unknown). The privatisation agendas of the World Bank
and International Monetary Fund are made apparent by a recent study highlighting that
International Monetary Fund loan agreements in 12 out of 40 countries included conditions
imposing water privatisation and full cost recovery. The World Bank's portfolio for water
projects currently accounts for 14% of its lending; and international private investments in
water supply to developing countries, virtually nil before 1990, increased to $25 billion by
the end of 1997 (Streeter, 2002; Hall, date unknown). It is not surprising, therefore, that
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many groups are lobbying for development agencIes and institutions to not force
privatisation through requiring public water systems to be privatised as a condition for
receiving loans or debt relief (public Citizen, 2002b). The World Bank has privatisation as
its core policy, which is evident by its 'Private Sector Development Strategy,' which
promotes private sector involvement in basic service delivery (Hall and Bayliss, 2002 p2).
The World Bank makes little effort to address alternative public sector approaches.
Instead, lending frequently carries the conditions of private sector service delivery. It
would be surprising if the public sector could not extend infrastructure services if they were
provided with the same support and resources (in terms of finance and guarantees) that are
made available to the private sector (Hall and Bayliss, 2002). However, the World Bank
ignores the success of well-structured public sector reforms, based on democracy and
popular administration commitment, which have extended infrastructure services
significantly and achieved recognised success. The South African rural electrification
programme is an example of such success after 1994, which reduced the number of homes
without electricity from 65% to 30% by 2000 (Hall and Bayliss, 2002).
2.4 Privatisation
Around the world, transnational corporations are pursuing one of the last frontiers for profit
making: privatising water services (Public Citizen, 2002b). "Some industries should never
be privatised, and water is one of them," says Jamie Dunn, water campaigner of Blue
Planet, a Canadian NOO (cited by Streeter, 2002 p18). "Businesses are not in the
benevolence business, their first obligation is to their shareholders and to make a profit.
That's the wrong motive when we're talking about water, a basic human right" (cited by
Streeter, 2002 p18). Business efficiency or pursuit of profit, if left to itself, can be
extremely damaging in social and environmental terms and ultimately unsustainable (Keet,
2000b). However, despite the fault line between those seeing water as a right and those
seeing water as an economic good, the 'blue-gold rush' continues unabated, with the
private sector seizing water supplies and water resources, from global to local levels
(Overseas Development Institute, 2002 p3). The domination of the water utility market is
headed by six major transnational companies and by 2010 are expected to increase their
overall share in markets worth $20bn in Africa, Asia and Latin America. By this time, the
private sector will account for between 20% and 60% ofall water and sanitation services
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supplied in these continents (Overseas Development Institute, 2002). The two dominant
global water corporations are French transnationals: Vivendi and Suez (Bond 2002; Hall,
date unknown). Ranked 51 st and 99th among the Fortune's Global 500 list, these two water
giants capture nearly 40% of the existing global water market share, providing water-
related services to over 100 million people each. Vivendi operates in over 100 countries
and Suez in over 130 countries with their combined annual revenues over $70 billion
(including $19 billion in water and waste services) (Bond 2002). The total global water
market accounts for approximately 4 trillion US dollars per year (Bond, 2001). The South
Africa government has not escaped privatisation's clutches and is one of 29 countries
targeted by European multinational corporations to support more privatisation and the
deregulation in many public service sectors- including water, waste and energy services
(Polaris Institute, 2002). Table 2.1 provides a visual depiction of the rapid rate of
privatisation of water and sanitation services globally.
Table 2.1: Projected proportion of water and sanitation services privatised globally
for 1997,;,2010 (Streeter, 2002 p19, citing Vivendi 2002).
Western Euro e* 20 35 10
Central and Eastern Euro e 4 20 4
North America 5 15 9
Latin America 4 60 9
Africa 3 33 3
Asia 1 20 10
*Excluding France and UK
The disappointing performance of governments in water service delivery (characterised by
low coverage rates, high water loss rates, low levels of cost recovery and poor quality of
water provided), coupled with the substantial market possibilities of water, has led to a
surge of private sector investment in water services (HRH Prince of Orange, 2002; Streeter,
2002). Discourse in the privatisation debate states that privatisation of water-service
provision does not imply privatisation of water resources- just the service delivery (HRH,
Prince of Orange, 2002). However, when privatisation exists and profit motives are
implemented, it is both the service delivery and the water resources that are privatised
(citizens pay for the service delivery and the water). In a case study of the Delhi Water
16
plant, India, the private company (Suez-Degremont) sourced the water free but the rural
citizens had to pay the full economic, social and environmental costs of the water resource!
(Shiva, 2002). Deregulation of once-sacred public services, such as electricity and health
care, provided a lucrative precedent. International and national organisations have
emphasised private sector provision of municipal water services as a potential solution to
the major problems in the sector as well as providing the 'carrot' incentive to private
companies of the potential to make substantial profits. Private companies were seen by
many, and saw themselves, primarily in a saviour role, capable of bringing market
discipline and the principles of competition and productivity to a government sector of
ineptitude (Streeter, 2002). It was acknowledged that private sector resources, applied
skilfully and conscientiously, could lift a huge burden from the shoulders of governments
and transform the lives of citizens (Streeter, 2002). Consequently, governments in many
developing countries have signed long-term contracts for the private provision of these
services in major metropolitan areas (HRH Prince of Orange, 2002). Most of these
contracts have been awarded to major consortia with European multinational companies as
partners, owing to the massive scale of investments and services required. This is proving
problematic as, not only are the profits returning to international coffers or to subsidise
other global investments, but water services are not continually subject to powerful market
force competition. The contract holder usually becomes a monopoly on services for, in
most cases, decades and unsatisfactory concessions are often difficult to terminate (Streeter,
2002; Keet, 2000b; Hall, date unknown).
One of the core arguments made in favour of privatising municipal services is that the
private sector is more efficient than the public sector, thereby reducing costs to the end user
and freeing resources for the state to be used for development needs (Hall, date unknown).
A second argument for privatisation is that it generates better public accountability. The
contrary has been shown in national and international research.
I The water for the Suez-Degremont plant in Delhi was sourced from the Tehri Dam. The dam had
displaced 100 000 people (many of them farmers, who lost both their land and access to water).
The dam cost millions of rupees to build and was built on a seismic fault in the ecologically fragile
Bhagirathi Valley (Shiva, 2002).
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Trends in extensive international research indicate that privatlsmg municipal services
results in an increase in prices, a deterioration of service quality and the reluctance of
private corporations to extend services to the poor (Hall, date unknown). Such was the case
in the Puerto Rico concession with a Vivendi subsidiary called Compania de Aguas, where
water access decreased; maintenance, operating and monitoring systems deteriorated;
customer service declined and financial mismanagement occurred (Hall, date unknown).
Research is revealing more variable results and problematic economic effects of
privatisation than the initial efficiency theories predicted, even in the more developed
countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (Martin, 1995
cited by Keet, 2000b p16). There is a lack of transparency, decisions are taken in secret,
public debate is minimal, and independent regulators and monitors are co-opted by private
sector influences and are often effectively marginalised (Hall and Bayliss, 2002; Hall, date
unknown). Although it is recognised that corruption occurs in public service undertakings
as well, privatisation erects greater barriers to transparency, the size and scale of the
business opportunities involved provide companies with greater incentives to pay bribes,
leading to 'state capture' and corruption by private companies. A simple but acute example
of private sector deceit is where transnational corporations mimic local languages or names
to make their companies more acceptable to local countries e.g. 'Siza Water,' a subsidiary
of Saur International, of France, operating in the KwaDukuza Municipality, KwaZulu-Natal
(Bond, 2002). Contract documents for water concessions frequently have secrecy clauses
written into them, are protected by commercial confidentiality and contract negotiations are
conducted behind closed doors (Pauw, 2003; Hall and Bayliss, 2002). A senior water
manager, working for the City of Cape Town (2002), described the force of private
multinational corporations in pushing for private sector contracts, in the following
statement, "Lyonnais des Eaux has come knocking on my door on two occasions. These
French water companies have become too powerful to resist. The take over is inevitable"
(cited by McDonald, 2002 p27).
Although this paper's argument and research indicates that increasing globalisation, faster
economic growth and privatisation are unsustainable at every level and infringe on the
rights of citizens, many countries, including the South African government, are buying-in
to the current paradigm (Grusky, 2002 cited by Bond, 2002; RDSN, 2002). To illustrate an
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example of the degree of pro-privatisation bias, Nelson Mandela, former president of South
Africa, stated that 'privatisation is the fundamental policy of our government. Call me a
Thatcherite, if you will' (cited by Bond, 2001). It is therefore disconcerting that recent
efforts to dull the privatisation drive have been thwarted as the fresh water outcomes of the
World Summit on Sustainable Development failed to institute efforts to limit or regulate
privatisation.
2.5 Public sector inefficiencies
There is an assumption that wherever privatisation occurs, it is the result of the inefficiency
of the previous public sector provider (Hall, date unknown). This assumption is not always
true. Public service delivery can be just as efficient and effective as private sector delivery
(HRH Prince of Orange, 2002). Public sector provision of water and sanitation is not in
itself a cause of inefficiency or an inferior basis for service delivery (HRH Prince of
Orange, 2002). Ninety five percent (95%) of municipal water services are provided by the
public sector, including in the USA, Europe and Japan (HRH Prince of Orange, 2002;
Streeter, 2002). Indicators show that public sector undertakings compare well with their
private sector counterparts and many public sector institutions have achieved major
efficiency gains, without privatisation or public private partnerships (Hall, date unknown).
This is evident in Sao Paulo, Brazil; Lilongwe, Malawi; Sri Lanka; Hydrebad, India;
Debrecen, Hungary and Tegucigalpa, Honduras where public sector reforms have increased
access, public accountability, reduced unaccounted for water usage and water charges
(Hall, date unknown).
Public sector 'inefficiencies' are not the sole reason for considering private sector options.
Privatisation may be considered to reduce government debt and improve municipal balance
sheets (Hall, date unknown). Privatisation is expected to benefit national government or
municipal finances by using the proceeds of a sale to reduce their debts or deficits.
However, this can conflict with the financial needs of the water service itself because the,
cost that a company is willing to pay to obtain a concession will depend on the profit
stream that the private company can expect, which sequentially will be affected by the price
it charges to users, and how generous the operating conditions are (such as the regulation
mechanisms present). Therefore, what is good for the government's finances is not
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necessarily best for water users and taxpayers (Hall, date unknown). Hence, schemes are
often designed that are amicable and affordable to governments and local municipalities,
rather than to households (Hall, date unknown). A stark example of such activities is
illustrated by the Budapest water supply concession (1997), which was awarded not to the
consortium which offered the most reasonable price for water, but to the consortium- led by
Suez-Lyonnaise and RWE- "which promised the council an extra 3 billion florints in
payment- although the price of water to consumers was higher by 3 florints per cubic metre
than any another bid" (Hall, date unknown, p9). An additional example of privatisation's
negative effects on water users is that private companies often do not provide investment in
desperately needed restructuring, rehabilitation and expansion of service utilities, as was
shown in La Paz, Bolivia. This is an important consideration, considering that not all
citizens are connected to national reticulation systems, especially in South Africa and other
developing countries. Research also illustrates that when one of the motives is raising
money to finance municipal budgets, there is an unscrupulous motive to privatise the most
financially efficient water undertakings, as they will obtain a higher level of cost recovery
and subsequent profit margins (Hall, date unknown). Hence, the phrase, "cherry picking or
red-lining," whereby contracts are designed for private companies to take the most
profitable aspect of water supplies, leaving governments with the most expensive service
areas (usually rural communities) thereby reducing the scope for cross-subsidisation- the
traditional foundation for universal public services (Hall and Bayliss, 2002). McDonald
(2002) argues that the most revealing indication of privatisation impulses driving urban
policy in central government is the fact that there is no parallel organisation to the
Municipal Infrastructure Investment Unit2 at a national level to promote and conduct
research on how best to improve and extend public sector service delivery.
2.6 Corporatisation of water services
"In many countries, government authorities and the management of state enterprises are
faced with trade union and broader public opposition to privatisation" (Keet, 2000b p17).
2 The aim of the Municipal Infrastructure Investment Unit (MIIU) is to promote and optimise private
sector involvement in municipalities (local government). The MIIU has been active in promoting and
financing the privatisation and corporatisation of municipal services and has provided advice and
funding to dozens of municipalities in the country along these lines (McDonald, 2002).
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Thus, they have adopted the compromise approach of 'commercialisation' or delicately
termed 'restructuring' of state owned enterprises, particularly public utilities, while leaving
them formally under public ownership (Keet, 2000b p17).
"Commercialisation is a process of 'creating an arm's_length service entity that is formally
owned and operated by the state but which is ring fenced?' financially and managerially
from other services" (Shirley 1999, PWC 1999, POG 2001 cited by Smith, 2002 p43). This
approach is taken when the state cannot discard all responsibility by simply selling off state
utilities. Commercialisation's underlying intention is 'to gradually and piecemeal, but
inexorably, transfer public assets into private and foreign hands' (Keet, 2000b p16). This
is often an "immediate measure to make the entity in question more efficient, profitable and
attractive, prior to its sale" (Keet, 2000b p18). 'Cost recovery' and 'user fees' are
introduced with the effect of reduced accessibility and utilisation of services. An additional
aspect of corporatisation is the outsourcing of core and non-core services, whereby services
undergo unbundling by contracting out aspects of the services to private enterprises, thus
reducing the control of state utilities (Smith, 2002).
When basic needs and human rights, or development imperatives are no longer viewed as
such, services are not sustained by public resources and become increasingly subjected to
profitability criteria, to the pressures of vested commercial interests and to market forces
(Sanders et ai, 1996, cited by Keet, 2000b). Commercial criteria, when applied to public
social services, are counter-productive to human resource development and capacity
3As a form of internal reorganisation, corporatisation involves the financial or managerial ring
fencing of public utilities (Smith, 2002). Financial ring fencing's objectives are to create a
transparent form of accounting where all income and expenditures associated with service delivery,
can be identified, along with subsidies in and out of the ring fenced unit. Ring fencing separates all
financial and human resources directly involved in the delivery of a particular service from all other
service functions. This is intended to reveal the real costs/surpluses of running a service and to
allow managers to identify areas of financial loss/gain that may otherwise have been hidden in the
intricate accounting systems and cross-subsidisation mechanisms of an integrated service delivery
scheme with centralised accounting. Financial ring fencing also creates an opportunity to introduce
financially driven performance targets and hence makes public utilities attractive to private
corporations who have the expertise to ensure a positive financial bottom-line (Smith, 2002). The
Director General of DWAF, Mike Muller, reiterated government's ring fencing agenda by stating that,
"water services must be ring fenced by local authorities" (Muller, 2003; presentation to DWAF
portfolio committee).
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building, with the cumulative effect of aggravating the social and political as well as the
financial burdens of government (UNDP, 1994-1996, cited by Keet, 2000b). This
perception of creeping 'privatisation and commodification' of water, critics argue, negates
important basic human rights, equity and justice, and undermines government
responsibility and capacity to uphold provision of these rights (Overseas Development
Institute, 2002). Without clearly defined procedures, full transparency and rigorous
scrutiny, the restructuring of state assets in many countries, is proving, in the main, to be a
self-serving process of manipulation by privatisation proponents, who are well positioned
in the economy to take advantage of privatisation exercises, or strategically-placed or
politically influential (Weekly Mail, 1996, cited by Keet, 2000b). The "self-serving
motivations of the proponents of privatisation, as well as the effects of the whole process
are extremely questionable" (Keet, 2000b p17).
Water should remain a public resource within local control. However, critical public sector
reforms are needed to ensure public development goals: public sector utilities are in
desperate need of restructuring, requiring public sector reform rather than take-over by
private interests. "Development of well-run public water systems that serve the entire
population should therefore be a priority" (public Citizen, 2002b p2).
2.7 Government responsibility and accountability
Those proponents standing on neutral ground maintain that irrespective of the approach
chosen (public or private), governments maintain a major responsibility for providing an
effective and efficient regulatory framework and enabling environment within which the
service providers operate and the water use rights of citizens are upheld (HRH, Prince of
Orange, 2002; Water Action Unit, 2002). This legal and regulatory framework should
constitute a commitment to pro-poor service delivery based on the principles of equity and
sustainability; and platforms and rights should be implemented to ensure citizens engage in
the political process and hold governments or local authorities accountable (HRH, Prince of
Orange, 2002; Water Action Unit, 2002; Hall, date unknown). One such legal policy is the
South African Municipal Systems Act, which stipulates that municipalities first assess and
reorganise internal delivery mechanisms prior to the consideration of private sector delivery
(cited by Weekes, 2001). However, this Act is limited by an absence of indicators that
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measure if and how sufficient efforts have been implemented in the reorganising of internal
delivery systems prior to the abandonment of public delivery to private delivery options.
The partnering of the private sector, government and civil society has been one recent
innovation in an attempt to capture the relative strengths of each. institutional form and
assign roles based on these strengths. Finding role complementarily has proved elusive;
however not least because of the different institutional time-horizons and motivations for
participation involved in partnership processes (Caplan et aI, 2001 cited by Overseas
Development Institute, 2002). However, if a partnership process is initiated, the key issue
is seen as a balance between private sector efficiency (including a commitment to national
priorities to meet the needs of the poor) and public sector enforcement and regulation
(Overseas Development Institute, 2002; DWAF, 2002). Although it is purported that the
public sector option should always be constructed and considered; ultimately, the decision
on whether or not to allow private sector participation rests with governments and their
people who must take into account their historical and cultural backgrounds (Water Action
Unit, 2002; Hall, date unknown). These decisions, if taken by informed, capacitated and
well-intentioned individuals, would be the preferred option; however, as stated in section
2.6; this is seldom the case. The South African government has made limited attempts to
commit themselves (budgets and political will) to public sector options thus far.
2.8 South African local government structure and regulation systems
Worldwide, approximately 95% of water delivery services are handled by municipal
utilities (HRH Prince of Orange, 2002; Streeter, 2002). The South African local
government has the primary constitutional responsibility to provide basic water and
sanitation services to people living within its boundaries (DWAF, 2002). Local
government, as stated by DWAF (2002), is an independent sphere of government and is
assigned the executive authority by national government for the provision of water and
sanitati~services...~I resources and municipal capacities differ with the implication
that some municipalities may achieve greater access and efficiency gains. This includes
setting tariffs and making bylaws. Provincial and national government have the duty to
monitor, support and regulate local government as well as set national standards. However
they are not permitted to take actions that may undermine local government's ability to
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exercise its' executive authority. This decentralised structure relies on cooperation between
the various spheres ofgovernment. Figure 2.1 conceptualises the water services regulatory
framework (DWAF, 2002 p32).
Figure 2.1: A conceptual framework for water services provision (DWAF,2002 p32).
The decentralisation of government service provision and hence the allocation of
responsibility for water services to local government, as well as the separation ofthe role of
the water service authority from the function ofwater service provision, indicates that a two
part regulatory system is necessary (DWAF, 2002). The first regulatory system entails that
water service providers (resource and/or service providers) are regulated by water service
authorities (typically through service contractual agreements). The second regulatory
system requires that water service authorities (local government) are regulated by national
government to ensure that the objectives ofgovernment (vision and objectives ofthe water
services sector) are realised and that there is compliance with the relevant legislation
(DWAF, 2002). "The national regulatory function has jurisdiction over the contracts set up
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by water service authorities with water service providers and is able to assist in regulating
and enforcing contracts, if and when necessary" (DWAF, 2002 p32).
'Customers' contract with the WSP by honouring their municipal consolidated bill
payments and the 'citizens' are protected by the WSA (regulated by national government)
who ensure that their rights to water are upheld. However, the line between 'customers and
citizens' may be hazy in that rights may differ and be determined by payment abilities
above social considerations. Although the legal framework has been set in place, to date a
regulatory system to give utility to the legal framework has not been implemented
comprehensively (Muller, 2003). The regulatory system framework, presented in
figure 2.1, appears to be sufficient in regulating the provision of water services. However,
its implementation efficiency remains to be seen in the experiences of citizens to water
service provision, the mechanisms implemented to support water service delivery, the
implementation of regulation and monitoring systems, the conformity of local government
to national government objectives and the powers of the national government to implement
punitive measures on defaulting WSAs (municipalities).
2.9 Full cost recovery
Full cost recovery is a market-based policy, which includes both financial and economic
functions. The financial function is where water users pay, through charges, the full supply
costs of operation (service provision, billing, disposing and wastewater treatment),
maintenance and capital investment in the system (Public Citizen, 2002a; Shiva, 2002;
Cosgrove and Rijisberman, 2000; Hall, date unknown). The economic function requires
that water rates reflect the scarcity value (long-term marginal productivity/utility cost: the
cost of supplying an additional unit of water including the social cost of externalities) and
the opportunity costs (the value of water in its best use) of the resource across uses (Saleth,
2001). When full cost recovery was proposed at the 2nd World Water Forum at The Hague
in March 2000, it was rejected in its simple form: the international ministerial declaration
agreed only to 'move towards' pricing water to reflect costs, emphasising the need to "take
account of the need for equity and the basic needs of the poor and the vulnerable" (Hall,
date unknown p20). Cosgrove and Rijisberman (2000) argue that full cost pricing should be
accompanied by targeted, transparent subsidies to low-income communities and
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individuals. Hence, public finance should be mobilised to cover capital investments and
provide social protection where users cannot afford the full costs of the necessary water and
sanitation programmes, thereby ensuring equity of water access (Hall, date unknown).
Wright (2002) states that while pricing systems must reflect the principle that affordability
should not be a barrier to accessing basic services, water institutions need to have reliable
streams of income. The economic prioritisation by water institutions is reflected in the
current financing agenda, whereby the concepts of demand-based development and user
financing of services has been firmly instituted (Overseas Development Institute, 2002).
The cost recovery model, consistent with international agreements on the provision of basic
services, is fundamental to the South African water delivery programme (RDSN, 2002).
There is now a strong move to the full-cost pricing of water services for all human uses,
based on the premise that scarcity exists, therefore water must be treated as an economic
good, for the full economic value of water and the cost of providing water services should
be recovered from all who can afford it (HRH, Prince of Orange, 2002; Cosgrove and
Rijsberman,2000). However, the challenges arise when water service charges are extended
to people who actually cannot afford the service charges. Costs of water service provision,
based on economic versus social principles, ensure that social imperatives become
subservient to economic principles with the implication that water access is determined by
ability to pay indicators thereby compromising equity and the upholding of human rights
and dignity (Overseas Development Institute, 2002; Hall, unknown date).
The main difficulty with privatising and commercialising services is that it becomes
difficult for private companies to provide services to low-income households (DWAF
director-general Mike Muller, cited by Bond, 2003; Smith, 2002). Low-income households
are a risk to the financial bottom litle, as low-income households struggle to make their
payments. Furthermore, in pursuit of profit margins, private companies tend to service
households who can afford the services thereby making services less affordable or
accessible to poor sectors of society (Smith, 2002). Already, poverty and unemployment
make it difficult for a significant proportion of households to afford services and it is
generally women and children who bear the consequences of service disconnections as well
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as the responsibility for the collection of alternative sources of water (Bond, 2002; Public
Citizen, 2002a).
A prime example of the case against cost recovery was seen through the implementation of
prepaid4 water meters, implemented in rural KwaZulu-Natal, in mid-2000, where the
government converted free communal taps to a prepaid card system with a R50 registration
fee. Thousands of people were forced to restrict their use of or turn to unsafe water sources
as an alternative to a water service that they were economically denied (Human Sciences
Research Council [HSRC], 2002; Public Citizen, 2002a). The outcome was the largest
cholera epidemic in at least a quarter of a century, with 120 000 cases of cholera and the
loss of 265 lives (Hemson, cited by Pauw 2003; Hall and Bayliss, 2002; RDSN, 2002).
This case is ironic as the costs of health care treatment and prompt water service delivery
via tankers, cost the government millions of rands (McDonald, cited by Pauw 2003). It is
important to note that prepaid meters and water cut offs are illegal in the United Kingdom
where they have been seen as inconsistent with sustainable development and act as a barrier
for low-income households' access to water for health and hygiene purposes (Hall, 2002).
"Ultimately, cost recovery measures could become the key stumbling block to the
achievement of democracy and the realisation of the development dreams of the liberation
struggle in South Africa" (HSRC, 2002 p2).
2.10 Financing water
A constraint in addressing the Issues related to water is the difficulty of mobilising
adequate finance to implement water service delivery and access programmes (Overseas
Development Institute, 2002; Hall, date unknown). Africa's and the developing world's
current level of underdevelopment means that there is limited scope for raising the
necessary capital from local financial markets and institutions as well as the fact that long-
4 Prepaid meters are a cost recovery tool used by municipalities for the service delivery of water and
electricity. Municipalities receive payment for services from consumers up-front; it reduces
administration costs; it removes debt liability; and local authorities no longer have to contract
workers to implement cut affs (Deedat, 2002). Prepaid meters work on the premise that one
purchases what one can afford; if one cannot pay for the prepaid card then one automatically self-
disconnects one's household from a water supply (Deedat, 2002).
27
term payback periods are required Wright, 2002). Hence, the developing world has to look
to internationalS support for financial assistance through private and donor financing or
regional and international banks (Wright, 2002). This is verified by Wright (2002), who
states that economic growth and integration in the global economy is the only way to access
long term finance, and is consistent with the path taken by Africa's economic policy, the
New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). The conundrum is that international
support is often provided on the condition of private sector delivery and hence creates
political obstacles to the achievement of social goals. Further indication of Africa's
financing intentions are shown through the African position paper on water which states
that, "participation by the private sector in water service provision will be supported,
provided that there are adequate safeguards, specifically for the interests of the poor, and
generally for the achievement ofNEPAD's goals" and the 'priorities for Action in Water'
which include: establishing sustainable organisations and mechanisms for improved
financing and cost-recovery in water resource management, development, allocation and
service delivery (cited by Wright, 2002 p22). The problem with Wright's (2002) argument,
besides the obvious reliance on cost-recovery, is that the 'safe guards' he refers to, are
frequently not given the priority necessary for universal access and affordability. The
financing path, prioritising privatisation and cost recovery, should be challenged as
developing countries should be able to choose how their water service delivery goals are to
be met and should not be forced to implement private sector delivery to secure their loans
thereby compromising the equitability of water access to their citizens.
The afore-mentioned paragraphs show that water allocation and pncmg decisions are
primarily economically and politically motivated (Water Action Unit, 2002). However,
whatever the schemes and the philosophy behind the financial means chosen, funds for
water provision have to come from one of the following sources: water users through water
charges (including cross subsidies either through different categories of users: rich/poor,
5 Governments currently dedicate only two percent of national budgets to water services and only six
percent of Official Development Assistance is directed to water services (Global People's Forum,
Water Commission Statement, 2002). Furthermore, there is a substantial gap for funding
investments in water infrastructure, maintenance, training and capacity building, research and data
generation and for the commitment to pro-poor water service delivery (Global People's Forum,
Water Commission Statement, 2002; Bonn Recommendations for Action, 2001).
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domestic/commerce/industry/agriculture; geographical or community-based finance);
resident citizens through taxes and government expenses (internally generated surpluses,
public investment funds, government grants or loans, municipal development funds, bank
loans, bond financing); world citizens through development funds (aid agencies,
international development financing from public and private sources and development
banks); and capital markets (Water Action Unit, 2002; Bonn Recommendations for Action,
200 I; Hall, date unknown).
The South African government's proposed financial framework for the financing of South
Africa's water delivery systems is conceptualised in figure 2.2 and prioritises the following
financial sources for water delivery (DWAF, 2002 p33):
• Capital investment subsidies through the consolidated municipal infrastructure
grant (MIG). This is a conditional grant which the Department of Water Affairs
and Forestry (DWAF) negotiates with the National Treasury and Department of
Provincial and Local Government concerning appropriate conditionalities on the
grant to ensure financial mobilisation for municipalities to support water and
sanitation sector objectives.
• Operating costs subsidised by government through the local government equitable
share (ES). The equitable share is provided for by the annually enacted Division
of Revenue Act (Bond, 2003). This is an unconditional grant and it is not possible
for DWAF to impose direct conditions on the use of the grant. However, it is
possible for DWAF to indirectly influence the use of this grant through the
regulation of the financial contract between the Water Service Authorities (WSAs)
and the Water Service Providers (WSPs).
• Capacity development subsidies through a single capacity development grant
(CS). This is a conditional grant, which DWAF will negotiate with the Department
of Provincial and Local Government and National Treasury to ensure adequate
resources are made available for the development of appropriate WSA capacity.
• Tariffs, through user-charges applied by WSAs and for WSPs, which will be
regulated in terms of the national economic regulatory framework which ensures
that tariff structures are compliant with the relevant legislation and regulations and
that the tariff levels provide a fair return on assets (DWAF, 2002).
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Figure 2.2: Proposed water services fmancial framework (DWAF, 2002 p33).
Although, as proposed by the Department ofWater Affairs and Forestry (2002), numerous
options of financing systems are available, intergovernmental transfers from national to
local government have decreased (McDonald, 2002). Local governments are being asked
to do more with less to satisfY the service delivery mandates proposed by national
legislation and policy (McDonald, 2002). A critical question therefore is, is it possible for
local government to assume full financial and operational responsibility for water and
sanitation services, as provided by the constitution?
2.11 Water pricing
Water pricing policy is (in practice) an attempt to cater for different objectives (economic,
political, social and environmental). It is therefore understandable that different groups
have different priorities and motives and that these interests are frequently in conflict (Hall,
date unknown). Water pricing is becoming an increasingly important aspect of water
selVice delivery and accessibility owing to the increasing pressure by neo-liberal policies in
forcing privatisation and full cost recovery on governments and municipalities. Water
pricing and its twin incumbent, full cost recovery, are the first steps in ensuring the
framework for private sector involvement. When water is provided with an economic
value, the market forces have the potential to play a large role e.g. private corporations are
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provided with a profit-motive incentive to capture public sector water utilities (Blue Planet
Project, 2002). However, social-good proponents state that water pricing policies must take
into account social and environmental needs; hence the twin goals of accessibility and
conservation (Hall, date unknown). Water pricing poEcies developed along holistic
frameworks by public institutions (based on the assessment of social, economic, political
and environmental objectives and public considerations, consensus and a sustainable way
of attaining them) are often more effective in pricing the true value of water compared with
private sector companies who are often confined to simple financial objectives or bottom-
line imperatives (Hall, date unknown). An example of such a holistic pricing framework is
indicated by Hazelton and Kondlo (1998), who found that consumers were more likely to
pay for water if pricing was equitable, service quality was adequate and reliable, and if the
water service authority was accepted by the people it served. Perhaps then, low-income
households' acceptability ofprice is the genuine indicator of targeting price accurately.
Water pricing must include the special financial constraints of low-income households. The
following points must therefore be considered: (1) low-income households spend the major
part of their income on service expenses to support their basic needs; (2) low-income
households prioritise their access to essential services; (3) low-income households spend a
larger proportion of their incomes on service access than do households that fall into higher
income brackets e.g. poor people in Africa, Asia and South America often pay between
20%-50% of their incomes for water and other services in comparison with households in
the developed world who pay a diminishing part of less than 1% for water (public Citizen,
2002b). This is consistent with Pauw's (2003) findings that poor households in South
Africa pay up to 40% of their incomes on water and electricity. As stated in section 1.1, a
statistically representative national survey, completed in July 2001, which sampled 2520
low-income households from across South Africa, found that basic service charges
typically represent a quarter to a half of total household income for 57 percent of the
households surveyed (Bond, 2001). The median cost for water, electricity, sewerage and
refuse removal services ranged from R224-R400 per month (Bond, 2001). These
affordability constraints left little monies for other necessities, such as food, education,
transport and medical expenses. Add households surviving just on a pension (R700 per
month) or households caring for people living with HIV/AIDS to the equation and it is
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recognised that South Africa faces a severe service affordability crisis (Bond, 2001).
Pricing of water and essential services should not decrease the access of these basic
services to low,.income households. It is imperative to recognise that access to an adequate
and affordable supply of safe drinking water is a basic human right and essential for
survival; this should be reflected in the pricing of water so as not to compromise social
goals (Public Citizen, 2002b).
2.12 Cross-subsidisation
Cross-subsidisation of the poor, by differentiating between social (domestic), economic
(commerce, industry and agriculture) or regional group users and charging them
accordingly, is generally regarded as a desirable redistributive, accessibility and
atTordability objective of water service providers (Hall, date unknown). The most common
method of cross-subsidisation is through the stepped or 'rising block' tariff, (different
households pay the costs of water in relation to a 'rising block' - hence each block is more
expensive than the previous one). Cross-subsidisation through amicably equated rising
block tariffs have the implication that the cost of water for poorer households is reduced
(Hall, date unknown). The usage of the rising block tariff system is seen as a sizable
reservoir for income redistribution, if the widths and prices of these blocks are carefully
chosen (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 1999). This
would permit everybody to obtain a minimum lifeline supply of water, with increased unit
charges for higher levels of consumption as well as including the important spin off
incentives to use water wisely, which is especially important in South Africa, which has
limited water resources (Ralo et aI, 2000).
As stated in the Draft White Paper on Water Services (2002), tariffs are the chief source of
revenue for water services in South Africa (over 80% are derived from the sale of water,
the remaining 20% are derived from taxes and subsidies). Tariffs are proposed to promote
financial and environmental sustainability and are based on the "principles of equity,
proportion to use (amount users pay should be in proportion to use of service),
atTordability, reflecting costs (costs associated with rendering the service), differentiation
(ditTerentiation between different categories of users, debtors, service providers, services,
service standards and geographical areas) and transparency" (Draft White Paper on Water
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Services, 2002 p37). DWAF, adhering to the water services act and the municipal systems
act is responsible for the regulation of tariffs (Draft White Paper on Water Services, 2002).
Libhaber, the World Bank's senior water and sanitation engineer in Latin America (cited by
Pauw, 2003), said that water and sanitation tariffs should be socially acceptable and that
they should not exceed certain payment thresholds of3-4% of household income, otherwise
people will simply be unable to pay (cited by Pauw, 2003). The World Health Organisation
put the tariff figure at 7% of household income. The South African tariff structure does not
meet the socially acceptable tariff rates as stated by Libhaber (3-4%), the World Health
Organisation (7%) or the above Draft White Paper on Water Services' tariff principles.
This is supported by the World Health Organisation, which states that "South Africans are
paying too much for their water" and the countrywide study (2002) released by the
Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG), which indicates that
municipalities are 'charging unaffordable and unreasonably high service rates' (cited by
Pauw, 2003 pS). Inadequately structured tariffs are causing major affordability problems
and ensuring that local councils are owed millions of rand in outstanding water payments as
low-income households struggle to pay the charges (pauw, 2003).
Alternative cross-subsidisation mechanisms6 include a tax-based approach (implemented in
the United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand) where charges are based on property
values, rather than consumption hence allowing for the cross-subsidy from those with more
valuable properties to those with less (Hall, date unknown). Solidarity charges are another
approach, whereby affluent users (high income groups able to afford commercial rates), or
those with their own connection, pay a supplement designed to cover the cost of supplying·
water to poorer users (Hall, date unknown). These systems could have a significant impact
in South Africa, as many people are not yet connected to reticulation systems and those
people already connected to such systems under apartheid, could contribute to new water
connections (Hall, date unknown). Solidarity charges have received widespread support
from numerous low-income groups within South Africa (Hall, date unknown).
6 The proposed alternative cross-subsidisation options should be accompanied by sound water
demand management practices with special consideration to the capacity of on-site water disposal
systems, level of sanitation services and water scarcities (Pfaff, 2003).
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Designing and managing such progressive and redistributive tariff systems therefore
present key challenges for governments and authorities, who have to consider numerous
facets in accuracy, justice and equity within subsidisation mechanisms (Hall, date
unknown).
2.13 The free basic water policy
The South African government implemented the free basic water (FBW) policy in July
2001 (RDSN, 2002). To date, 26.8 million people have access to FBW7, 12 mi11ion of
which are poor people who would otherwise have been unable to afford a basic supply of
potable water (Muller, 2003). The free basic water policy is a strategy initiative to ensure
all South Africans (or at least those who cannot afford it) have access to a basic amount of
safe water by 2004 (DWAF, 2002). The Department of Water Affairs and Forestry's Vote
34 states that 'the free basic water policy is a further step within broad municipal and
intergovernmental policy towards the goal of access to basic water for all' (DWAF Vote
34, 2003). The FBW policy entitles all people to a free lifeline supply of water of 6000
litres/6 kilolitres (kl) per household per month; or 200 litres per household per day; or 25
litres per 8-member household per day (DWAF, 2002; RDSN, 2002; Ralo et aI, 2000). The
policy was initiated as the majority of poor South Africans could not afford to pay the ful1
cost of water services (even if the required payment was minimal) and were therefore
constrained by economic determinants in accessing the minimum requirement of water to
satisfy their daily needs (DWAF, 2002; Hall, date unknown). Furthermore, the costs of
water were forcing households to prioritise food over water with the implication that
available monies were spent on securing food and alternative avenues were sought to·
secure water e.g. rivers or ground water- certain sources were not potable and led to severe
health implications (DWAF, 2002). It is acknowledged that access to a minimum amount
of potable water is essential for public health and environmental protection, as a kick-start
to local economic development, to break the apartheid inheritance of inequality in basic
service delivery and to ensure that fundamental human needs are met (Ralo et aI, 2000).
7 It is important to note that access to FBW does not necessarily mean that the 26.8 million people
served are actually accessing the FBW utility (hence are using less than 6kl per month). Hence, these
statistics may be misleading.
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Although the FBW policy has been heralded internationally, it does have a considerable
number of flaws. The first error is that the 'basic' allocation of 25 litres per 8-member
household is apparently inadequate and does not meet the basic water requirements
necessary for the health and well being of households (AIDC, 2002). DWAF (1994)
acknowledges this by saying that 25 litres is not adequate for a full, healthy and productive
life; but it can be considered a minimum (cited by Dube, 2000). Therefore, by DWAF's
own assertion, the South African government is providing a minimum that does not meet
health and productive life objectives. Furthermore, the derivation of the 25-litre allocation
is devoid of any scientific calculations (AIDC, 2002). The Msunduzi (pietermaritzburg)
proposed interim policy implementation states the following: "consumption greater than an
average of 200-litres per household per day is assumed to be more than the basic
requirement' and that the 'World Health Organisation recommends that the basic water
requirement is 25-litres per person per day' (Msunduzi Municipality, 2001 p61). Both the
assumption and the stated WHO recommendation are incorrect. The basic water
requirement as recommended by the WHO is actually 50-litres per person per day (Fiil
Flynn, 2001; Ralo et aI, 2000), and is consistent with the widely adopted findings of Gleick
(1996). SAMWU (2002) revisited Gleick's (1996) study and put the basic water
requirement at 63- litres per person per day (a 26% increase). However, AIDC (2002)
indicated that even 63-litres per person per day might be insufficient as SAMWU's (2002)
figures exclude the special water requirements of children, the aged and people living with
HIV/AIDS7• The rural development services network [RDSN] (2003) found that 'the
average township or urban household uses between 20-24kl per month'. This is a far
greater consumption than provided by the FBW allocation of 6kl. Household size is absent
from allocations and the FBW policy is based on the inaccurate assumption that low-
income households use less water because of their low-income status (Smith, 2002; Fiil
Flynn, 2001; Ralo et al, 2000). All of the above point to the fact that the FBW standard
bears no relationship to the basic water requirements of households; and puts the whole
FBW policy on shaky ground (AIDC, 2002). For the purposes of clarification, a basic
allocation benchmark of +63-litres per person per day (based on the research of SAMWU,
2002; AIDC, 2002; Gleick, 1996) is debated, in this study, as an adequate per person per
day allocation.
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The FBW policy is dependent on sufficient resources from the public budget and is covered
by local governments through national transfers and by recovering costs from those who
can afford to pay (Wright, 2002). It is argued that the policy is based on a cost-recovery
model instead of a subsidy from government and a tax on economic utilities, which are
high volume users (RDSN, 2002). Hence, the system will only be sustainable if
accompanied by cost-recovery measures and strict credit control mechanisms e.g. punitive
measures for non-payment. Regarding the afore-mentioned concerns, it remains to be seen
whether the South African government is considering the critical FBW challenges and
taking steps to address them.
2.14 Implications of disconnection of water supply
Current poverty and unemployment levels in South Africa make it difficult for a significant
proportion of households to afford basic service charges. Since 1994, millions of South
Africans have had their water cut off for non-payment of service bills, with the same
number having experienced an electricity cut off (Hall and Bayliss, 2002; HSRC, 2002;
Bond, 2001). Added to this figure, approximately 2 million people have subsequently been
evicted from their homes for non-payment of their bonds (Hall and Bayliss, 2002; HSRC,
2002; Bond, 2001). Non-payment for services results in service disconnections becoming
increasingly common. Water service disconnections raise serious questions concerning
water's importance to basic health, poverty alleviation, basic human rights, gender equity,
education, local environments, people living with HIV/AIDS, households dependent of
social grants and the dignity of all citizens. The health and safety implications of having a
household's water cut off are serious, especially for women and children who bear the
burden of securing alternative water sources, resulting in increased stress levels and
workloads; loss of productivity (as time is reallocated); increases in domestic violence and
a range of other health concerns (affecting all genders and ages) e.g. diarrhoeal diseases,
including cholera and parasitic diseases (public Citizen, 2002a; Fiil-Flynn, 2001).
Service disconnections are not responsible public health policy (Fiil-Flynn, 200 I). This is
because water is seen as both a basic human right as well as a general public health interest.
Water and sanitation should be universally available (Hall, date unknown). As stated in
section 1.1, failures to integrate universal service benefits (improved public health, better
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gender equity and healthier local environments) into holistic social-benefit analyses are
shortsighted and socially irresponsible (Fiil-Flynn, 2001). It is therefore a rational assertion
that all households have access to a free basic supply of water, even in the event of
disconnection (Ralo et aI, 2000). A critical question in the disconnection debate is how
credit control mechanisms can be implemented without compromising the necessity of
ensuring a free basic minimum water supply? The Draft White Paper on Water Services
(2002 p36) states that "if municipalities have undertaken the correct legal procedures and
where provision has been made for FBW and where this right has been abused" than water
may be disconnected. This challenge, however seems to be ignored by the Department of
Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) who admit that the "national department's hands are
tied regarding their influence over municipalities (Kasrils, 2002). This is a questionable
position as the role of the national department is to monitor and regulate the WSAIWSP, as
indicated in Figure 2.1. Perhaps, if this is DWAF's position, then the constitution and
monitory mechanisms shOUld be amended to increase the departments' powers. The
implications ofan amicable credit control policy and the relationship between FBW and the
indigent policy could play a significant role in resolving the disconnection debate. The
indigent policy is a targeted subsidy, which provides free basic services to low-income
households. Msunduzi households qualify as indigents if their total monthly household
income is R1378 or less per month, Rl6536 per annum or ifthe combined municipal value
of land and buildings is R30000 or less (Msunduzi municipality indigents policy, 2002).
Notwithstanding the above, the disconnection of water services to any consumer is a
typically controversial and a highly political matter (DWAF, 2002). Cutting off the water
supply of non-payers is an 'ultimate' sanction which is illegal in many countries, including·
the United Kingdom (Hall, 2002).
From the afore-mentioned paragraphs, it is seen that many low-income households' income
simply cannot cover their basic service expenditures. It is not surprising therefore that
many low-income groups maintain that failure to pay the full-costs of water should not
result in a cut off of water supply. They therefore see that disconnection is not an
acceptable form of credit control. This has resulted in the formation of numerous social
movements, in South Africa and globally, mobilising against cut offs, arguing that access to
services is a constitutional right and cutting off essential services ignores the economic
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constraints of low-income households (consistent with McDonald, who said, 'we are
starting to see a ground swell of opposition' cited by Pauw, 2003 p4). The Soweto
Electricity Crisis Committee responded to electricity disconnections by launching
Operation Khanyisa. This involved committee activists illegally reconnecting those who
had been cut off for non-payment. Community groups, specifically the 'Anti Eviction
Campaign,' have undertaken a similar campaign in reaction to water cut offs in the Cape
Flats, Cape Town. An interesting point to note here is that service disconnections did not
take place during apartheid for fear of widespread revolt (Petersen, 2002).
2.15 Alternatives to the dominant privatisation paradigm
Governments, unions and civil society organisations are faced with numerous challenges in
responding to the neo-liberal paradigm of the privatisation of water resources and water
services. Financial, monetary and broader economic and socio-economic policies are
rapidly being constrained within an inflexible set of pre-detennined macro-economic
policies and imbalances (Keet, 2000a). Ultimately, the key issue is whether to accept such
financial policies as immutable 'realities' within which to operate, or whether to interrogate
the economic assumptions underpinning such inflexible policies as the detennining
framework for all economic and social development policies (Keet, 2000a). There are
numerous options and possibilities for policy manoeuvres at the international and local
level and decision makers do still have the political and economic space to retain, improve
and extend public services (McDonald, 2002). A good starting point, internationally,
would be to advocate for human rights and environmental protections to be beyond the
reach of the WTO (Blue Planet Project, 2002). Water and water services should be kept out
of the WTO and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (Global People's Forum,
Water Commission Statement, 2002). Furthennore, a new international agreement on
water that recognises water as part of the global commons and not the global market place
should be ratified and implemented (Blue Planet Project, 2002). On a local level, groups
can put pressure on governments to increase intergovernmental transfers from national to
local government (hence, mobilising national resources to be used for local water access).
Furthennore, public resources (redistribution of human, financial and capital resources per
capita) should be more equitably distributed to remedy historic and social injustices and
cross-subsidisation should be strategically applied (McDonald, 2002). Pro-public
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proponents suggest that moratoriums on privatisation (and commercialisation) should be
instituted (locally, within municipal jurisdictions, nationally and internationally) at least
until better information on public resources and capacities have been gathered (McDonald,
2002). A moratorium would prevent the premature sale and ring fencing of services that
have the potential to become more efficient and equitable public sector entities (McDonald,
2002).
An intrinsic question on the response to privatisation is whether all stakeholders have the
political will and capacity to engage in fundamental policy debates on the rationale for
public service provision under the socio-economic conditions prevailing in their countries
and regions as a whole, and to analyse the effects and efficacy of privatisation programmes,
and to investigate alternatives (via pilot sites and case studies), rather than the transfer of
public assets and services into private hands (Keet, 2000a). Consideration of the future
role, reform and restructuring of the public sector has to be a process that engages a wide
range of stakeholders, within and outside the sector, and must also be premised upon the
explicit recognition that there is a range of alternatives to radical privatisation programmes
that will make public enterprises and entities as effective as required (Keet, 2000a).
Platforms must be created for such debates, strategies and processes. The alternatives
require maintaining, revitalising and democratising state enterprises, particularly those
identified as having strategic importance for national security and social as well as
economic development (Keet, 2000a). Political will is also needed to pursue creative
research and analysis, which is generally lacking from government planning (Keet, 2000a).
Furthermore, people should mobilise to increase pressure on their governments and to
create international solidarity to advance public water control (Global People's Forum,
Water Commission Statement, 2002).
Perhaps one of the most disconcerting issues regarding the current global paradigm is that
insufficient efforts have been made by governments to explore alternatives (Bond, cited by
Pauw, 2003). South Africans should therefore explore alternative options (internally and
externally). One of the best examples of alternatives to the dominant privatisation
paradigm is that of participatory democracy in Porto Alegre, Brazil, which was initiated in
1989 (Menegat, 2002). The Porto Alegre's local government has been coined 'popular
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administration,' which is managed according to the following key characteristics: the
adoption of techniques for a popular democracy; a high level of citizen involvement in
allocating the local government budget; the reorientation of public priorities by citizens; the
integration of public environmental management policies, and the regeneration of public
spaces (Menegat, 2002 p8). Since 1996, Porto Alegre has had the highest standards of
living of all Brazilian metropolitan areas and this success is attributed to a high level of
public accountability owing to an autonomous form of public participation and control
(Menegat, 2002). As an example, the Porto Alegre case provides indications of what can
be achieved if the public gains control of the finance, administration and public service
delivery of municipal services as well as providing hope for the transformation of public
sectors towards an improved social involvement versus an estranged private sector
institution.
2.16 Water demand management and water conservation
Water demand management and water conservation should aim to reduce water usage and
water wastage by fixed targets over fixed timeframes (McDaid, 2003). System
maintenance and repair could be a management approach and is indicated in the Draft
White Paper on Water Services (2002, p46) which states that 'water service authorities
should consider providing assistance for the repair of plumbing fittings as it is a cost-
effective intervention in reducing water service costs to both consumers and the water
service provider.' It further states that water service providers should adopt a systematic
approach to reduce water leakages, while considering costs and benefits through pressure
management, utilising technical innovation, and developing management information
systems to provide relevant and timely information (Draft White Paper on Water Services,
2002). It is important to apply the benefits of lateral thinking to the operation and
management of water delivery systems; hence, cost-benefit approaches should be
prioritised and not constrained by limited operational budgets and financial constraints
(Shepherd, 2001). Furthermore, Shepherd (2001) asserts that the water service provider
should ensure that its operation is proactive rather than reactive as such an approach
provides for a sustainable water service.
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2.17 Summary
The literature perused shows that South Africa's water service delivery policies and
strategies are governed and confined by increasingly inflexible political and economic
boundaries. Furthermore, it reflects the urgency that is required to wrestle the public sector
back to a popular democracy. Water is a basic human right. However, privatisation and
neo-liberalism are forcing it into the economic realm where profits can be made and social
and environment considerations thwarted. Social justice, no longer applied to the life
resource of water, compromises the equity, accessibility, affordability, efficiency,
effectiveness and sustainability of South Africa's water service delivery policies and
strategies.
In chapter three, the methodology used in the study will be systematically presented to
expound on the research design; elements of community action research; conceptual
framework; selection of communities, community researchers and households; data





A community action research design was employed to determine whether South
Africa's water service delivery policies and strategies were equitable, accessible,
affordable, efficient, effective and sustainable to Msunduzi low-income households.
Community researchers engaged directly with the research process to promote
community control and direct advocacies for reform based on the study outcomes. The
study methodology will report on the research design, elements of community action
research, conceptual framework, selection of communities, community researchers and
households, data collection, survey themes, survey materials and approaches, control in
the study and data treatment and analysis.
3.1 Research design
A community action research design was applied in the study. The design was fOWlded
on community-managed research to direct and determine community-based
interventions or actions to change the prevailing norm. Community action research
incorporates the elements of community elicited research, empowerment, mobilisation
and action (De Vos, 2000). The conceptual framework for the study is used to identifY
all actions, processes and data collection techniques at each research phase and to link
these to the study sub problems.
The research design was adapted from the action research and participatory action
research design (Terre Blanche and Durrheim, 2002; De Vos, 2000). It will henceforth
be referred to as a 'community action research (CAR)' design (see figure 3.1). The
design was chosen because of the realisation that community individuals are in the best
position to undertake their own research on pertinent issues; they have the most to gain
from such research and are best able to provide the commitment and determination
necessary to take resulting findings forward. The CAR design is comparable with Gill
and Johnson's (1991) definition, cited by Hart and Bond (1995), as a design invohing a
planned exploration by a researcher into an everyday event (in the case of this study, it
is preferable to adjust the 'everyday event' to a 'life- situation'). Lathlean (1994) cited
by Hart and Bond (1995 p53) states that action research is distinguished by the features
of "taking action in the real world and a close examination of the effects of the action
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taken, thus it always involves intervention." CAR involves action; hence, the research
is undertaken with the objective of bringing about an action to change the socio-
economic and socio-political norms. Structures are created for the community action
research to be transformed into usable action strategies (refer to figure 3.2). These
structures will be expanded upon in the following section. CAR, as used in this study,
is built on the following foundations: community elicited research, empowerment,
mobil isation and action (expanded upon in section 3.1.1). The model of the CAR
process (as used in this study and adapted from the participatory action research model
as indicated by Rahman, 1993 cited by De Vos, 2000) is presented in figure 3.1.
3.1.1 Elements of Community Action Research
The aim of the action research design is to bring about a social change in the
participants (supported by De Vos, 2000). Community members, who would usually be
seen as the subjects of research, are seen as capable of co-creating their own reality.
Data are collected in cooperation with identified research participants (referred to, in
this study, as 'community researchers' [CRs]) who are empowered by the researcher to
undertake their own research (De Vos, 2000). The purpose of using such a type of
design is supported by Rahman (1993) cited by De Vas (2000 p18) who "states that
people want to stand up, take control over what they need to work with, do things
themselves in their own search for life and move forward, supporting one another."
Such an approach is pertinent owing to the current water situation whereby water
activists require hard-core data to support their advocacies for the reform of policies. If
a researcher approached this type of data collection through the conventional approach
of monopolising ownership and control of the process of research, he/she would not
only limit the participants' ability to understand the prevailing systems and seek
community solutions, but would also deny the participants the opportunity to take the
issues forward through mass advocacy for an improved life-situation (Terre Blanche
and Durrheim, 2002). Community Action Research (CAR) is an approach whereby
identified community members themselves become researchers and can draw on their
own collected data to facilitate commwlity wlderstanding, engagement, mobilisation
and collective strategies to challenge the prevailing norm (consistent with Terre Blanche
and Durrheim, 2002).
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Communities, community liaison individuals and community researchers
identified. The processes for future research, water issues, prevailing
communication structures were discussed.
Community researchers provided with research-related information to ensure
that decisive choices and options were considered. Objectives for research
were stated.
Methodologies were chosen and implemented and tools synthesised for use.
.Respondents were identified, pilot study conducted, adaptations made and
time frames implemented for research. Researcher facilitated organisation of
community researchers and obtained a commitment by all to become research
partners. Monitoring and control mechanisms were discussed and
im lemented.
Surveys were conducted within given timeframe. Community researchers were
involved in a two-day workshop to critically reflect research findings, fill in
gaps, build consensus, capacity and validity. Community researchers were
assisted to document their findings, articulate experiences and evaluate·
rocess.
Action strategies on extending and disseminating findings were discussed and
implemented. Findings of research were disseminated through a 'door-to-
door information campaign' and local newspaper supplements to conscientise
communities. Municipal departments and NGOs were engaged to triangulate
data.
Researcher and community researchers facilitated community workshops;
conducted to provide information, promote community buy-in and solidarity.
Community task teams (included community researchers and interested
community members) were formed and a community action plan was initiated
to support reforms. Researcher and community researchers created
community platforms for community issues through existing structures or
throu h those created in fi ure 3.2.
Action plan was evaluated, adapted and synthesised for a joint approach with
researcher, community researchers, community task teams and wider
community. Community task teams reviewed progress collectively and
formulated future course of action.
Researcher's role was changed to a supportive role. Communities initiated
advocacy strategies in the support of reforms through the Water Action
Campaign (see figure 3.2). Researcher role eventually phased out.
Figure 3.1: Model of Community Action Research process (adapted from the
participatory action research model: Rahman, 1993 as cited by De Vos, 2000
p416).
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Incorporating the chief characteristics of Participatory Action Research (PAR), as
identified by De Vos (2000), CAR uses alternative systems of knowledge, which are
based on the community researchers' involvement in decisions regarding the questions
to be asked, who the respondents will be, how the questions will be asked, what role the
researchers will play in data gathering, how the data will be interpreted, the
development of models and programmes, and the evaluation of all processes. Hence,
the actual research is subservient to the emergent processes of collaboration,
mobilisation, empowerment, self-realisation and the establishment of community
solidarity (De Vos, 2000).
The action research design is an empowering type of intervention and includes building
alliances and networks, improving communication systems and reframing issues (Terre
Blanche and Durrheim, 2002; Hart and Bond, 1995). As defined by De Vos (2000),
empowerment is a process of increasing personal, inter-personal and political power,
enabling individuals to act in cooperation to improve their life-situation. Mobilisation is
a direct result of empowerment and refers to the engagement by large masses of people
in a collective action (comparable with De Vos 2000). Mobilisation takes into account
the nature of the problem and the availability and structural features (density, size and
nature of support networks), which determine the character of the mobilisation. Social
support structures were initiated by research participants where they were absent, used
where they already existed and built on where existing structures were weak (by
building networks and support mechanisms, consistent with De Vos, 2000). Two
different structures, operating at different levels, were created during the study: the
Water Action Campaign and community task teams. The Water Action Campaign
provided a platform for engagement on fundamental water issues and policy debate,
infonllation sharing and water-related advocacies. Community tac:;k teams, based in
each participating community, were used to facilitate a local platform for the discussion
of pertinent issues (refer to figure 3.2). The structures were implemented to ensure that
debates and actions resulting from the analyses of the data were adequately housed and
supported through information sharing, capacity building and group cohesion. The
structures, although proposed and initiated by the researcher, were accepted and
supported by the community researchers.
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Figure 3.2: Engagement and advocacy structures.
The last and fundamental element of community action research is that of community
managed and directed action. The actions were founded on community-elicited data,
community decision-making and planning. Communities determined and identified the
strategies necessary to advocate for reforms and implemented these strategies supported
by broad community mobilisation (community action was still pending and therefore
was not documented in this paper).
3.1.2 Conceptual framework for the study
The conceptual framework for the study is presented to identifY elements and themes
involved in the research (refer to figure 3.3). Four tiers of water service delivery are
depicted: the global water service delivery paradigm (neo-liberalism, international
finance institutions, transnational corporations, cost recovery and privatisation);
national water service delivery (neo-liberalism, cost recovery, privatisation, national
policies, citizen rights, financial mechanisms and regulation); municipal implementation
strategies (implementation of policies, setting of tariffs, cross-subsidisation, credit
control mechanisms, municipal efficiencies, effectiveness and administration systems);
and community experience to water service delivery (socio-ec.onomic status, payment
abilities and specific household requirements.
Household demographics, illness




Payment channels and water service reporting channels
Figure ~.~: Concentual Framework for the study.
~
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All four tiers of water service delivery impact on one another; however, the degree of
influence differs e.g. the Msunduzi municipality has a Free Basic Water (FBW) policy
however, its success is influenced by the basic water requirements and consumption
patterns of low-income households as well as the information available to households
and their use of monitoring tools such as meters. Furthermore, if the FBW policy does
not meet the basic water requirements of households, than the willingness and ability of
households to pay any excess consumed, over the first 6kl, would influence both the
household's income status and their ability to access a basic supply of water to secure
their livelihoods. The research concentrates primarily on the experience of
communities to municipal water service delivery strategies, which are governed by
South African national policy and strategy, which in turn are limited and confined
within the rules and norms of the global paradigm.
3.2 Selection of communities, community researchers and households
Non-probability sampling was used in the study, both purposive and snowball, and
consistent with the manner described by De Vos (2000). Four tiers of sampling were
used at different stages within the research process: community, initial contact person,
community researchers and household selection. Purposive sampling was used in the
selection of communities and community researchers, and occurred over a period of two
months. The researcher familiarised herself with the water-related issues affecting the
Msunduzi jurisdiction through attending numerous water workshops and networking
with potentially interested organisations and individuals. Affected communities were
identified through these workshops, networks and various local news materials. The ...
communities were purposively selected on the criterion that they were experiencing· J
certain water-related problems, relevant to the study. Community contact individuals
living in these communities were purposively selected, by the researcher through one-
on-one interviews, according to the criteria of gender mainstreaming, interest,
commitment and involvement in development committees. These community contact
individuals were liased with and the research proposal was discussed.
After interest was shown, the community contact individuals were tasked to identify
four individuals each from their communities, who would be involved in the community
research. These individuals were purposively selected, by the community contact
individuals, according to the same criteria as above. Systematically, five community
48
researchers (ordinary community members, including the contact person) were chosen
to conduct community research in each of the following peri-urban communities:
Imbali (units 1 and 2); Sobantu; Haniville and ThembaliWe. Twenty-five community
researchers were involved in the study (5 representing each of the 5 study areas).
The households to be interviewed were selected on the criteria of known water payment
difficulties and general water service-delivery dissatisfaction. Hence, absolute
randomisation may have been compromised for the collection of truthful and relevant
data. Both purposive and snowball sampling was utilised in the selection of households
owing to the controversiality and sensitivity of such research and the nature of the data
collected. Additional data collection techniques (focus groups, workshops and house-
to-house information diss~mination) targeted community members who responded to
information leaflets (refer to appendix F) and local information published through free
local newspapers (refer to appendix G). This allowed for an inclusion ofhouseholds not
directly involved in the surveys. The pilot study was conducted in Imbali (unit 1), as it
was decided by the community researchers that this area provided a comparable
situation ofall areas to be covered.
3.3 Data collection
Data was collected using a variety of methods: surveys and focus groups; community
meetings, regional and national meetings and water-related workshops; community
visitations; local and national policy analyses; and involvement and informal
engagement with various municipal departments, non-governmental organisations,
organisational programmes and workshops.
The community researchers involved in the study, participated in a two-day
'Community Action Research workshop' facilitated by the researcher. The first day
was valuable in providing a framework for the introduction of CAR as well as a
discussion of the prevailing water issues in Msunduzi (which became the themes of the
research). It provided a platform in which generic action research skills were taught -
applicable to any issue that the community researchers might face in the future. The
second day was used to translate the theory (of the previous day's work shop) into the
practical application of the research skills (in this case, the identified water-related
themes), culminating in the selection of methodology and data collection techniques to
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be used in the study. The community researchers were involved in every phase of the
research process: methodology, synthesis and collating the questions used, data
collection, analyses of the results and strategies to take the findings forward (consistent
with Terre Blanche and Durrheim, 2002). A detailed report of the workshop elements is
included in Appendix A.
The researcher attended numerous community meetings, regional and national meetings
and water-related workshops to engage in debate, present the picture of the Msunduzi
water situation and strategise community formulated plans of action. The researcher
attended two community meetings in each of the selected communities, and were
initiated as a direct result of the research: Imbali (units 1 and 2); Sobantu; Haniville and
Thembalihle. The researcher attended eight regional and six national meetings for a
comprehensive understanding of the dynamics and diversities involved in water service
delivery. These included the following: South African Civil Society Water Caucus,
Cape Town Water Caucus, Parliamentary Civil Society-DWAF portfolio committee
meetings, World Summit on Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Water
Forum (Cape Town). Numerous water-related national and local workshops were also
attended to familiarise the researcher with a comprehensive South African and global
picture of water issues (see Appendix B).
Community visits provided observations of the Msunduzi, KwaZulu-Natal and the
South African water-situation. This provided the study with substance and contributed
to a comprehensive understanding of the situation. The areas, in which the surveys
were conducted, were visited, as were the following areas, Woodlands (unit 11) and
CopesvilIe (unit 29) in Msunduzi, Umlazi (unit J) in Durban, Gugulethu, Khayelitsha
and Tafelsig in Mitchell's Plain, Cape Town. These visits provided informal
engagement with community members; opportunity to ask questions (informally) and
permitted the opportunity for powerful observation.
Local and national policies were analysed to provide a framework in which the local
water-related issues were housed and governed. The following policies were reviewed
and analysed: Towards a Water Services White Paper (DWAF, 2002); Draft White
Paper on Water Services (2002); Indigent Policy (2002); National Water Resource
Strategy, proposed first edition (2002) and the Free Basic Water Policy (2001).
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Municipal departments and non-governmental organisations were interviewed
informally to obtain and triangulate information and acquire valuable insight into the
official water service delivery paradigm.
The researcher participated in, and provides organisational support to the Anti Eviction
Campaign (AEC). The AEC is an advocacy group for households facing eviction
proceedings owing to non-payment for services and loan repayment defaults. This
alliance assisted in the identification of communication channels, data collection
techniques and advocacy methodologies. Furthermore, it assisted the researcher in
informal engagement and debate on pertinent water-related issues to provide a
foundation of understanding on the prevailing national water service delivery situation.
3.3.1 Data collection techniques and approaches
The survey materials and approaches were related to the data collection techniques used
in the study. The diverse array of survey materials and approaches adopted reflected the
necessity of engaging effectively at different levels. Data collection techniques included
surveys and focus groups, community meetings, local and national meetings and water-
related workshops, community visitations, local and national policy analyses, and
involvement and informal engagement with various municipal departments, non-
governmental organisations and workshops.
Surveys were supported with focus groups (with community researchers and
community members) to ensure comprehensive understanding as well as to fill in gaps
in the survey. Focus groups were also effective for facilitating a greater representative
of the survey: 2 workshops were held in each area (approximately 30 community
members attending each workshop); house-to-house information campaign (each
community researcher interviewing 10-15 households); and research team community
visitations (informal interviews with community members in different municipal areas).
All data collection activities were represented by both genders equally. The outcomes of
the diverse data collection techniques were representative and accurate of the
communities in the study area.
Surveys were chosen because of their ease of utility, value in providing entry into
communities, as well as the ability in collecting large quantities of data (Woodhill and
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Robbins, 1999). Closed and open-ended questions were included in the surveys to
ensure that responses were qualified. The community researchers were coached to ask
questions beyond those stated in the survey to ensure that their own individual
capacities were expanded. Due to the sensitive nature of certain questions, time was
spent putting the interviewees at ease through building rapport. In the interests of
greater community involvement, some accuracy in data collected had, of necessity, to
be yielded.
Focus groups were used for two purposes: to expand the study outcomes and to build
group cohesion, as the research design chosen went beyond the boundaries of mere data
collection to include action (Woodhill and Robbins, 1999). Consensus building and
participation were aimed for in all activities and all workshops carried this component.
Brainstorming activities, individual (round-the-group) inputs, research group inputs,
group reporting, minute taking, report-backs, summarIes and in-workshop
documentation were part of activities introduced to promote organisational capacity
building amongst the community researchers. The primary materials used were
flipcharts, which were easy to follow, and promoted interaction. Activities were
participant-friendly and efforts were made to ensure ease of learning and engagement.
Workshop proceedings were made available to the community researchers and provided
a valuable reference point. Action planning time frames for research process activities,
persons responsible for each activity and deadlines were drawn up by the researcher and
community researchers (Woodhill and Robbins, 1999). This ensured that the researcher
and community researchers were aware of future commitments, engagements and
promoted the ownership of the research process by all involved.
Community meetings/workshops were arranged to understand community dynamics
and community channels (to take issues forward). Community meetings/workshops (2
per area) provided a platform to obtain wider community consensus and representivity
of the study findings. The meetings/workshops were open to all community members
and the issues raised were consistent with the study findings. The meetings/workshops
also provided opportunities to engage in debates on water-related issues and to build
capacity within communities. Due to the substantial interest in the study, these
engagements also provided the researcher and community researchers with
opportunities to explain the importance of the study to the wider community as well.
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These engagements were also valuable in building wider community support for the
study outcomes and a commitment to forward water service delivery reforms.
National, regional and local water-related workshops (policy hearings, discussions and
water service delivery issues)1 were used by the researcher and community researchers
to network and build on their knowledge foundations. The researcher and one
representative of each community research team conducted community visits to build a
comprehensive understanding of the areas in which the research was conducted as well
as gaining wider understanding of areas not directly involved in the study. These visits
provided valuable insight for the researcher, and also promoted group cohesion amongst
the community researchers.
Local and national policy analyses were conducted to understand the water service
delivery paradigm. These were valuable in identifying policy and water service
delivery inconsistencies. The researcher conducted the policy analyses. However,
efforts were made to triangulate analyses with water-networks and discuss the policy
implications with community researchers. Efforts were made to access municipal
statistics. However, attempts were fruitless and, at best, the researcher could only
access municipal 'unofficial' comments on specific study results (comments are clearly
indicated in the study results). Informal engagement with various municipal
departments and non-governmental organisations were used to triangulate data and to
access information.
3.4 Survey themes
Community researchers, participating in the two-day, 'Community Action Research
workshop,' were asked to discuss and present the chief water problems experienced in
their communities (refer to section 3.3 and appendix A). These issues were divided into
specific themes and represented in the surveys to ensure clarity and relevant data on
specific variables (consistent with Terre Blanche and Durrheim, 2002). The surveys
encompassed the following themes: household demographics, water systems,
1 Financial restrictions allowed only the researcher to attend national meetings. Regional
meetings were attended by the researcher and one community researcher representing each
area. However, the meeting procedures were discussed with all community researchers. Local
water-related workshops (organised through the research process) were attended by the
researcher and all community researchers. Workshops involved presentations, engagement in
debate, building capacity and understanding on relevant policies and strategies.
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affordability mechanisms, administration systems, water servIce efficiencies and
effectiveness.
Household demographics were used to conceptualise a picture of low-income
households. It also provided for an easy introduction to the survey and assisted in
building rapport between the community researchers and the households. Items
included general demographic questions, such as: home ownership, employment, other
income and illness status characteristics (refer to chapter 4: sample characteristics).
Water system delivery themes included types of water system connections, quantities
used per weekday and weekend, adequacy and affordability. Tools in service delivery
and monitoring questions were used to ascertain the acceptability and efficiencies of
water meters and the implementation and information available on Free Basic Water.
Affordability mechanisms, including household expenses and income themes, were
used to elicit household economic considerations of various service expenses in relation.
to household incomes. These questions were valuable in assessing affordability
capabilities and constraints. Administration system themes were directly related to
water service payments and contributed to the holistic picture of the water service
delivery framework. Water standards and quality themes elicited data that contributed to
the understanding of water service satisfaction and the willingness to pay. Water
service efficiency themes were a culmination of all questions and hence provided an
explanation of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the service provider as well as
suggestions for municipal service improvement. Appendices C and D provide the
survey sheets and translations and shOUld be read in conjunction with the above-
mentioned theme explanations.
3.5 Control of the study
Controls and monitoring mechanisms were implemented at each stage of the research
process. These were implemented through actively building capacity within the
community researchers. Participation and consensus building were at the core of the
research design, which had the effect of a 'double-control', because activities were
automatically verified for relevance and validity.
All community researchers participated in an initial two-day CAR workshop (refer to
section 3.3). This compulsory participation ensured that the community researchers
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were familiar with the research process. Consequently, only the community researchers
who attended the full workshop proceedings were involved in conducting the surveys to·
ensure that surveys reached a satisfactory standard. Translation, synthesis and collation
of surveys were conducted with input from five community researchers (each
representing one study area). A pilot study was subsequently conducted in Imbali (unit
1) to ensure that surveys were relevant and easy to understand. Adaptations were made
to the original survey and the adapted survey was presented to the research team leaders
and discussed for additional input and clarification. The research team leaders then
discussed the survey with their teams. Surveys were conducted within a two-week
period (between 22 October and 05 November, 2002). The period ensured for minimal
seasonal variation.
Data analysis was conducted in a focus group, with all community researchers, to
ensure that the statistical analyses were comparable with the general joint-analysis.
This control ensured internal validity of the results as well as providing a valuable
monitoring mechanism, understanding and consensus of results. The researcher was
involved in all activities, except actively conducting the surveys, and provided guidance
at each stage. This ensured that a standard control was implemented throughout the
research process. Activity evaluations of all processes were implemented, ensuring that
researchers were constantly analysing their performance and learning abilities.
3.6 Data treatment and analysis
Data treatment and analysis was conducted in two forms: the first form was through a
focus-group, comprised of all community researchers, which employed a participant-
friendly approach where the analysis was conducted by reconstructing themes to build
an in-depth picture of local water service delivery paradigms (consistent with De Vos,
2000); the second form was a statistical analysis by the researcher of the data using the
SPSS programme.
Community researchers attended a post-study two-day workshop at which an
explanation of data treatment and analysis was presented. The analysis was conducted
through building consensus on each water-related theme. Each theme was approached
to build a picture of the particular theme employing the rich picturing technique
(Woodhill and Robbins, 1999). After the themes were discussed (household
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demographics, water systems, affordability mechanisms, administration systems, water
service efficiencies and effectiveness) the findings were summarised to build a full
picture of the prevailing water situation. This joint analysis was used to support the
statistical analysis of the results. .
The researcher, using the SPSS programme, conducted a statistical analysis of the data.
Data treatment occurred by dividing the survey into themes or issues. All questions
were coded to provide for statistical treatment (refer to appendix E). The SPSS
programme was used to analyse the data, and primarily employed frequencies,
correlations and Pearson's Chi-square tests to elicit variable links. Qualitative data and
observations were utilised to support the statistical results.
3.7 Summary
The methodology of the study was discussed by detailing the Community Action
Research process. The following aspects were discussed for this purpose: research
design, conceptual framework, selection of communities, community researchers and
households, data collection, data collection tools and approaches, survey themes,
control of the study and data treatment and analysis. Chapter four will present the




The characteristics of the sample provide the foundation for the experiences of low-
income households to national and local water policies and strategies. The sample
characteristics are intentionally brief and provide an introduction to the household
demographics and the socio-economic status of low-income households and the
community water service delivery situation, which will be expounded on in chapters 5
and 6. Characteristics of the community researchers and external stakeholders are
stated to ensure clarity on positions or perspectives voiced.
4.1 Sample characteristics
The sample of low-income households came from the Msunduzi municipality within the
uMgungundlovu District Municipality (DC22); with five areas sampled: Imbali (unit·
1), Imbali (unit 2), Sobantu, Haniville and Thembalihle (refer to figure 4.1: map of
study areas). The sampled areas provide the location for the study. Community
amenities are given to provide an indication of the physical resources available to the
sampled communities. Household demographics and socio-economic status are given
as a foundation for the experiences of low-income households to national and local
water policy and strategies. Community water service delivery provides a picture of
how households access water.
The sample characteristics are based on the information and experiences sourced from
314 households via community researchers in the 5 study areas. Twenty-five
community researchers were tasked to conduct fifteen surveys in each of their
respective areas, providing 375 surveys. However, certain surveys had to be discarded
because of substantial missing data. The number of households surveyed in each area is
depicted in table 4.1.
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4.1.1 Characteristics of community amenities
The areas in the study had the following physical resources (however, the degrees of
accessibility and effectiveness varied): roads, transport, clinics, schools and spaza
shops. All households, included in the study, resided in fonnal urban settlements. No
informal settlements where included in the study. Dwelling types were generally of
limited size with building materials of concrete blocks and corrugated iron roofing
materials and housing extensions of concrete blocks, wattle and daub and.shack material
of corrugated iron, wooden planks, cardboard sheets and plastic. Approximately a
quarter to a half of all houses (exact number unknown) had backyard shack residents
(extended families and/or paying residents).
Households accessed the following services: piped water, electricity (billed monthly or
prepaid), sewage and waste removal. Imbali (unit 1 and 2) and Sobantu had municipal
offices in their areas. Transport availability and the condition of the roads were
satisfactory in facilitating ease of access to community municipal pay points or central
municipal pay points for service payments. However, the available monies and time
required to access the pay points varied. Communities had similar community political
structures comprised of councillors and ward committees. However, their efficiency,
approachability and political agendas varied e.g. three councillors endeavoured to
prevent the research taking place and one councillor held parallel community meetings
to the research meetings and threatened community researchers.
4.1.2 Characteristics of household demographics and socio-economic status
All households represented in the study were black South African households. The
population size for Black South Africans residing in each area were the following:
Imbali, 31284 (incorporating all units within Imbali); Haniville, 877; Sobantu, 7732;
and Thembalihle, 5482 (Msunduzi city planners, 2003). The majority ofhouseholds
(94.9%) owned their property and the average household size included 5.4 members
(reflected in table 4.2). The average household sizes per area are listed in descending
order: Sobantu 6.5, Imbali (tmit 1) 5.6, Haniville 5.1, Thembalihle 5.0 and Imbali (unit
2) 4.9. The average household size (for all areas) is 5.4 persons per household.
However, it is assumed that the backyard shack residents were not included as
'household members' by the respondents. The provincial household size (all races) is 6
persons per household and the national average household size (all races) is 5.4
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(consistent with study) as stated by Census 2001. However, this data does not include
cluster household residents (Statistics South Africa, 2003). Refer to figure 4.2.
Therefore, it is the researcher's opinion that the average household size may be closer to
8-persons per household. Refer to figure 4.2, which indicates that the households
included in the survey, fell into the higher population size range. Unaccounted for
backyard shack residents may not contribute to income levels, but additional members
would influence the amount of water consumed. There was no differentiated regulation
of water use between shack residents and household residents. It was voiced that water
was a basic human need and that all residents should have the same right and freedom
to the water required. If back yard shack residents were expected to pay rent, the
monies where not divided into specific utility payments e.g. a proportion of the rent
payments designated to water was not evident.
Table 4.2: Average household size per study area.
1 1 2 3 0 2 8 2.5
2 5 1 5 5 8 24 7.6
3 7 5 16 4 9 41 13.1
4 8 8 19 9 10 54 17.2
5 8 10 13 9 12 S2 16.6
6 4 3 12 8 8 35 11.1
7 10 6 5 15 5 41 13.1
8 3 3 7 12 1 26 8.3
9 2 0 4 5 2 13 4.1
10 2 0 2 3 2 9 2.9
11 1 0 0 2 1 3 1.0
12 0 0 1 3 0 5 1.6
13 2 0 1 0 1 3 1.0
Total 53 38 88 75 60 314 100.0
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Figure 4.2: Map of average Msunduzi and South African household size (all races)
[Statistics South Africa, 2003].
61
Most households (60.5%) had no one employed while 31.4% of households had one or
more members employed (refer to table 4.3). The study's figures of households with no
one employed (60.5%) are higher than Census 2001 figures that state Msunduzi
unemployment rate (all races) at 49% (cited by Coetzee and Newport-Gwilt, 2003).
Households with no one employed per area are the following and listed in descending
order: Imbali (unit 2) 78.9%; Thembalihle 78.3%; Imbali (unit 1) 58.5%; Sobantu 56%;
and Haniville 45.5% (see table 4.3). Twenty eight percent (28%) of households
received one pension grant and 16.2% of households received child support or disability
grants (total nwnber and differentiated grants per household is unknown). The illness
status of households was indicated as 27% of households having at least one seriously
ill member. The commonest type of identifiable illness was elicited as tuberculosis,
with an assumption that the tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS links were strong.













The majority of households (83.5%) have a total income ofless thanR1200 per month,
the average total monthly household income for all areas in the study was R932.17 and
the households were therefore characterised as low-income households (earning less
than the minimum South African income of RII00 as used by DPLG, 2003):
comprising 23.9% earning the midpoint of the range of RO-R600 (R300) per month and
59,6% earning the midpoint of the range of R600-R1200 (R900) per month (refer to
table 4.4). Average total income per area is indicated in descending order: Sobantu
(Rl158.66), Imbali unit 1 (Rll 00.00), Imbali unit 2 (R976.32), Haniville (R831.82) and
Thembalihle (R620.00). It is important to note that the total average household income
for all areas in the study (R932.17) is less than the Msunduzi indigent's policy
benchmark of R1378 per month (refer to section 2.14) or the RIIOO per month
(indicated by the DPLG as the minimum monthly income). Hence, if the average total
monthly household income were taken (for all areas), all the households would (on their
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average total monthly household income) qualify as indigents I. The average household
income per area was cross tabulated with the average household size per area and the
results were as follows for a per person income equivalent (descending order): Imbali
(unit 2) R199.25 (4.9), Imbali (unit 1) R196.43 (5.6), Sobantu R178.26 (6.5), Haniville
R163.10 (5.1) and Thembalihle R124.00 (5.0). If the total average household income for
all areas (R932.17) were cross tabulated with the average household size for all areas
(5.4) then the average per person income equivalent would be R172.62. The figure of
R172.62 puts the average income per capita (no age differentiation) below the
supplementary living level (R220.10), per adult equivalent household subsistence level
(R251.10) and the income poverty line per adult equivalent of R237.00 (May et al,
2003). Moreover, considering average monthly income per capita, it is plausible to
assume (despite failures to obtain detailed expenditure data, see 5.2.1) that the large
majority of households, in the study, are part of the population cut-off at 40
th
percentile
of households ranked by adult equivalent expenditure (297.29), the 50% of national per
capita expenditure (R201.82) and would, according to May's (1998) classification, be
part of the 40% of South Africa's 'poor', indicated by having less than a monthly
household expenditure of R353 per adult equivalent (Leibbrandt and Woolard, 1999
cited by May et al, 2003).
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* Midpoint of the range of Ro-R600 (RJOO), R60o-R1200 (R900), R1200-R2000 (R1600), R200o-RJOOO
(R2500), RJOOO-R4000 (RJ500) and R4000-R5000 (R4500).
1 Household total average income levels below the indigent policy or minimum monthly income
are important when determining which households to target with lifeline water tariffs or basic
service subsidies. The low-income households, in the study, fell into the potential targeted low-
income category, and therefore provided a plausible group of households who should be
benefiting from local and national policies and strategies in promoting improved livelihoods,
relieving affordability constraints and maintaining household well being (to be unpacked and
discussed in chapters 5 and 6).
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The variables of 'total average household income' and 'other household income' were
analysed using Pearson's Chi-Square tests for the effect of pensions or grants on total
average household income. It was found that pensions and grants made a significant
contribution to the total households' income (p=O.OOI). This was reflected in the higher
total household incomes of Sobantu and Imbali units I and 2, which had significantly
more households holding pensions then Haniville and Thembalihle. This was plausible
owing to the fact that Haniville and Thembalihle were relatively newly established
communities and therefore did not have an aging population. Child support grants were
distributed evenly in all areas.
Figure 4.3 provides a graphical illustration of the demographic household characteristics
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Figure 4.3: Demographic household characteristics per area.
The characteristics of household demographics and socio-economic statuses of the five
study areas were relatively comparable. Albeit differences did occur in average
household income, income per capita, frequency of pensions or grants, household size
and dependants; these were especially apparent in Thembalihle. Nevertheless, a
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relatively analogous household demographic and socio-econornic picture can be drawn
for all study areas (where there are marked differences, these will be stated).
4.1.3 Characteristics of community water service delivery
Almost all households (98.4%), in the study, had on site taps (not in-house). Water
services were delivered through one tap connected above a concrete sink and attached to
water-borne sewage, which was housed within a small concrete structure. Water was
used at the sink or carried by buckets or other containers to the homestead. Households
not connected to water utilised the water and sanitation of neighbouring households.
Almost all households (94.9%) in the study were metered. Two types of meters were
used: Invensys and Kent. The meter connections were either in-yard or approximately
15 metres outside the yard. Water was used for a variety of household purposes e.g.
cooking, drinking, cleaning, washing clothes, bathing, sanitation, economic purposes
and small food gardens.
Water volumes consumed per person per day as provided by households2, ranged from
0-25 litres (47.3%) and 25-50 litres (42.0%) and are presented in figure 4.4. Albeit per
person and per household consumption figures as provided by households may not be
accurate, as they were not verified with specific water usage data (e.g. volume of water
used per activity and frequency of activities for bathing, washing, cleaning, flushing
toilets etc). Nevertheless, if the household-provided volumetric figures were used in
conjunction with the average household size (5.4 members) then average household
water conswnption should range from 135-270 litres per household per day or 200-400
litres if an 8-member household were used (accounting for backyard shack residents).
2 As low-income households generally carried water from outside taps in containers for inside
use, water consumption figures were calculated in terms of the number of containers used per
day (where water was used directly, at the tap, sink or toilet, it is assumed that these quantities
wen~ excluded from household calculations). However, regardless of the calculation method
used, the consumption figures provided by households were inconsistent with municipal
consumption records.
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Because the accuracy of household-provided individual and household water
consumption data was in doubt3, the data was triangulated with municipal statistics.
Chapter 5 presents the municipal statistics for monthly household consumption (not for
each household surveyed in the study, but an average figure for low-income households
in the Msunduzi area). TIle results of the study acknowledge the consumption figures
provided by households. However, they rely predominately on municipal statistics as a
means to present a more accurate data source and account for backyard residents
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Water consumed per person per day in litres (grouped)
Figure 4.4: Water consumed per person per day in litres (figures from households
in study).
4.2 Characteristics of community researchers
The 25 community researchers were black South Africans. Both genders were
represented: 10 females and 15 males. The average age of the community researchers
was 25 years of age. The majority of community researchers were unemployed.
3 It is the researcher's opinion that it is difficult for individuals and households to provide
accurate figures of per person and per household water consumption, rather more accurate
statistics could be obtained via actual monthly household water bills. Numerous consolidated
municipal bills were seen by the researcher, facilitated by community meetings whereby
community meetings were encouraged to bring their water bills. The figures were consistent
with the municipal official data, stating that average low-income household monthly
consumption was in the range of 20-25 kilolitres (further discussed in section 5.1.2).
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However, they were active in their communities and engaged in various social activities
e.g. local development committees and community based organisations (forming part of
the GREEN network- a Greater Edendale environmental and development based
network). The majority of community researchers had never participated in research
activities prior to the study. The community researchers indicated that their reasons for
participating in the study were to learn research skills, to acquire information, to change
the prevailing social norms and to socialise with different individuals. However, the
common trait that bound the community researchers was a passionate interest in social
issues and to gain different perspectives. Because the community researchers lived in
the areas in which the study was conducted, they shared similar socio-economic statuses
as the households they surveyed. Furthermore, the community researchers'
understanding of the water service delivery situation was consistent with the households
included in the study, as they, too, faced similar water service delivery frustrations or
concerns on a daily basis and could provide greater insight into community water·
sefVlce Issues.
4.3 Characteristics of external stakeholders
Two different external stakeholders' perspectives were included in the study:
government and civil society organisational perspectives. Government institutions
included municipal departments, of Msunduzi water department, treasury and
administrative department and city engineer officials. The researcher conducted
informal interviews with local municipal departments through personal or telephonic
communication. Opinions were sought on specific aspects of the survey with the
objective of information sharing, verifying statistics and experiences, and challenging
officials on inconsistencies between policy, strategy and implementation.
Civil society perspectives were sOUTced through individuals working on water-related
issues in non- governmental organisations (Alternative Information and Development
Centre, Environmental Monitoring Group and Rural Development Services Network)
and community based organisations/movements (Anti-Eviction Campaign, Anti-
Privatisation Forum and Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee), public unions (South
African Municipal Workers Union and Public Services International), university
institutions (Municipal Services Project and University of the Witwatersrand) and the
South African Civil Society Water Caucus. The researcher conducted informal
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interviews with civil society organisations pre and post-study through personal,
telephonic or e-mail communication. The objective of engaging with civil society
individuals was to share information, draw on valuable resources and experiences, gain
greater insight into municipal water service delivery and the political dynamics involved
in national policies and strategies.
4.4 Summary
The sample of low-income households came from the Msunduzi municipality; with five
areas sampled: Imbali (unit 1), Imbali (unit 2), Sobantu, Haniville and Thembalihle.
Community amenities were basic but available and accessible. Dwellings were of
limited size and approximately a quarter to a half of houses had household-extensions to
accommodate backyard shack residents. Households accessed the following basic
servIces: piped water, electricity (billed monthly or prepaid), sewage and waste
removal. The characteristics of household demographics and socio-economic statuses
of households were comparable. The average household included 5.4 members
(increased to 8-members to account for backyard shack residents); had a high
unemployment rate; an average monthly total household income of R932.17 (pensions
and grants were a significant contributing factor); qualified for indigent
subsidieslbenefits; and approximately every third household had at least one seriously
ill member. TIle majority of households (98.4%) had on-site taps (not in-house) and
were metered (94.9%). Water services were delivered through one tap connected above
a concrete sink and attached to water-borne sewage, housed within a small concrete
structure. Water was used for a variety of household purposes. Average per person
consumption, as provided by households, ranged from 25-50 litres per person per day,
135-270 litres per household per day and 6-12 kilolitres per household per month. It
was noted that municipal consolidated bills and Msunduzi municipality consumption
statistics were more accurate in obtaining accurate water consumption figures.
Therefore, the study relied on municipality obtained statistics, which are discussed in
Chapter 5. Community researchers had comparable socio-economic characteristics with
the households included in the study. External stakeholders included government and
civil society representatives.
The characteristics of the sample area, community amenities, household demographics,
socio-economic status, community water service delivery, community researchers and
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external stakeholders were provided as a background for the experiences of low-income
households to national and local policies and strategies. Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 will
provide substance to the outline provide by the sample characteristics.
69
CHAPTER 5
RESULTS: EXPERIENCES OF MSUNDUZI LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS
In assessing whether 'South Africa's water service delivery policies and strategies are
equitable, accessible, affordable, efficient, effective and sustainable to Msunduzi low-
income households,' the results unpack the implementation of local and national policy
and strategy from the perspective of Msunduzi low-income households. Hence sub
problem one: 'what is the experience of Msunduzi low-income households to
municipal water service delivery' is systematically discussed and linked to sub problem
two which is presented in chapter 6. The results relating to sub problem one are
provided within the survey themes, as indicated in section 3.4, and discussed to provide
clarity and understanding of the experience of Msunduzi low-income households to
water service delivery. The water themes are the following: water systems,
affordability mechanisms, administration systems, and water service efficiencies and
effectiveness. The variables of equity, accessibility, affordability, efficiency,
effectiveness and sustainability are linked to the themes, in chapter 6, to address the
research problem.
5.1 Water systems
Water systems included water pressure, water quality and the social value of water.
Water volumes were provided in litres or kilolitres consumed per person and per
household per day and month to highlight household volumetric uses, access to the free
basic water (FBW) utility and low-income household affordability. The experience of
low-income households to the FBW policy was presented in terms of access to the FBW
utility (0-6 kilolitres [kID and the resulting affordability constraints when the lifeline
tariff (provided by the FBW policy) was not accessed by low-income households.
Meters were discussed because they were the chosen method, by the municipality, to
monitor household consumption. Water leakages were discussed as if they were
common and poorly prioritised; they affected household affordability, access to the
basic water requirements and sustainability of the resource.
5.1.1 Water pressure, quality and value
Water pressure as indicated by the majority of households (80,1%) was good. Most
households (72.8%) indicated that water quality was good with little evidence of
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contamination. The social value of water was indicated as valuable with the majority of
households (94,2%) stating that water was very important and essential for survival (on
a Likert scale of 1-3). See appendix C.
5.1.2 Water volume consumed
Households reported that per person per day volumes consumed ranged from 25-50
litres (refer to figure 4.3) or approximately 6-12kl per household per month.
Household-provided volumetric data was inconsistent with the Msunduzi municipality
who reported that low-income household monthly consumption ranged from 20-25kl
(Municipal administration, 2003 consistent with RDSN, 2003- see section 2.13).
Msunduzi municipal figures (using the midpoint of 22,5 kilolitres per household per
month) amounted to 750 litres per household per day or 93.75 litres per person per day
(calculated on an 8-member household l ). It was evident that the Msunduzi municipal
volumetric data was substantially higher than the consumption figures provided by low-
income households. This implied that low-income households struggled to provide
accurate figures of water volumes consumed per day, were unable to link water-use
activities with actual volumes consumed per person per day, were unable to understand
municipal consolidated bills as well as the indication that water meters were neither
understood nor utilised as water-monitoring tools.
It is important to note that municipal consolidated bills where not used by the
community researches in obtaining water volumes consumed. This method was
purposively implemented to endeavour to facilitate household conceptualisation of daily
water volume consumed with special regard to water usage activities to determine per
person basic water requirements. Prior to the survey implementation, community
researchers were trained to equate water collection implements (buckets and other) with
the corresponding amount in litres. The subsequent research processes (community
workshops and house-to-house information dissemination) encouraged the analysis of
household municipal bills by community members. This exercise revealed consumption
figures consistent with Msunduzi municipal consumption figures. However, it is
acknowledged that per person per day consumption figures would have been more
1 Household size for the study is calculated on 8-persons per household to include backyard
shack- dwelling water-using residents (see section 4.1.2).
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effective and accurate if obtained in conjunction with household municipal consolidated
bills.
Households reported that weekday and weekend water volume consumption differed;
that weekend water consumption was double that of weekday consumption. These
differences were attributed to increased frequencies of water use activities and different
water use activities e.g. increased household washing, water for recreation and visitors
or more household members staying at the home for longer periods.
A high proportion (81,9%) of households indicated that the water consumed was
sufficient for household activities. However, households were not restricted by
economic measures, as the Msunduzi municipality had not implemented a broad credit
control policy. Households continued to use the water, as required, for household
activities and were not limited by punitive measures for non-payment. Water bills.
continued to arrive and arrears increased. However, few households limited their water
consumption (only 10 out of 314 households had initiated self-restriction mechanisms).
Households unable to pay for their water and exceeding the FBW utility, continued to
reap the benefits of an unrestricted water supply. Many households, making no effort to
pay for their water, maintain that water is a human right and gift from God, inability to
pay therefore should not, according to these households, restrict their access. It is
envisioned that until credit control is institutionalised and monetary value attributed to
water, water usage patterns will remain unchanged. What remains to be seen is that
when restrictions do become institutionalised, will households be satisfied and able to
continue meeting daily household water requirements within the Msunduzi municipal
restrictions?
5.1.3 Free basic water
The free basic water (FBW) policy was implemented in the Msunduzi municipality
jurisdiction on the 1st December 2001 (Msunduzi Municipality, 2001). The FBW
policy, as implemented in the Msunduzi municipality, allowed for 6kl per household per
month, 200 litres per household per day or 25 litres per person per day (per 8-member
household). If more than 6kl per household per month was consumed then households
were expected to pay the full costs for the water consumed i.e. the full 6kl costs plus
any additional kilolitres used over the first 6kl (at the standard tariff rate). As stated in
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section 5.1.2, municipal statistics indicated that Msunduzi low-income households used
between 750 litres per household per day or 93.75 litres per person per day. This meant
that low-income households, having 3 or more members, struggled to access the FBW
utility and therefore were required to pay the full cost for the water consumed.
Research data indicated that 100% of households, included in the study, were not
accessing the FBW utility (benefiting from using less than 6kl per month). Noting that
10.1% of households (see table 4.2) had 2 members or less and therefore should, by
indication of Msunduzi municipality statistics, be accessing the utility of FBW,
numerous possibilities exist to account for the 100% statistic: households were
receiving FBW but were consuming more than 6kl therefore they were unable to access
its utility; households were uninformed (81.2% of households knew nothing about FBW
and hence did not know if they were receiving it) or were not paying household
municipal consolidated bills (in 38.2% of households no one took responsibility for
payment therefore those particular households did not know whether they were
receiving their water for free or not- refer to table 5.3). Unfortunately, Msunduzi
municipal statistics on how many low-income households were accessing the utility of
FBW were neither available nor accessible. Such municipal statistics would be an
invaluable indicator of the success of the FBW policy.
5.1.4 Meters
The municipality, as a tool to measure and monitor household water consumption and
provide the FBW allocation, used meters. As stated in section 4.1.3, the majority of
households (94.9%) were metered. The municipality maintained the meters and
monitored household monthly consumption via municipal meter readers who
documented monthly household meter readings. If understood by households, meters
were a valuable tool for self-monitoring household consumption, checking volumes
consumed against water bills and detecting water leakages.
Most of the households (81.8%) were not satisfied with the way meters were monitored
by municipal meter readers. Their dissatisfaction was attributed to the manner in which
their meters were read (by municipal meter readers) and their (the households) general
lack of understanding on how meters operate. Households indicated that municipal
meter readers did not read the meters frequently, readings were inaccurate or estimated
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(resulting in varying water costs per month) and a general air of scepticism and poor
community acceptance of meters and municipal meter readings existed. Municipal
meter readers claimed that they did read the meters but they were often prevented from
doing so as the household members were often away at the time of reading (hence the
municipal meter readers could not be monitored or witnessed) or the meter readers were
scared of household dogs and were afraid of entering the yards. Households voiced that
they required basic information on how meters were operated, how the 'dials' were read
and how the readings corresponded with the monthly bills to ensure that they could
monitor their water usage and check that they were not being overcharged. In addition
to the confusion on the operation of meters, meter readings were not consistently taken
on the same day each month so municipal consolidated bills did not reflect a constant
date, time duration or volume used. This compounded the difficulty of households to
monitor meters and billing. Meters, connected to an efficient computer programme,
could be managed effectively. However, the administrative department stated that the .
current computer systems were outdated, with the implication that monitoring was
difficult and current and reliable statistics were lacking.
Despite the widespread dissatisfaction of households to meters, a large percentage of
households (68.8%) indicated that meters were still a good tool in service delivery:
However, when asked to provide possible meter alternatives, 85.9% of households
suggested non-specified alternatives. This emphasised the perceived uselessness of
meters for household monitoring in the absence of information and the necessity to find
socially acceptable alternatives accompanied by usable consumer information.
5.1.5 Leakages
Most households (77.1%) had leakages, after the meter pOSItIon (this figure was
consistent with the findings by the Msunduzi city engineers, 2003). See table 5.1.
Leakages were present at one or more of the following sites: at the meter, after the
meter (on the pipe connecting the tap), at the tap, on the pipe connecting the toilet and
in the toilet. This was a significant concern for households and was shared by the
Msunduzi city engineers (2003). Leakages were not dealt with promptly and continued
to drip, spurt or gush. Leakages, as indicated by households, could be attributed to
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shoddy workmanship or inferior materials used by contractors, aging systems2, high
pipe pressure or poor maintenance and management. The inefficient or delayed fixing
of leakages by households could be ascribed to: lack of personal capacity in fixing
leakages or household affordability and time constraints. The inefficient or tardy fixing
of leakages by municipalities could be attributed to inefficient notification systems, a
lack of budgetary or financial support for maintenance projects, insufficient staff or the
low prioritisation of maintenance operations on a political level. Table 5.1 depicts the
number of households experiencing leakages (at the meter, after the meter (on the pipe
connecting the tap), at the tap, on the pipe connecting the toilet and in the toilet) per
area.
Table 5.1: Number of households experiencing leakages per study area.
Imbali (unit 1) 3 50 53 94.3%
Imbali (unit 2) 8 29 37 78.4%
Haniville 27 59 86 68.6%
Sobantu 27 45 72 62.5%
Thembalihle 5 53 58 91.4%
Total 70 236 306 77.1%
Leakages that were not dealt with promptly and continued unabated presented
households with a challenging affordability problem. If households could not cover the
loss, then municipalities assumed the economic burden, which through the cycle of
responsibility, were transferred to households through higher tariffs thereby increasing
the fmancial burden of households. The Msunduzi city engineers (2003) expressed that
they were mandated by the Msunduzi municipality to fix leakages pre- and at the meter
but that they were also endeavouring to assist households and would repair post-meter
leakages but would charge for their services, which could be paid for through
instalments (see figure 5.1). This avenue was explored, by the researcher (water
department toll free number: 0800 001868, 2003); however, it was found that this
service was not being implemented and that households would have to hire a private
plumber if the leak fell after the meter position. Under the current system (where water
2 The approximate date of service water pipe installation is correlated with the date of the
establishment ofstudy areas and is the follOWing (provided by community researchers): Sobantu
[1930], Imbali (unit 1) [1950], Imbali (unit 2) [1955]. Haniville [1990] and Thembalihle [1996].
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demand management is not prioritised), it would be interesting to ascertain the water
volumes and monies lost per day/month/year. Water losses have serious implications for
the financial and environmental sustainability of low-income households, municipalities
and South Africa and may push the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF)
to source further water supplies through expensive and unsustainable measures as big
dams or alternative water catchment areas or basement transfers (National Water
Resource Strategy, 2002). The National Water Resource Strategy (NWRS) is
admittedly weak on water demand management and conservation management and is
consistent with the (prioritisation of leakages) position taken by the Msunduzi
municipality (personal communication with DWAF director of strategic planning
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Figure 5.1: Municipal and household leakage responsibilities (Msunduzi city
engineers, 2003).
A water leakage project and water audit had been launched in Msunduzi at the time of
the study. However, the specific details were still pending. Widespread water leakages
had significant implications for households, municipalities and South Africa: leakages
could decrease household access to the FBW utility (households pushed into higher
stepped block tariffs- thus resulting in inability to access the 6kl allocation), increased
affordability problems to households (paying for lost water and paying at higher tariff
rates) and municipalities (in cases of non-payment or unaccounted for water, which are
transferred to households through higher tariff rates) and ultimately compromised
environmental sustainability of the resource.
5.2 AfJordability mechanisms
Household affordability was explored by analysing average low-income household
basic service expenditures, essential and additional needs with average low-income
household total income levels. Water costs were isolated and presented as a proportion
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of total household incomes. Tariffs were linked to the average low-income household
water consumption levels and their implication for total water costs and low-income
household affordability were discussed. Cross-subsidisation was presented as a method
for ensuring that low-income households could continue accessing the basic water
requirements (at an affordable tariff) by ensuring adequate cross-subsidisation from
high volume consumers, who were charged at higher tariffs. The 'willingness and
ability' of households to pay water costs was unpacked to explore if the water charges
were socially acceptable.
5.2.1 Affordability
Basic service expenses for low-income households, included III the study, were
approximated and calculated for the following basic services: water (22.5 kl per
month), electricity, waste removal and sewage, and were as follows: water costs
RI09.80 (22.5 kl); electricity costs R200.00; waste removal costs R19.53 and sewage
costs 20.75 (service figures did not include monthly arrears repayments). The total for
the approximated household expenses was R350.083 (refer to table 5.2).
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Using the following low-income household midpoint categories of income, R300, R900
and R1600, the proportion of income spent on basic service expenditures was the
following: 116.69% of R300, 38.9% of R900 and 21.88% of R1600. If the average
total income for all areas in the study was used (R932.17, refer to table 4.4), then the
proportion of income spent on basic service expenditures was 37.56% (consistent with
Pauw (2003), Public Citizen (2002b) and Bond (2001) who stated that basic service
expenditures for low-income households ranged from 25-50% of total household
3 The low-income household basic service expenses were derived from analysing municipal
consolidated bills, focus groups with community researchers and community meetings with the
wider communities (included in the study). This was necessary as the data derived from the
surveys were generally incomplete and it was necessary to triangulate data to ensure a greater
degree of accuracy.
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income, refer to. section 2.11). If monthly water costs were isolated then the proportion
of income spent on monthly water bills (RI09.80) was the following: 36.6% of R300,
12.2% of R900, 11.78% of R932.l7 (average total income) and 6.9% of R1600. If
water and sanitation expenses were added together (averaged at Rl30.55) then the
proportion of income spent on water and sanitation payments rose to 43.5% of R300,
14.5% ofR900, 14.0% ofR932.17 (average total income) and 8.2% ofR1600. These
figures were much higher then the socially acceptable tariff rates of 3-7%, as cited by
Pauw (2003) in section 2.12, and illustrated the significant affordability problem faced
by low-income households (especially low-income households at the bottom of the low-
income range who were not receiving social grants). Table 5.2 excluded arrears
repayments, which ranged from R3000 to RIO 000 per household (triangulated with
community researchers through focus groups and communities included in the study
through community meetings) and value added tax CVAT) at 14% on service expenses.
Both arrears payments and VAT compounded affordability constraints and decreased
monies available for other essential and additional needs (discussed below)..
Basic service expenditures left little monies for other essential needs e.g. rent, food,
schooling, transport, sanitation and hygiene requirements, medicines and emergency
funding. Additional needs might include: life and medical insurance, burial and pension
schemes and furniture repayments. Essential and additional needs to the basic service
expenditure equation left households struggling to balance their daily needs with
compulsory payments to secure basic services. Furthermore, although basic service
expenditures were relatively uniform for many low-income households, the amount of
remaining income (after services had been paid for) utilised for household well being
(food, schooling, transport, medicines etc) was influenced by household size, number of
children and scholars, and ill members.
The maJonty of households (95.1 %) indicated that their water charges were
unaffordable. It is important to note that the consolidated municipal bill included water,
electricity, waste removal and sewage and it is unknown if 'water' in the question was
considered as all of the above or as a separate entity. The affordability constraints
relating to water and other basic service expenditures, as indicated by households in the
study, were due to the following: household money was stretched (service expenditures
and other basic needs); water was too highly priced; there were high arrears repayments
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(67.2% ofhouseholds were in arrears); households had no one (60.5% of households) or
only one member employed (31.2% of households); approximately one-third of
households were surviving on government grants (see section 4.1.2) and household total
income was low in relation to basic service expenditures. An additional factor
affecting water affordability, as voiced by households, was poor service quality. This
was interesting as households were linking service quality to water costs hence the
service provided was not deemed worth the money that was necessary to pay fot it
(consistent with Hazelton and Kondlo, 1998, cited in section 2.11).
As indicated in the above-mentioned paragraphs, basic service expenditures were high
in relation to available household income (consistent with Public Citizen, 2002b, cited
in section 2.11). The burden of water payment responsibility fell predominately on
mothers, pensioners and other female members (refer to table 5.3). This illustrated the
gender inequity involved in water payment responsibility thereby putting increasing .
pressure on already financially and time-burdened members of society.




























Considering the total household income available, the basic service expenditures,
essential and additional basic needs expenditures and household water consumption, it
was not surprising that affordability constraints had the implication that payment rates
were low and arrears were high (refer to section 5.2.3).
5.2.2 Tariffs and cross-subsidisation
Tariff structures and cross-subsidisation were discussed because if correctly equated,
they could ease the affordability constraints faced by low-income households and
ensure that the basic water requirements for low-income households were met (refer to
section 2.12). Stepped block tariffs implemented at regular intervals along the volume
79
chain would ensure that low volume water users were charged at lower rates,
(affordability increased) and high volume water users were charged at higher rates
(providing for adequate cross-subsidisation). However as indicated in figure 5.2 below,
the Msunduzi tariff structure did not provide an adequate stepped block tariff structure
with the implication that low-income households fell into the 2
nd
block (charged
substantially higher than the 1st block) which resulted in the compounding of low-
income household affordability constraints and decreased opportunities for cross-
subsidisation.
Municipalities set their own municipal water tariffs (supposedly in adherence with the
national tariff principles). The Msunduzi tariff structure had two tariff blocks: the 1
st
block (6kl) was charged at R17, 07 (calculated from original 1st pre-FBW block 5kl
tariff at R2.29 + 2nd block 6th kl tariff at R5.11 (+inflation) = RI7.07) and the 2nd block
(7kl+) was charged at R5, 62 (figures provided by Treasury and Water department,
2003, refer to figure 5.2).
Figure 5.2: Msunduzi municipal derivation of free basic water tariffs.
The implementation of FBW saw the tariff structure largely unchanged. Hence, the
monetary value attributed to the tariff structure remained the same; it was only the
parameters that changed to incorporate an additional kilolitre (Msunduzi water
•
department, 2003). The tariff structure did not provide lower rates through lower tariffs
for low-income consumers of 22.5kl (average low-income household consumption for
the study, noting that the majority of low-income households were not accessing the
FBW utility) and did not provide disincentives through higher tariffs for water wasters
or high volume consumers (refer to figure 5.3). Cross-subsidisation was therefore
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Figure 5.3: Msunduzi municipal tariff structure.
5.2.3 Amounts households were willing and able to pay for water
On reflection of low-income household water expenditures (approximately R109.80,
refer to section 5.2.1) and non-payment rates (65.1 %4 of all households in the study,
refer to section 5.1.3), households were asked to provide amounts that they were willing
and able to pay towards their monthly water bill. The cross tabulation for the average
amount all households were willing and able to pay for their water and the total average
monthly household income are presented in table 5.4. As evident in table 5.4, it was
noted that although households having a lower relative income were prepared to spend
relatively less of their monies on water services in monetary terms they actually spent·
proportionally more of their income on water services than did relatively higher income
households (consistent with Public Citizen, 2002b, see 2.11).
4 The research statistics of 65.1% of households not paying for their water was verified
telephonically with the Msunduzi water department. The Msunduzi water department stated that
although they did not have the relevant statistics on hand, the figure did appear to be
reasonably accurate.
81
R 0 8 7 2 0 0 0 17 5.7
R 5 5 12 3 0 0 0 20 6.8
Rl0 22 33 6 5 0 0 66 22.3
R15 4 3 0 0 0 0 7 2.4
R 20 20 46 5 1 0 1 73 24.7
R 25 0 11 2 0 0 0 13 4.3
R 30 5 22 5 0 1 0 33 11.1
R 35 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 0.7
R 40 0 5 1 0 0 0 6 2.0
R 50 4 34 10 1 0 0 49 16.6
R 80 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0.7
Rl00 0 2 4 0 1 0 7 2.4
R150 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.3
Total 68 178 38 7 3 2 296 100%
Total R15.51 R25.76 R34.60 R17.14 R55.00 R85.00 R25.03
The variables of 'total average household income' and 'willingness and ability to pay'
were analysed using Pearson's Chi-Square tests for the effect of income on willingness
and ability to pay. It was found that total household income had a significant effect on
the households' willingness and ability pay (p=O.OOO). It was evident from table 5.4 that
households (all areas) with the following total average montWy household incomes
were willing and able to pay the following average equivalent in rands towards their
water costs per month: R15.51 of R300 (5.17%), R25.76 of R900 (2.9%), R34.60 of
R1600 (2.2%), R17.14 of R2500 (0.69%), R55.00 of R3500 (1.6%) and R85.00 of
R4500 (1.8%). All households (average total income for all areas of R932.17) were
willing and able to pay R25.03 (2.69%) towards their water costs per month. In
comparison with the socially acceptable tariff rates (3-7% of total income), as stated by
Libhaber cited by Pauw, in section 2.12 and 5.2.1, the amounts households were \\'illing
and able to pay towards their monthly water bills were lower than Libhaber's
recommendation. If the figures provided for the 'willingness and ability' of households
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to pay towards water bills were re-equated to Libhaber's recommendations (cited by
Pauw, 2003) then the figures would stand as follows (for 5% of total income, using the
average of 3%-7%): R15 ofR300, R45 ofR900, R80 ofR1600, R125 ofR2500, R175
of R3500, R225 of R4500 or R46.60 of R932.17 (see last row of table 5.4). It is
important to note that household 'willingness and ability' to pay might have been
underestimated, as it is human nature to underestimate both the available monies one
has, and the monies one is prepared to spend. Nevertheless, the figures presented in
table 5.4 are still significant as the gap between what tariffs should be (in socially
acceptable terms), what they are, and what is preferred is vast.
Noting that the average monthly water bill was R109.80, it was significant that only 8
households (2.7%) out of the 296 households (who respondedto the question) indicated
that they would be willing and able to pay their monthly water expenditures (including
monthly arrears payments). However, if Libhaber's recommendations were utilised,
then only 4.4% of all households in the study had an average total income ofR2500 and
would therefore fall into the category of households able to afford their average monthly
water bill (see table 4.4). This reaffirmed the "national crisis in the affordability of basic
municipal services" as cited by Bond (2001) in section 1.2.
It was necessary to identifY other variables that might influence willingness and ability
to pay, if light were to be shed on increasing payment rates. The dependant variables of
'affordability' and 'satisfaction with the water service provider and service quality' and
independant variable of 'willingness and ability to pay' were analysed using Pearson's
Chi-Square tests for the effect of perceptions of affordability and satisfaction with the
water service provider on willingness and ability to pay. It was found that perceptions
of affordability had a slight significance on the households' willingness and ability to
pay (p=0.02) whilst perceived satisfaction with the water service provider and service
quality had a significant effect on households' willingness and ability to pay (p=0.008).
Households perceiving water to be 'affordable' were prepared to pay the average of
R31.07 per month versus the R24.81 (R6.26 less) put forward by households deeming
water unaffordable. Households which were satisfied with the water service provider
and water quality were prepared to pay the average of R27.38 per month versus the
R18.74 (RI 1.08 less) put forward by households which were not satisfied with the water
service provider. Willingness to pay was determined primarily by perceptions of
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servIce quality (incidence and status of leakages, water pressure, water quality),
satisfaction with the water service provider (effectiveness and efficiency ofmunicipal
administration, responses to problems, service provision and communication) and
affordability (including social acceptance of tariffs and to a lesser extent
incidences/total amount of arrears). 'Ability to pay' was primarily attributed to
household total income, which would be influenced by demographic variables
especially household size and expenditure characteristics.
In order to triangulate the significance of satisfaction with the municipality and
affordability on willingness and ability to pay, each area's willingness and ability to pay
was observed. As indicated in table 5.5, the results support the impact of satisfaction
with the municipality and affordability on willingness and ability to pay. Hence, the
results were as follows (listed in ascending order of percentage of average total
household income per area): Imbali (unit 1) R13.35 (1.2% of RI100), Thembalihle
R12.01 (1.9% of R620), Imbali (unit 2) R22.05 (2.2% of R976.32), Haniville R21.87
(2.6% ofR831.82) and Sobantu R38.43 (3.3% ofR1158.66).
Table 5.5: How much were households (per study area) willing and able to pay for
water services.
0.00 0.00 3 0 7 0 7 17
5.00-10.00 7.50 29 13 13 1 30 86
11.00-25.00 18.00 8 12 33 25 15 93
26.00-50.00 38.00 7 10 29 39 5 90
51.00-150.00 100.50 0 1 0 9 0 10
Average per R13.35 R22.05 R21.87 R38.43 R12.01
area
The differences between the 'willingness and ability to pay' in relation to the separate
areas can be primarily attributed to household satisfaction with the municipality (refer
to table 5.6) and to a lesser degree to total average monthly household income. e.g.
Thembalihle had the lowest income per household (R620) and was least satisfied with
the municipality (and had the highest number of respondents indicating that water
service delivery should be 'improved'-23/37, refer to table 5.7); whilst Sobantu had the
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highest income per household (1158.66) and was the most satisfied with the
municipality (and had the highest number of respondents indicating that water service
delivery was 'fine'- 9/37, refer to table 5.7).
5.3 Administration systems
Administration systems encompassed two facets of water servIce administration:
payment and water service delivery reporting channels. Payment channels addressed
the delivery and receipt of municipal consolidated bills, payment points, household
members' responsible for payment and options for disputing or querying consolidated
municipal bills. Water service delivery reporting channels reflected community
structures and municipal structures available and accessible in reporting faults, issues or
queries for information.
5.3.1 Payment channels
Municipal consolidated bills were delivered through the post or by hand (where post
boxes were absent) for all communities in the study. The administration of consolidated
municipal bills (CMBs) as reported by households, included in the study, were as
follows: 38.4% = fme; 33.1% = poor; and 28.5% =very poor. Households reported that
CMBs were not delivered consistently on a standard date, sometimes did not arrive or
were delivered to the incorrect address. The data reflected that households were
generally not satisfied with the administration of CMBs.
The format of the CMBs included the household address, name of account holder,
account number and covered three different services: water, sewage and refuse
removal. Water was charged at two different tariffs (0-6k1 and 7k1 +) if more than 6k1
was consumed that the first 6kl was charged at R17.07 and the subsequent kilolitres
were charged at R5.62 per kilolitre. The date that appeared on the bill was not a
standard date (e.g. the first or last day of every month) but the date on which the meter
reading was taken. Value added tax at 14% was charged on the total current amount
due (for water plus sewage plus refuse removal). The total amount due was broken up
into arrears at 60 days, 30 days and the current account. The account date was different
to the date in which the water meter was read. Households reported that CMBs were
complicated, difficult to read and should be accompanied by an information insert to
promote ease ofunderstanding.
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Out of the 168 households that responded to the question of where households paid their
CMBs, the majority of households (78.6%) paid at the central municipality pay point,
which required transport, time (in travel and queues) and money. A small proportion of
Imbali units 1 and 2 and Sobantu residents (3.6%) used local pay point offices, 15.5%
of all households used municipal paypoints in the city and 2.3% of households used post
office pay points. Households reported that municipal and local pay point offices had
their own intrinsic problems as municipal-community communication channels (with
municipal administrative officials) were difficult to access (phones unanswered, no one
available to respond to queries in person, language barrier and a hostile environment),
which contributed to the frustration of communities as queries or inaccuracies with
CMBs were not promptly addressed. Nevertheless, despite the infrequent use of local
pay point offices (in Imbali units 1 and 2 and Sobantu), households reported that local
pay points should be implemented (albeit fundamentally enhanced) in all areas as local
offices would ease the resources required in accessing the offices and improve payment
rates. In light of the above-mentioned data, it is important to note that low-income
households are often the last to benefit from municipal initiated avenues to ease
payment hassles (e.g. through local supermarket chains or direct banking transfers) and
have to continue using valuable resources to honour their payments.
5.3.2 Water service reporting channels
The water service reporting channels used by households to report leakages, water-
related issues, or to access information were though ward committees, councillors,
informed and capacitated community members or municipal authorities. The
community councillor was the prime channel taken by households (through their ward
committees) to report their water-related issues. However, responses were frequently
delayed or absent. The preferred channel used by households (44.7%) was through
local municipal authorities via telephone or direct contact. However, many households
were forced to make arrangements within social circles or simply ignore the problem, as
official reporting channels were generally inefficient or unavailable. It was evident that
dissatisfaction existed about the current system. Community authorities generally
exhibited a low level of interest, capacity or will to take issues forward and municipal
authorities were approached with skepticism (by households) because of their
(municipal authorities) high level of bureaucracy, inaccessibility or lack of social
(customer) skills. All the above contributed to the disempowerment of households and
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a poor acknowledgement by the relevant authorities of how important it was that
communication channels were open and effectively maintained.
5.4 Water service delivery efficiencies and effectiveness
Water service delivery efficiencies and effectiveness were unpacked to provide a
holistic summary of the level of household satisfaction towards water service delivery.
Satisfaction levels of households to water service delivery were generally positive but
numerous potential improvements (reported by households) were provided.
The variables of 'household satisfaction with the municipality' and 'study area' were
analysed using Pearson's Chi-Square tests to determine if the satisfaction of households
residing in different communities was different. It was found that there was a
significant difference in household satisfaction with the municipality between different
communities (p=O.OOO). Refer to table 5.6. Household satisfaction with the
municipality are in ascending order: Thembalihle [42.1%], Imbali (unit 1) [50%],
Imbali (unit 2) [52.9%], Haniville [87.4%] and Sobantu [88.6%]. Because the degree of
satisfaction between areas was diverse, and the respondents displayed caution when
answering the question, it was necessary to unpack the 'satisfaction with the
municipality.' 'Satisfaction with the municipality' was attributed to the municipality not
implementing broad based punitive measures for non-payment and extending water
services to those households not formerly connected to the reticulation system.
Satisfaction levels were therefore based on access and not service delivery efficiency.
Furthermore, households displayed caution in challenging the municipality for fear that
it might lead to disconnection or discrimination. The cautionary principle was adopted
because of two factors: many households were not paying for their water and feared
that their rights to criticise the municipality were limited and their level of participation
in the water sector was poor. Household dissatisfaction with the municipality were
attributed to the following: poor service quality, poor channels of communication,
delays in responding to problems, old or inferior reticulation systems, delayed leakage
responses, meter reading concerns, affordability constraints, inadequate arrangements or
warning in cases of service disconnections (during system maintenance) and
disconnections for non-payment.
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Households, in the study, provided the following suggestions on how the Msunduzi
municipality could improve service delivery (prioritised in descending order- refer to
table 5.7): local community involvement and improved communication (28.1%);
improving service delivery- non-specific (24,8%); repairing and replacement of delivery
systems (11.2%); improving water affordability (8.3%); meter information, improved
meter reading or monitoring technology change (7.8%); no changes required (5.8%);
improving access (4.9%); in-house connections (4.9%); information and education
(2.9%) and implementing a flat monthly charge (1.5%). The majority of households
from Imbali (units 1 and 2) and Haniville suggested increased community involvement
and communication; Sobantu reported that the water service delivery was fine and
Thembalihle residents indicated improved service delivery (non-specific).
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Improve service 6 3 13 6 23 51
delive
Repair/replace pipes 8 2 2 5 6 23
and ta s
Improved 2 5 6 2 2 17
affordabili
Meter information, 3 9 2 16
improved reading or
technolo chan e
Water service 0 9 12
delive fine
Im roved access 1 1 4 3 1 10
Water connection 0 4 3 3 0 10
inside house
Information and 0 3 2 0 6
education
Flat rate 2 0 1 0 0 3
* 1high priority for group and 10 low priority for group
The information requested by households, in the study, was the following: all aspects
of free basic water; how the water system and administrative system worked; how
households could conserve water; sanitation information; how meters worked, how
meters were read and how to read meters in conjunction with CMBs; affordability and
payment options and how water was polluted. The majority of households reported that
information was imperative for an effective water service delivery.
5.5 Summary of sub problem one
The experiences of Msunduzi low-income households to Municipal water servIce
delivery were explored in relation to the study themes. The experiences of Msunduzi
low-income households to municipal water service delivery were disconcerting. Low-
income households were unable to obtain the utility of FBW as the FBW allocation did
not meet basic water requirements; meters were ineffectively monitored and managed,
leakages were poorly prioritised; tariffs were poorly equated which refuted cross-
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subsidisation mechanisms thereby providing little respite to low-income household
affordability constraints; administration channels were inaccessible and water service
delivery was inefficient and ineffective. However, despite the numerous problems
within the Msunduzi municipal water service delivery system, households seemed
cautious and in many cases reluctant to challenge the municipality on the obvious
inefficiencies. An air of powerlessness (ofcommunities) existed owing to the feelings
that the community bargaining position was lessened owing to high non-payment rates
and limited platforms to engage with municipal officials and community structures.
Considering the experiences of Msunduzi low-income households to municipal water
service delivery, chapter six will endeavour to identify where the discrepancies in South
Africa's policies, strategies and implementation lie, as it addresses the equity,
accessibility, affordability, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability of local and





. ULTS: NATIONAL POLICY AND STRATEGY IMPLEMENTED IN THE
. MSUNDUZI MUNICIPALITY
Chapter 6 addresses sub problem 2: Are local and national water service delivery
policies and strategies equitable, accessible, affordable, efficient, effective and
sustainable in servicing Msunduzi low-income households? This is related to the sector
goals as stated in the Draft White Paper on Water ervices (2002) that guarantees all
people the right to access adequate and affor le potable water to meet basic domestic
needs and water and sanitation services should be delivered equitably, affordably,
effectively, efficiently and sustainably to satisfy sector goals. All of the prior-
mentioned sector goals are systematically discussed, with the inclusion of accessibility,
to provide an overview from which the research problem can be examined.
National policies and strategies are governed by the Growth, employment and
redistribution strategy's (GEAR) requirement of fiscal discipline which has the
implication that municipalities are forced to recover costs (in the desperate pursuit of
implementing 'unfunded mandates') from all households, even those who can ill afford
the full costs of service delivery (refer to section 1.1). However, municipalities are
entrusted by their citizens to find amicable mechanisms for implementing national
policies and strategies, and it is here that municipalities should be receptive to the needs
of low-income households. It is therefore argued that municipalities are not doing
enough towards the interests of low-income households and the experiences of
Msunduzi low-income households (as presented in chapter 5) bears this out.
6.1 Is South Africa's water service delivery equitable for Msunduzi low-income
households?
The Draft White Paper on Water Services (2002 p8, refer to section 1.8) defined
equitable as 'adequate services to all people, fairly.' The research found that South
Africa's water services, according to the afore-mentioned definition, were not equitable.
Inequities played themselves out in every aspect of water service delivery, be it
differential water service connections, affordability mechanisms, credit control policies,
water restrictions, inadequate warnings for water disconnections or system maintenance,
inadequate mechanisms for problem resolution and poor treatment of citizens at the
hands of administrators.
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A prime example of inequity was the failure to incorporate cross-subsidisation from
past connections to present ones (specifically pre-1994 and post-1994 connections).
Newly connected (primarily low-income) townships often had to pay additional charges
on their monthly service bills to cover system connections (over and above tariff rates).
Thembalihle was such a case. Thembalihle had the lowest total household income per
area and per person, in the study, as indicated in table 4.4. However, Thembalihle
residents paid a flat rate charge of R54.00 per month for their sewage connection in
comparison to other study areas, which paid a flat rate charge of R20.75 per month.
The difference was attributed to the recent implementation of a water and sewage
system in Thembalihle, 1999. Such a situation, void of cross-subsidisation, ignored the
substantial benefits captured by past recipients and more significantly was in breech of
the Draft White Paper on Water Services, as an inequitable tariff (NGO, 2003;
consistent with Hall, undated, section 2.12).
Inequities linked to the type ofwater system connection to low-income households were
prominent. All of the study areas had in-yard yet out-of-house water connections. Such
connections, although considered 'adequate' by authorities, were not equitable.
Authorities argued that out-of-house connections were the only amicable option in
ensuring access to basic water services (for all) and satisfying financial objectives. One
could argue that the type of water system connection provided was strongly correlated
to the ability of the municipality to recover revenue from the recipients. Therefore,
although acknowledging the financial constraints of municipalities, it was argued that
water system connections were chosen on cost-recovery principles and were not
equitable with those in higher income suburbs. Furthermore, regardless of the type of
water system connection (in-yard or in-house connections), the costs of water delivery
were identical. Hence, low-income households, having relatively inferior in-yard water
system connections compared to higher income suburbs (with in-house connections)
were expected to pay the same tariffs for their water services as higher income suburbs.
6.2 Is South Africa's water service delivery accessible for Msunduzi low-income
households?
'Accessible' by the researcher's definition is, "not restricted or constrained; easy to
obtain by all," (see section 1.9). In the following section, access is discussed only in
relation to access to the free basic water utility and not access to water per se. The
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minimum core right to water, basic water requirements, significant factors relating to
the basic water requirements and reference to the RDP access goals are discussed. The
indigent policy and FBW policy's relationship are investigated.
6.2.1 Free basic water and water access
Access to water was confined to the 'minimum core right' and was not an 'absolute
right' (Draft White Paper on Water Services, 2002 p33 section 2.2). This meant that
access to water had the conditions of 'responsibility' attached to it. 'Responsibility'
was interpreted as paying for the services received. If a low-income household was
unable to pay for its services, then it was branded as 'irresponsible', and its rights to the
'absolute' access to water were waived and the 'minimum core right,' provided by
FBW, came into effect. The 'minimum core right' may have been considered
acceptable, if it met basic household water requirements; but it did not. The South
,~constitution guaranteed all people the right to access adequate (and affordable)
potable water to meet basic domestic needs (refer to section 2.2). The Department of
Water Affairs and Forestry's Vote 34 (refer to section 2.11) reference to the FBW
policy as a 'further step towards the goal of access to basic water for all'; was not true,
as it was not expanding access to water, as low-income households could not meet their
basic water needs within its allocation.
The question, therefore, is why did the FBW policy not ensure that the FBW allocation
accounted for meeting basic water requirements (consistent with section 2.13) and why
did it fail to account for the realities of household size; number of dependants
(consumption increases because of frequent clothing washes and hygiene practices); ill
household members (specifically people living with HIV/AIDS whose hygiene goals
were essential for well-being thus requiring higher water volume); flush toilets (using 91
per flush); differentiations of weekday and weekend (increased washing); more
members present, visitors, washing cars- increased volumes used); and water for
productive use? The suggestion by AIDe (2002) that the FBW allocation was devoid
of scientific calculations was increasingly plausible, especially if we considered that it
ignored the previously mentioned variables. Alternatively, could it be that the FBW
allocation was just based on financial considerations? Or was it a political bargaining
tool? Whatever the reason, be it uninformed decision making, the cost-recovery focus
or furthering political agendas, the FBW policy did not meet the basic water
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requirements. Hence, many households faced significant access and affordability
constraints as a result of a policy that was purported to actually increase the
accessibility to and ease the affordability of water for all South Africans.
Accessibility should be commensurate with an adequate volume of water to meet basic
water requirements. The FBW allocation of 200l/household/day ignored the fact that
low-income households had more than 4 members (research statistics, as presented in
table 4.2, indicated that the average household had 5.4 members. In addition, the
researcher put this figure closer to 8-members to account for backyard shack residents).
Hence, the WHO recommendations would only be met for a 4-member household.
Albeit that the WHO recommendations of 50l/person/day have already been argued as
not meeting the true basic water requirements (Gleick, 1996; SAMWU, 2002; AIDC,
2002 section 2.13); nevertheless the 200l/household/day, provided by the FBW policy,
did not meet WHO recommendations of 50l/person/day (Gleick, 1996; SAMWU, 2002;
AIDC, 2002: or basic water requirements of 631 + per person per day, refer to
section 2.13) and was even further from consumption patterns of 93.751/person/day
(calculated from municipal statistics, refer to section 5.1.3). All of this indicated that the
2001 allocation per household per day provided by FBW was not sufficient to meet the
basic water requirements.
The RDP stated that 25l/person/day (derived from the allocation of 200l/8-member
household/day) was a provisional goal with the end goal being 50l/person/day (NGO,
2003). Noting that DWAF's implementation time line is set at 2004 (refer to
section 2.13), it is uncertain whether access is likely to increase by 2004, if DWAF
continues the pursuit of implementing the inadequate 6kl allocation per household per
month. Access to adequate water should take into account the following: basic
minimum water requirements; household demographics and household water usage
patterns; household income and expenditure statuses; ability to pay; tariff structures;
seasonal variation and the ease with which households can adapt to lower volume
allocations e.g. the current 25kl of water per month to 6kl water per month to qualify for
the FBW utility. This paper is not advocating that fixed volumetric allocations be
implemented for all households by simply raising the 6kl FBW allocation. Rather, it is
advocating that all factors are acknowledged and amicable policy changes are made
(drawing on the low-income experience of FBW) to ensure that real accessibility
mandates are achieved.
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6.2.2 Indigent policy and water access
The indigent policy was based on ensuring the access of low-income households to a
subsidised or lifeline basket of social services (NOG, 2003). Two fundamental
problems existed with the indigent policy regarding water service access: the indigent
policy did not subsidise water consumed over the 6kl allocation and it restricted water
access to only 6kl, if households could not pay additional volumes (over 6kl) consumed.
Noting that low-income households (included in the study) qualified as indigents (total
average household income calculated at R932.17, which is less than R1378 per month
limit in the indigent policy, refer to section 4.1.2) and used between 20-25kl/
household/month, it was conceivable that low-income households would not be able to
access the FBW utility and would therefore be expected to pay for any water consumed
over the 6kl provided. Hence, the indigent policy was based on the flawed FBW policy
and perpetuated the same inadequacies.
6.3 Is South Africa's water service delivery affordable for Msunduzi low-
income households?
Affordability is discussed with reference to tariffs, cross-subsidisation and credit
control. Tariffs are presented as a mechanism to promote affordability and amicable
cross-subsidisation. Credit control is explored in terms of how inadequate credit control
measures may compromise the basic water requirements and compound low-income
household affordability constraints. The efficiency and effectiveness of responding to
and addressing leakages also affect the affordability of and access to adequate water.
6.3.1 Tariffs and cross-subsidisation
The tariff principles of equity, proportional use, differentiation and affordability as set
out by the Draft White Paper on Water Services (paragraph 5.7.1 p37, refer to
section 2.12) were not being upheld by the Msunduzi municipality (DC22). This has
been verified by the experiences of Msunduzi's low-income households (refer to
section 5.2.2 and expanded below). Tariffs were inequitable: the poorly equated tariff
structure provided limited steps for cross-subsidisation. Low-income and low-
consumption users received no differentiated concessions, as tariffs were not
comparable with use: after 6kl were consumed, all households (low or high consumers)
paid for their water at a fixed charge of R5.62 per kilolitre. Tariffs were not
implemented according to differentiated water system connections (in-yard or in-
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house). All households, regardless of water system connection, paid the same tariff for
their water service. Tariffs were not affordable: low-income households struggled to
pay their water bills as their water and sanitation expenditures came to the range of
8.2%-43.5% of total household incomes from R300-RI600 (the modal percentage for
the average total income of R932.17 was 14.5%, see section 5.2.1). The tariff structure
worked on the assumption that all low-income households were accessing the lifeline
tariff provided by FBW. This was an inaccurate assumption. Low-income households
consuming more than 6kl, remained firmly set in the 2nd tariff step and received no
subsidisation benefits. The amended tariff structure (with the implementation of FBW)
had not brought a monetary shift, rather a parameter shift (of lkl, see figure 5.2) with
the implication that cost-recovery was still being pursued from low-income households
who could ill afford the tariff charges. Poorly equated tariff structures decreased cross-
subsidisation options from rich to poor and industryl to domestic users. The Municipal
water department (2003), when questioned by the researcher on the Msunduzi
municipality's breech of the tariff principles, indicated that they were aware of the
incongruities. However they asserted that the decision-makers in council refused to
listen to their concerns. The Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, the regulator of
tariffs, as stated in section 2.12, should, according to its role, use its teeth to ensure that
the Msunduzi municipality amends its tariff structure.
Furthermore, because the FBW of 6kl/month was non-discriminatory, affluent small
member households could be benefiting from a scheme, which was not primarily tailor-
made for them. The inflexible tariff structure had in affect brought no resolution to the
affordability constraints facing low-income households.
1 Industry in Msunduzi is charged the follOWing tariffs: R2.95 (0-400kl), R2.76 (401-1 OOOkl)
and R2.28 (lOOl-no limit). (Municipal administration, 2003). It is interesting that the most
industry can be charged for their water is R11 881 per month (Municipal administration, 2003).
Hence no disincentives are included for high consumption; instead industry is proVided
concessions for high consumption. At the very least, industry tariffs should reflect the 'polluter
pays' principle to promote the environmental sustainability of the resource (NGO, 2003). This is
because, when industry pollutes, it is the municipality's responsibility to fit the bill for clean-up
operations (NGO, 2003).
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An example of the rigid tariff structure and the inadequate conceptualisation and
integration of the FBW policy was that of the situation whereby households able to
access the FBW utility still had to pay a flat-rate service charge for sewage services
2
•
6.3.2 Credit control and affordability
If households consumed more than 6kl and were unable to pay the additional volume
consumed, than a credit control policy was implemented with the implication that
households were restricted to only 6kl via restriction washers. Restriction washers were
mechanisms that allowed only 200 litres to be made available to households per day,
thereby complying with the 6kl allocation. Restricted water supply was an unacceptable
form of credit control as 6kl was not sufficient to cover the basic water requirements
essential for the survival of medium-large households. Low-income households could
not use less than their basic water requirement and still remain healthy. The study
found no correlation between water volume consumed per person per day and average
total household income for low-income households (see table 6.1). As indicated by the
households in the study, households with the average total income of R300, R900,
R1600, R2500, R3500 and R4500 consumed the following per person average
consumption per day: 36.7, 35.3, 42.9, 35.7, 25 and 37.5 litres. The Pearson Chi-
Square test analysis of monthly average total household income and average water
consumption per person per day revealed that there were no significant water
consumption differences between households with varying income levels (P=0.996).
Hence, income levels up to or equal to a point (indicated as R4500 in the study) had no
significance on the amount of water consumed per person per day. The FBW policy
was therefore based on the incorrect premise that low-income households required less
water than relatively higher income households. This highlighted a fundamental truth in
that all households (poor or rich) required a basic minimum amount of water per day to
ensure that their basic needs were satisfied. This point was frequently absent from
government policy (especially the FBW policy) and departmental administration, and
should be noted.
2 The indigent policy is to cover sewerage free of charge. However, this can only be
implemented once households are registered as indigents; until such time, households continue
to pay for sewage services (Msunduzi municipality indigents policy, 2002).
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Table 6.1: Cross tabulation of monthly average total household income and water
consumption per person per day.
5~ 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
10 ~ 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
15 ~ 0 4 0 0 0 0 4
20 ~ 11 16 0 0 0 0 27
25 ~ 21 50 12 4 3 1 91
30 ~ 5 12 3 0 0 0 20
35 ~ 2 5 2 0 0 0 9
40 ~ 7 10 4 0 0 0 21
45 ~ 0 4 1 0 0 0 5
50 ~ 8 35 8 3 0 1 55
55 ~ 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
60 ~ 0 8 0 0 0 0 8
65 ~ 1 1 0 0 0 0 2
70 ~ 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
75 ~ 0 1 1 0 0 0 2
80 ~ 0 2 2 0 0 0 4
100 ~ 0 4 2 0 0 0 6
125 ~ 0 2 0 0 0 0 2
180 ~ 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
200 ~ 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
59 156 35 7 3 2 262
Households should not have been discriminated against because the FBW policy
allocation was inadequate. There seemed to be a deliberate manipulation of the FBW or
access policy to be used as a restriction and credit control policy. The FBW policy
should have ensured the free allocation met the basic water requirements and it should
not have been accompanied by a restriction policy if more than 6kl of water was
consumed and not paid for. Prior to the implementation of FBW, households were
liable for disconnection for non-payment of water or unpaid arrears3. This action was
neither equitable nor just4• The implementation of FBW allowed for at least 6kl to be
accessed, even if households were unable to meet payments. If more than 6kl was used
3 In certain instances, households were liable for the repossession of household goods or even
the eviction from their houses by the municipality (Imbali units 1 and 2 and Sobantu
respondents).
4 In 2003, it was deemed illegal (except in the case of criminal tampering with the supply
infrastructure) to completely disconnect households for non-payment of water services; the
household may only be restricted to 6kl per month.
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and not paid for, then restriction washers were implemented by the municipality to
ensure that low-income households could access a small (yet inadequate for medium-
larger households) amount of water (6kl) and municipalities could limit financial losses.
Medium-larger households, restricted to 6kl of water through the municipal
implementation of restriction washers, had their rights compromised and in this case
(where the FBW policy is directly used as a credit control mechanism) the FBW policy
is in breach of the constitutional right of households to access adequate water to meet
basic domestic needs. If the restriction washers were removed, or if there was evidence
of tampering, then the household was liable for even greater injustices delivered through
the disconnection of water supplies. This was a controversial issue, as tampering was
likely to occur because 6kl was not sufficient to meet basic water requirements.
It was argued by the municipal water department that the FBW allocation would only be
used effectively once credit control policies were implemented. This was supported by
the Draft White Paper on Water Services that stated "a consumer who does not pay for
wate~n to the amount consumed has no incentive not to waste water" (Draft
White Paper on Water Services, 2002, paragraph 5.7.1 p37). Hence, if a low-income
household used more than 6kl and could not afford the payments (this ignored the
inadequacy of the 6kl allocation and the affordability constraints faced by low-income
households), then they were wasting water. If a high-income household used more than
6kl, this was expected, and because the rich could afford it, it was not considered as
wastage but valuable in recovering much needed revenue. Ultimately, the well being of
households should be given preference and other cost recovery avenues investigated.
6.3.3 Leakages: affordability, efficiency and effectiveness
The Draft White Paper on Water Services (2002, paragraph 6.3 p46) stated that 'water
service authorities should consider providing assistance for the repair of plumbing
fittings as this is a cost-effective intervention in reducing water service costs to both
consumers and the water service provider' (refer to section 2.14). As depicted in
figure 5.1, the municipality's responsibility ended at the household meter. Noting that
contractors connected the fittings from the meter to the tap, and that monitoring of
contractors was poor (reported by households and Msunduzi NGO, 2003), it is critical
that such a service exists. The City Engineers (2003) acknowledged these problems.
However, they stated that they were limited by budgetary constraints; hence, the
Msunduzi municipality did not apply their lateral thinking to the systematic and cost-
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benefit approach of pressure management, technical innovation, and the development of
management information systems (refer to section 2.16). The development of
management information systems, identified by the Draft White Paper on Water
Services (2002), were not adequately implemented by the Msunduzi municipality and
the current system was not consistent with the 'proactive approach' asserted in
section 2.14. The Msunduzi municipality had initiated a toll free line for reporting
leakages and complaints. However, this initiative was constrained by limited finances,
human resources and innovative systems. Until an effective water demand management
plan is implemented, households will continue receiving inflated water bills and in the
case of inability to pay, the municipality will continue recouping losses for unaccounted
for water through the transfer of the financial burden to households through increasing
tariffs which will still not be able to be paid.
6.4 Is South Africa's water service delivery efficient and effective for Msunduzi
low-income households?
As stated in section 1.9, 'efficient' is defined as the job being well done and physically
reaches all people and 'effective' is defined as resources not being wasted (Draft White
Paper on Water Services, 2002 p8). The majority of households (98.4%), in the study,
had on site taps (refer to section 4.1.3) and free basic water had a 100% coverage rate
(assuming 100% coverage of 98.4% of households having on-site taps). One would
therefore deem that the Msunduzi municipality had reached a high level of efficiency.
However, the majority of households had major problems with the inability to pay their
consolidated municipal bills and were not accessing the FBW utility. Furthermore,
regarding the effectiveness of water service delivery in relation to the aforementioned
section 6.3.3, one would find it very difficult to affirm that water resources are not
being wasted. One would therefore argue that the Msunduzi municipality is neither
efficient nor effective. However, the efficiency and effectiveness of South Africa's
water service delivery was primarily investigated by considering the new role of local
government provided by the decentralisation of the Department of Water Affairs and
Forestry. Cooperation between and within departments was also considered as a critical
aspect of efficient and effective water service delivery.
The Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) is undergoing a period of
decentralisation. DWAF will remain 'a regulator, a policy maker and a supporter' but
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all other national responsibilities will be transferred to local government (Draft White
Paper on Water Services, 2002, paragraph 4.22 pI5). This provides local government
(municipalities) with numerous challenges in that their capacity will have to be
substantially increased if they are to take on their new roles efficiently. Furthermore, a
worrying aspect is that if local government is not ready for their new role, the private
sector may grasp the opportunity to be water service providers and may be the preferred
option considered by municipalities. This is in contradiction of the capacity building
and local governance principles motivating the decentralisation objectives. Furthermore,
it raises concern because 42% of DWAF's budget is allocated for private consultants
(DWAF Vote 34, 2003 p821). If DWAF does not have the capacity then the probability
of local government having the capacity is poor. Decentralisation of water services to
local governments comes at a time when municipalities are expected to do more with
less and do better with what they have. With the changing policy environment, it can be
said that decentralisation is being implemented with undue haste, as many
municipalities do not yet have their 'house in order' and are still struggling to achieve
water delivery goals even with the full support ofDWAF.
There were significant cooperation challenges faced within the local Msunduzi
municipality's administration, treasury, engineering and water departments. It was
attributed, as described by the municipal water department (personal communication,
2003), as a 'silo-effect' whereby different departments did not communicate with one
another and had a conflict of interests. This frequently resulted in projects not being
provided sufficient financing, political backing or social prioritisation, which
culminated in inefficiencies and uninformed decisions. Furthermore, the municipal
water department and city engineers stated that there was substantial political
interference in budgetary allocation and the prioritisation of water issues. There were
communication barriers within decision-making forums, whereby the recommendations
of diverse departments seldom were synthesised into integrated strategies (City
Engineers, 2003). This resulted in the municipal council ('rubberstampers') taking
decisions from uninformed positions and ignoring critical aspects, which ultimately
meant that adopted strategies were neither holistic nor efficient.
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6.5 Is South Africa's water service delivery sustainable?
The financing of South Africa's water service delivery was primarily based on 'user
fees' or cost-recovery from users for services received. Such a system should have been
accompanied by well-placed subsidies if it was to be sustainable. Currently,
subsidisation mechanisms provided by tariffs, the FBW policy and indigent policy are
ineffective, which provides significant challenges for cost-recovery owing to the fact
that the majority of low-income Msunduzi residents and South Africans are unable to
pay the expected full cost of water services. The Draft White Paper on Water Services
(2002) stated that tariffs should promote financial and environmental sustainability.
The definition of financial sustainability was the following: subject to explicit external
subsidies, tariffs should at least recover full capital costs in addition to operating and
maintenance (Draft White Paper on Water Services, 2002, paragraph 5.7.1 p37).
Hence, financial sustainability was based on subsidies and cost recovery. The problem
with cost recovery arose when cross-subsidisation through tariff structures was poorly
equated. The irony is that when tariffs are poorly equated, water is even less affordable
which translates to low levels of cost recovery, which once again turns full cycle to the
increase of tariffs.
6.5.1 Financial sustainability
The financing of FBW was based on the equitable share, user fees and cross-
subsidisation. The equitable share was a non-conditional grant, calculated on a basket
of basic services (based on census data) for targeted poverty relief allocated on the
population served by 284 municipalities (NGO, 2003). It was sourced directly from the
division of revenue act through the national fiscus and its annual amount increased or
decreased annually depending on the pressure put on the national treasury for tax relief
(refer to section 2.10). Because the equity share was a non-conditional grant, national
government could not dictate its use, but could merely recommend its use (Draft White
Paper on Water Services, 2002, paragraph 5.6.3. p35). Municipalities were therefore
able to decide on its application, which mayor may not have been allocated to financing
water services (refer to section 2.10). Furthermore, the regulation of the equitable
share's use was poor and there were no mechanisms to ensure that it was allocated to
water provision. The Msunduzi tariff structure did not allow sufficient scope for cross-
subsidisation leaving the financing largely up to the equitable share (non-conditional
grant) and user fees (which were dependant on high payment rates). The financial
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sustainability of FBW was· severely compromised by the reliance on the poorly
regulated and fluctuating equitable share. Low-income households, which consumed
more than the FBW allocation of 6kl, were unable to access the benefits of the equitable
share and the poorly equated tariff structure provided no cross-subsidisation resulting in
their expectation to pay the full cost for their water provision. A question, reliant on
obtaining Msunduzi municipal statistics on how many low-income households are
accessing the FBW utility, is if the FBW utility is not being accessed by the majority of
low-income households (as this research suggests), then where is the Equity Share
going to?
6.5.2 Environmental sustainability
The Draft White Paper on Water Services (2002, paragraph 5.7.1 p37) stated,
"environmental sustainability can be promoted by ensuring that external environmental
costs are internalised into the tariff structure". A 'rising block' or stepped tariff.
structure discouraged excessive use of water and reflected the marginal cost of
expanding supply capacity (Draft White Paper on Water Services, 2002, paragraph 5.7.1
p37). The findings from the research indicated that environmental sustainability via a
limited 'rising tariff structure' was not adequate in promoting the conservation of water
nor was it adequate in providing for cross-subsidisation of the resource. The tariff
structure in Msunduzi was in contradiction with environmental sustainability:
Msunduzi had insufficient 'rising block tariffs' (only two blocks: flat rate of R17, 07
for first 6kl and R5.62 per additional kilolitre used, regardless of household volumetric
consumption). This had the implication that low-income households, not accessing the
FBW utility, paid the same tariff for their water as high consumers and high consumers
had little incentive to save water (as there was no steep increase in tariffs after the
original 7kl tariff of R5.62). Moreover, industry in Msunduzi was charged at
descending tariff rates; hence, the more water they used, the less they paid per kilolitre
(R2.95 [0-400kl], R2.76 [401-1000kl] and R2.28 [lOOl-no limit], see 6.3.1) thereby
receiving no incentives to conserve or recycle their industrial water used. Low-income
household monthly water and arrears payments became insurmountable owing to very
real afTordability constraints, which rendered water usage and economic cost linkages
useless (because households never expected to ever finish paying their water arrears
which were beginning to look like mortgages). The inability to pay coupled with
Unrestricted water usage (no credit controls implemented as yet) had serious
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implications for the sustainability of the water resource. Household conservation of
water was limited to personal water consumption restriction. However, it was noted
that the majority of households requested water conservation infonnation therefore, it
could be assumed that water was not entirely without financial or environmental value
(the social value was noted as high, see section 5.1.1). Moreover, household meters
were not utilised as water consumption monitoring tools thereby negating an important
conservation tool. However, the blame could not be solely aimed at low-income
households as the municipality had underestimated its value for household water
demand management.
6.6 Summary of sub problem two
Chapter six highlighted that local and national water servIce delivery policies and
strategies and the implementation of policy and strategies were neither equitable,
accessible, affordable, efficient, effective nor sustainable for Msunduzi low-income .
households. The majority of inconsistencies existed at the implementation level (poor
or inadequate regulation, tariff setting and water demand management). However, in
certain cases it was the policy and strategy that was at fault due to its reliance on cost-
recovery principles, inadequate lifeline allocation and poor integration of related
variables. Many of these problems existed because the regulation at national level was
not implemented properly which allowed for many irregularities to go unnoticed e.g. the
inequitable connection costs as was evident in Thembalihle and the poorly equated
block tariffs (in Msunduzi Municipality). Clear and infonned policies and strategies
should have incorporated integrated approaches with a clear cognisance of the
constraints faced by low-income households and a solid public participation foundation.
Chapter seven addresses policy, strategy and implementation shortcomings and suggests




RESULTS: REFORMS TO POLICIES AND STRATEGIES
Chapter seven addresses sub problem 3: what refonns can be made to national and
local water service delivery policies and strategies to ensure equitable, accessible,
affordable, efficient, effective and sustainable water service delivery to low-income
households? The variables of equity, accessibility, affordability, efficiency,
effectiveness and sustainability are not presented in isolation; rather water service
delivery contraventions, inconsistencies or inadequacies are approached directly. This
approach is taken as many of the variables are crosscutting and can be applied to all or
some of the policies, strategies or water service delivery issues. In conjunction with the
above-mentioned variables, the following issues will be discussed: free basic water
policy and implementation strategies, low-income household affordability constraints,
affordability mechanisms, credit control policies, monitoring mechanisms and water
demand management, administration and financial mobilisation. Refonns are suggested
through the vehicle of reviews, evaluations and audits to make infonned amendments
and adjustments in policies, strategies and regulation and monitoring mechanisms.
7.1 Free basic water policy and implementation strategies
Free basic water (FBW), as described in this study, has been synonymous with access to
the FBW utility (refer to section 2.13). This is a limited description and negates the
broader situation whereby certain households do not have access to water (let alone
access to FBW). However, for the purposes of the debate, access is described here by
the narrow definition as 'the access to the FBW utility.' A national FBW evaluation
should be implemented to clarify the accessibility of the FBW utility. The basic water
requirements for health, well-being and satisfying productive, sustainable livelihoods
should be scientifically and socially assessed. A parallel process should be
implemented to create platfonns whereby the experience of low-income households to
FBW could be showcased. The outcomes of the evaluation, basic water requirements
and low-income experiences to FBW should be integrated and used to adjust the FBW
policy for the achievement of the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry's (DWAF)
accessibility mandate. The amended policy should incorporate the factors affecting
consumption (household size, number of dependants, ill household members, flush
toilets, differentiations of weekday and weekend, seasonal variation, rural/urban
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location, water for productive use and socio-economic situations) and adopt a diverse
and integrated approach. As is the case of the Msunduzi municipality, the FBW
policy's implementation is only phase one. Such amendments should be built into
policy evaluations and inform future implementation plans/phases.
The implications of the process provided above are that the amended FBW policy will
be more accessible and acceptable to low-income households. The main objective of
the FBW amendments should be to ensure that the spirit of the FBW policy is upheld,
that is of increasing access to water for all (as per the Draft White Paper on Water
Services, 2002; Bill of Human Rights, 1996 and National Water Act 36, 1998), not
simply expanding the number of municipalities implementing the FBW policy (there is
no correlation between municipalities implementing the FBW policy and the numbers
of people accessing the FBW utility). In addition, the free basic sanitation policy
should be integrated with the amended FBW policy. Monitoring systems and criteria
should be implemented by DWAF to verify if FBW and free basic sanitation efforts are
meeting accessibility targets and policy objectives.
The access to the FBW utility is determined by household consumption patterns and
needs (can they or can they not limit themselves to only 6kl); and the access to water
(over and above the 6k1) is determined by affordability constraints and the severity of
credit controls. Hence, if households require more than 6kl for their basic water
requirements, which is plausible especially for medium-large households, affordability
constraints mean that households will either have to use their limited income to pay for
additional volumes consumed or restrict their water consumption to 6kl (implications
for health) or consider alternatives to their household supply. It is therefore necessary
to unpack the affordability constraints faced by low-income households so as to provide
suggestions to ensure that households are able to access the basic water requirements for
their survival.
7.2 Low-income household affordability constraints
There should be a national review of the affordability constraints facing low-income
households. This is consistent with the White Paper on National Water Policy for South
Africa (1997), which states that government should move systematically to achieve
realistic water pricing within a reasonable time frame. The 'realistic water pricing' as
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addressed by the White Paper on National Water Policy for South Africa (1997) should
be implemented by amending current expected water and sanitation expenditures to
within reasonable charges and realigning these charges with the percentage of average
total household income low-income households were willing and able to pay towards
their monthly water and sanitation expenses (see table 5.4), with the socially acceptable
tariff rates of 3-7% (as cited by Pauw, 2003, in section 2.12). See table 7.1.














Table 7.1 indicates the complexity of realigning expected payments with willingness
and ability and socially acceptable tariff percentages. However, it is the researcher's
opinion that two variables could simplify the alignment: firstly, the amount households
were expected to pay is too high (tariffs poorly equated and inequity within the water
delivery system) and secondly, the amounts households were willing and able to pay to
secure water services were understated (such is human nature). Hence, it is the
researcher's opinion that if water and sanitation services were priced giving special
consideration to income and service expenditures of low-income households, household
size, number of dependants and people living with HIV/AIDS, then the socially
acceptable tariff (range of 3-7%) would be obtainable. Moreover, service expenditures
for low-income households should be decreased if government is to fulfil its
affordability and accessibility mandate. This can be achieved through equitable tariff
structures that allow for sufficient cross-subsidisation measures. Cross-subsidisation
should be crosscutting and be utilised across services and not simply services in
isolation (hence not ring fenced).
Further mechanisms to promote affordability (as suggested by households), could
include the following: removing vat on basic service expenditures (following the same
vein as VAT-free basic food stuffs e.g. brown bread and mealie meal); and scrapping
arrears on basic service expenditures, providing for a fresh start. Scrapping arrears
could be a valuable tool in promoting the payment of services as mounting debt causes a
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powerlessness to ever finish paying off debts and mitigates against future payments.
Skills programmes, as stated by households, on household budgetary management could
be valuable in assisting households to budget correctly. The low-income households'
willingness and ability to pay should be elicited to ensure that pricing policies are
acceptable (price and service quality relationship) and affordable to low-income
households. The social acceptance of service expenditure costs by low-income
households is critical.
The socio-economic constraints facing low-income households can be addressed
through properly equated tariff structures and policies that specifically address the needs
and circumstances of low-income households. Mechanisms are available for this
purpose e.g. cross-subsidisation, tax-based approaches, indigent policies and solidarity
charges (see section 2.12). Currently, however, affordability constraints reduce access
to essential services whilst putting the health, well being and sustainability of
households in jeopardy. Affordability should be reviewed and pricing and cross-
subsidisation policies should be reviewed, adapted and expanded to be truly receptive
and valuable to low-income households.
7.3 Affordability mechanisms
Amended tariff structures and the indigent policy, if correctly equated, could promote
the affordability of water delivery services for low-income households. The Msunduzi
tariff structures suggested that tariffs were neither affordable nor equitable to Msunduzi
low-income households. A national review of tariff structures should be initiated as
poorly equated tariff structures, as evidenced in Msunduzi, are not unique to Msunduzi
municipality. Many municipalities have similar irregularities and these should be
investigated. Progressive redistributive tariffs should be implemented to promote cross-
subsidisation and conservation incentives. Stronger regulation mechanisms should. be
implemented by DWAF to ensure that the tariff principles, as stated in the Draft White
Paper on Water Services, are upheld. The indigent policy may be valuable in increasing
the accessibility and affordability of water and other basic services. However, its value
should be reviewed and the low-income socio-economic constraints should be factored
into the amended policy e.g. household size, number of dependants, illness status,
household water activities, income and expenditures. Thereafter, the indigent policy
should be fast-tracked and all qualifying households should be assisted in registering for
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the subsidy. This could be administratively possible through employing more staff to
achieve this purpose. The indigent policy's relationship with the FBW policy should be
reviewed and the scope of the indigent policy should be expanded to ensure that no
households/persons, genuinely qualifYing for such a policy, slip through the net.
7.3.1 Tariff structures
There should be a national review of municipal tariff structures to assess if the tariff
principles, as stated in the Draft White Paper for Water Services, are endorsed. The
Msunduzi municipal tariff structures suggested that the tariff principles were not being
satisfied. The Msunduzi tariff structure (for domestic users) had two blocks: the 1st
block (6kl) was charged at R17, 07 and the 2nd block (7kl+) was charged at R5, 62 per
kilolitre (figures provided by Treasury and Water department, 2003, refer to figure 5.2).
The Msunduzi tariff structure, for industrial consumers, had the following blocks:
R2.95 [0-400kl], R2.76 [401-1000kl] and R2.28 [lOOlkl-no limit], refer to section 6.3.1.
Such a tariff structure provided industry with concessions for high water consumption.
The Msunduzi municipal tariff structures should be adapted to ensure that social and
environmental imperatives are addressed before economic considerations and that high
volume consumers cross-subsidise low volume users (which is not currently the case).
Amended tariff structures should take into account all associated low-income household
service expenditures (electricity, rates, rent, food, school fees, transport and medical
expenses), willingness and ability to payl, social justice, environmental sustainability
considerations and social acceptance indicators to ensure that the final tariff structure is
affordable and acceptable to low-income households. The following suggestion is
provided: 1st block, amended FBW (equated by considering basic water requirements
and all associated factors); 2nd block (upper limit 25kl), lifeline tariff; 3rd and 4th block
to account for high volume consumption. The FBW allocation should be calculated at
zero cost to the citizen, the lifeline tariff should be calculated at an affordable rate and





tariff - hence high volume users, higher than the amended FBW and lifeline
tariff, should they pay the FBW tariff. The 3rd and 4th block should be much higher than
the 2
nd
block to provide incentives for the wise use of water and provide for large cross-
subsidisation opportunities. The progressive redistributive tariff system should meet
1 It is essential that tariff rates correspond with the 'willingness and ability to pay' of low-
income households if payment rates are to be socially acceptable and the rates of payment, by
households, are to increase.
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equity and affordability objectives, whilst promoting the sound use of the resource
(conservation and money-saving incentives for all consumers) and ensuring amicable
cross-subsidisation from high to low volume users. Such a system emphasises the
importance of the accurate calculation of the FBW allocation and suggested lifeline
allocation. DWAF should enforce tougher regulation of tariffs and should not just
suggest tariff recommendations. Equity should prevail and the tariff principles should
be upheld.
7.3.2 Indigent policy
As indicated in table 4.4, the total average income for all study areas (R932.17)
. suggested that the average household, in the study, qualified as an indigent household
(earning less than R1378 per household per month, see 2.14). Despite the indication
that most low-income households would fall in the indigent category and receive certain
benefits (albeit limited), the indigent policy should be reviewed to ascertain if it
acknowledges the special socio-economic constraints of all low-income households to
ensure that no justified qualifying households fall through the system. All factors
should be considered e.g. the number of household members, number of dependants,
income and basic service expenditures, people living with HIVIAIDS and dependency
on social grants. As it stands, the indigent policy benchmark provides a fixed amount
per household and does not take into account the factors mentioned above. All
variables should be included in determining which households qualify for the indigent
policy and how much should be allocated per capita in that household. This could be
achieved through providing each variable a social ranking and matching this with an
equivalent concession (denoted as an increase in the benefits). Hence, the beneficiaries
of such a system would therefore receive varying degrees of assistance, which should
make a difference to livelihoods and not simply be a respite to numerous survival-
challenges. The indigent policy should than be fast-tracked and all households
classified as indigents should be assisted in registering for the grant, as it is a policy that
should have a significant effect on the well-being of low-income households.
Administrative assistance should be achieved by increasing staff numbers in
administrative centres, employing field-workers to provide 'house-to-house' assistance
or by organising community meetings where indigent policy procedures can be
discussed and the relevant information and forms disseminated. The indigent policy
and FBW policy relationship should be reviewed. Assuming no change in the FBW
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limit, the indigent policy should cover additional water consumed above the inadequate
6kl allocation. Indigent households should not face water restrictions if they consume
more than the insufficient FBW allocation. Credit control mechanisms, however, could
be applied if households use more than the suggested 2nd block of 25kl (see 7.3.1) after
considering household size and water usage activities, but they should not undermine
the fmancial constraints faced by low-income households classified as indigents.
Because affordability mechanisms are not yet receptive to the socio-economic
constraints of low-income households, credit control policies can undermine the socio-
rights of low-income households. Affordability mechanisms, amicably equated and
implemented, should be seen as synonymous with promoting human right imperatives
i.e. dignity. There is a place for credit control policies in the case of the disregard or
misuse of services. However, if credit control policies are utilised to erode the access to
basic services, based on inability to pay, than they are unacceptable and should be
amended.
7.4 Credit control policies
Credit controls are a direct result of full-cost recovery policies. Municipalities, having
few financial options available to them (as a result of inadequate national to local
transfers and poorly structured tariff blocks), are unable to cross-subsidise their large
low-income sector bases. Credit control policies are therefore a desperate mechanism,
implemented by municipalities, to recover costs from users. The problem with such
policies is that they neglect to take into account the socio-economic constraints of their
consumers. Hence, a financial and administrative decision is taken without considering
the affordability constraints of low-income households and seldom reaches the expected
cost recovery levels. Credit control policies should consider the social implications of
such a policy. Hence, policies should reflect the constraints of low-income households
and implement amicable and acceptable policies. Credit control policies often
contravene constitutional rights. Such was the case of disconnecting household water
supplies because of an inability to pay (refer to 2.14). Credit control policies allowing
for the restriction of water supply below the basic water requirements, repossession of
movable property or eviction from houses for inability to pay for basic services is
unacceptable (refer to 2.14). Nevertheless, municipalities are entitled to implement
credit control policies. However, they should follow constitutional rights, national
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guidelines and ensure that the socio-economic well being of households is upheld.
Monitoring and regulatory powers of national government should be increased and
municipalities in breach of fundamental socio-rights should face punitive measures.
7.5 Monitoring mechanisms and water demand management
There should be a national audit reviewing the type, utilisation, value, cost and
acceptance of meters and their value in terms of cost-benefit to municipalities and
households. Information should be distributed (with some urgency) by municipalities to
households to promote the use of meters as a household monitoring tool. Leakages pose
a significant sustainability and affordability problem as most households in the study
(77.1%), experience leakages after the meter position (see table 5.1). A national
household water audit2 and household water demand management plan should be
implemented to limit the environmental and financial loss of the resource. Information
management systems should be implemented to ensure that leakages are promptly
reported and addressed (as suggested in the Draft White Paper on Water Services, 2002,
refer to section 2.16). 'Community water leaks projects' are suggested as a mechanism
whereby communities can acquire skills and tackle the problem, while having the
support of municipal technical resources and finances. Financing options, identified
through the Municipal Income Grant, could be used to address leakages, upgrades and
maintenance issues (see section 2.10). Monitoring mechanisms through regulation and
standards are suggested to ensure quality workmanship and water system installation
and maintenance.
7.5.1 Meters
There should be a national audit on the type, utilisation, value, cost and social
acceptance of meters. Msunduzi municipality has implemented such a meter audit;
however the results of the audit are still pending. Should the results of the audit show
that meters are an acceptable monitoring mechanism and show a favourable cost-benefit
to municipalities and households then the following should be implemented (based on
the experiences of the households included in the study): information should be
distributed to households on how meters function, how households can utilise meters as
2 The results of the Msunduzi water leaks audit were unavailable; however (on its availability)
such data should be analysed and the amount of water being lost per day (unaccounted for
water) should be linked to the economic and environmental costs to low-income households and
the Msunduzi municipality.
112
a household consumption monitoring mechanism and how to use the information from
the meter readings in conjunction with municipal consolidated bills. This would
transfer monitoring control to the households. In addition, municipal consolidated bills
should be reformatted and simplified to ensure understanding. Information on how to
read the reformatted municipal consolidated bills should be distributed to promote ease
of use. The type and form of information could be similar to that distributed via local
newspaper attachments as initiated by the Water Action Campaign (from this research,
see appendix G). Furthermore, the date that the municipal meter reading took place
should be consistent with the meter reading date appearing on the municipal
consolidated bill. This would assist households in monitoring their meters in
conjunction with the municipal consolidated bills and allow households to query any
irregularities. Households should also be encouraged to enter the monthly meter
readings into their own household logbooks as a triangulation mechanism.
In the cases of accessing the FBW utility, the receipt of municipal consolidated bills
should be terminated thereby reducing administrative costs. Systems could be
implemented that only show up if more than the FBW allocation is utilised. The current
Msunduzi municipality connection policy of moving meters outside the yard, for easy
meter reading access by the municipal meter readers, may be advantageous in ensuring
meter reading consistency; however it sends a strong message that meters are for
administrative use only and ignores the value of individual household self-monitoring of
water consumption. This incorrect message should be remedied on the outcomes of the
review and the dissemination of household meter reading information (as described
above).
Another option in the meter discourse is of implementing bulk meters instead of
individual household meters. Why does council continue implementing household
meters if the possibility exists that meter readers do not read them accurately (are poorly
trained or unable to access the meters) and households cannot use them as a monitoring
tool owing to lack of information? Are bulk meters (that service 50 households) not a
better option (SAMWU, 2003)? Costs in implementation are relevant because bulk
meters would save money (installation costs RIOOO versus R300*50 = R15 000
(including service charges); administration and meter reader costs, time and
achievement of the same goal (possibly more accurately as meter readers could read
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fewer meters and read them consistently as time constraints would be lessened; hence
reading 1 bulk meter versus 50 individual household meters). Bulk meters offer a
considerable saving; however, individual self-monitoring would be negated (but, as it is,
self-monitoring is not really common practice because of a lack of understanding), as all
50 households would split the consumption costs equally. Nevertheless, if meters are
estimated or not accurately or consistently read then bulk metering could save the
Msunduzi municipality some monies. The opinion of the researcher is that if the current
technology is pursued than it must be supported by efficient computer technology,
consumer information and social acceptance.
7.5.2 Leakages
A comprehensive national household water leakage audit should be implemented. The
audit should elicit how much water is being lost per household per day and the
monetary values lost to municipalities in real costs. Water saving scenarios should be
implemented in terms of the cost-benefit of implementing water demand management
policies which examines actual water consumption in areas, water losses, monies lost
over one month, one year and five years; and includes the population served, population
growth, and the implication of all the factors on water-serviced resource expansion and
municipal and national government fmances.
A comprehensive national and local household water demand management policy
should be implemented. The water demand management policy should cover all water
systems, including meter to tap leakages. Political will and sufficient financial
resources should support the policy. Through the policy, an information management
system should be implemented whereby technical equipment can pinpoint where and
when leakages are occurring. A technical team will then have to synthesise the data and
mobilise a leakage management team to address the leakages promptly. A reporting
system, whereby households can report the leakages directly to the technical team,
should act as a parallel system to that mentioned above. The water demand
management policy could assist in creating the space whereby 'community water leaks
projects3, could be initiated. 'Community water leaks projects' should work closely
with the technical team until all leakage responses and leakage monitoring could be
3 Such a water leaks project was implemented in Gugulethu, Western Cape, by the City of Cape
Town, and achieved a high success rate.
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referred to them. Hence, the project staff members should undergo a period of training
and practical experience (working closely with the technical team) until they could
manage the project by themselves. The municipality should support the project with
finance and technical assistance. The project should still receive information (on the
location of leakages) through the technical team and improved reporting systems.
Ultimately, the specific communities should own and manage the project. The project
staff members should also be trained in implementing environmental audits whereby
they can assist households in identifying water losses as well as ways to conserve water
(NOO, 2002).
An encompassing water leakage policy supported by a nationwide water audit would
provide insight into the current Msunduzi and national water leakage problem.
Numerous possibilities do exist to the leakage challenge e.g. increased monitoring,
regulation, quality control and accountability of contractors; proper pressure
management (during 12-4am to decrease water losses); improved leakage management;
fast-track leakage response (arrangements made for municipal and community leakage
management capacity/ community affordability constraints); community plumbers; and
information (Msunduzi city engineers, 2003). However, political will for higher
prioritisation and sufficient financing for water leakage projects must support options.
Financing such a policy and water leakage projects should be mobilised through the
Municipal Income Grant for infrastructure (leakage) upgrades and maintenance.
Additional urgent issues that should be addressed include the upgrading of old water
systems (especially in older townships) and regulating and monitoring municipal
contracts. Standards and regulations should be explicit for all activities and
construction, and monitoring systems should be implemented.
7.6 Administration
An effective water service delivery framework is reliant on an efficient and effective
administrative system. Municipal administrative systems should be enhanced through
the development of an effective and diversified technical and personnel base. The
systems should be easily accessible and receptive to the population served. Platforms
should be enhanced to ensure active participation and control by all role players.
DWAF should ensure that municipalities are ready and capacitated for their new roles.
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Municipal plans. should be implemented to promote popular administration and
information should be accessible to ensure informed decision-making. Political space
should be accessible to all role players. Service delivery should not be manipulated as a
political tool to further the agendas of certain political objectives at the expense of the
people. Community structures should be capacitated, apolitical and their powers should
be adapted to ensure that certain responsibilities are transferred to community service
offices.
7.6.1 Municipal administration
Efficient and effective administrative systems are imperative for an effective water
service delivery framework. The administrative and technical personnel and the
capacity of personnel should be increased. Human resources should be diversified and
the technical systems necessary for efficient and effective systems should be increased.
Administrative staff frequently complain that they are doing the best they can with
outdated technical equipment and shortage of support staff- this should be promptly and
adequately addressed (Msunduzi administration, 2003). Information management
systems should be effectively implemented (Draft White Paper on Water Services,
2002). D'\tabases~ be accessible, transparent and efficient. Administrative
systems sh~ easily accessible (available, sufficiently staffed and speak the
language of the consumer) and provide a satisfactory level of service. Municipal
systems should be assessed in light of the current decentralisation of DWAF.
Municipalities should be assisted to ensure that they are ready and capable to take on
their new roles.
Platforms and communication channels between and within members of parliament,
departments, councillors, ward committees and communities should be improved.
Decisions should be made on apolitical, informed and integrated grounds. Diverse
departments should strive to fulfil common objectives. Capacity within councillors,
ward committees and communities should be enhanced through aggressive training,
engagement with the many social issues they face and a strong supportive resource
network. Councillors and ward committees should attend all community task team
meetings (it has been voiced by study participants that councillors and ward
committees often fail to attend community meetings). Community structures should be
enhanced to ensure an apolitical platform on which community voices are heard.
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Infonnation on water systems management and municipal structures should be available
and accessible to all to promote engagement with decision-making structures. Popular
involvement should be increased and extended to all aspects of water service delivery
e.g. budget prioritisation by communities (refer to section 2.15). Central to popular
involvement is the right to access infonnation for the exercise or protection of rights
(Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996: section 32.1), which should be
upheld and available to all, without restriction. Municipal plans for such a popular
administration should be implemented.
7.6.2 Political platforms
Communication channels are essential to a democratic decision-making body. All lines
of communication should be enhanced and the capacity of all stakeholders to engage in
fundamental issues should be improved. This study has revealed fundamental problems
concerning the 'top-down approach' system of municipal decision-making; whether
community representatives really represent their communities; and if they have the
capacity and political space to do so. Platfonns for infonnation and experience sharing
should be created to ensure that the experience from the ground is incorporated into
fonnal and infonned decision making processes and not solely rely on community
representatives to speak on the communities' behalf. The political space should be
provided for all stakeholders to engage and control the process.
Municipal and ouncil decision-makers should have the mandate to take issues forward
tlrrough po . ical will, capacity and financial backing. These communication channels
houl xtend to input into local issues, strategy and policy and hence from a local to a
national level. The ANC's emphasis on 'a better life for all' is embedded in improving
service delivery. Service delivery has become a political issue; it is what the ANC
government will be judged on.. As with all political issues, services can be manipulated
to serve a political purpose, at the expense of the people.
As indicated by the households included III the study, community structures are
problematic in tenns of reporting systems (refer to section 5.3.2). Frequently the
councillor and ward committee positions are dogged by political imperatives. Hence, a
citizen of a specific political affiliation will have a greater chance of getting an issue
addressed if he/she holds the same political affiliation as the councillor or ward
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committee. In the case of holding a different political affiliation to those in the
community structure, citizens become frustrated and problems persist. This reason alone
should be enough to push for an effective and apolitical structure to address specific
issues. The councillors and ward committees should not be the channel used to report
water issues; rather community pay points and reporting offices should be established in
all areas to meet this role. The role of councillors and ward committees should shift
slightly whereby they can address popular service related issues yet still monitor service
quality effectiveness and follow-up issues not adequately resolved. Their time will be
freed-up to address broader issues and attend specific information workshops so as to
assist their communities more effectively.
Households indicated that community structure roles and positions should be re-
evaluate~ tasks allocated to support different systems. Furthermore, it may be
n ssary to assess the current political problems within community structures and
source recommendations to improve community systems and promote service delivery
which is removed from political agendas e.g. the election of community structures on an
apolitical basis, and a councillor should not be an ANC councillor but rather an Imbali
or a Sobantu councillor With no political affiliation. Such a policy would ensure that all
issues would be adequately addressed and not simply addressed because it would
forward the specific political interests of the specific councillor.
As per the above suggestions to reform the water service delivery communication
channels, community service offices should be provided as a possible resolution to
political manoeuvring. Municipalities should support community service offices.
However, local community members should hold positions with no political agendas.
The community service offices should be adequately outfitted, responsive and be staffed
by competent staff who are able to address and resolve issues promptly. Such a
community office should hold staff members with special water-related training and the
structures and systems (computer and administration) involved in addressing problems
would be well known to the staff members. This implementation will build capacity
within the particular community and promote efficiency and effectiveness in water
service delivery. Furthermore, community service offices should be integrated to
address numerous service delivery issues e.g. electricity, waste, sewage, road/traffic
issues, transport, indigent and social grant assistance. From the results of the study,
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such community service offices should be kept busy full-time (by a steady flow of
complaints, queries and information requests) and should be invaluable in improving
service delivery.
7.7 Financial mobilisation
Financial considerations are at the loci of all water service delivery decisions. Finances
should be mobilised to ensure that water delivery is equitable, affordable, accessible,
efficient, effective and sustainable. National to local government transfers should be
increased to ensure that municipalities are able to implement 'funded mandates' of
accessibility, affordability, equity and sustainability. Private sector options should not
be considered until public sector ones have been thoroughly investigated.
The equity share, a primary funding mechanism for FBW, should be increased to cover
the full costs of providing an amended FBW allocation. This increase would assist in
removing the focus of its cost recovery through user-charges from this socio-economic .
level. The equitable share allocation should be increased and this figure should be
equated by taking into account all relevant databases and studies. The equitable share
should be stabilised (hence not reliant on the fiscus) and a fixed amount should be
allocated annually. Furthermore, the equitable share should be changed to a conditional
grant; hence, municipalities should be forced to allocate it to specific services and
should not be allowed to use it as they see fit. This should ensure that it is utilised for
its specific purpose/so Municipalities should be accountable for its allocation and
should be closely regulated and face punitive measures if it is misused. The allocation
and use of grants should be annually audited and monitoring mechanisms should be
implemented.
Financial departments should ensure that public fmance be mobilised to cover capital
investments and social protection where users cannot afford the full costs of the
necessary water and sanitation programmes, therefore ensuring equity of access (Hall,
date unknown). The reliance on cost-recovery should be shifted upwards on the
understanding that many sectors of society simply cannot afford the full costs of service
delivery. References to full cost-recovery should be limited to economic sectors or
high-income users who can actually afford all costs, thereafter cost-recovery should be
seen in terms of the equity share, funded mandates and cross-subsidisation. The
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mobilisation of grants, equitable cross-subsidisation and amicable tariff structures are
important to ensure accessibility, affordability, equity and sustainability.
Financial mobilisation is determined by economiC policies. The current national
paradigm is influenced by the global paradigm of fiscal discipline and the recovery of
costs. This has prompted a shift from public sector options to private sector
alternatives. Public sector options are more favourable in meeting the needs of low-
income sectors of society and securing access goals and should therefore always be
considered above private sector options. The South African Municipal Systems Act,
which stipulates that municipalities first assess and reorganise internal delivery
mechanisms prior to the consideration of private sector delivery (refer to section 2.7),
should be adhered to and criteria developed to determine whether all options are
considered before the adoption of private sector options. The manipulation of the word.
'privatisation' by using terms such as 'restructuring' should be challenged. If
'privatisation' is referred to, than it should be made clear. Outsourcing should not be
considered, rather the capacity of the public sector should be increased and more
personnel with diverse portfolios should be allocated to the public sector, as it is a more
sustainable option. More monies should be allocated to this end, rather than a large
proportion of the budget allocated to private options (42% of DWAF's budget allocated
for private consultants, refer to section 6.4).
7.8 Summary of sub problem three
Reforms have been suggested in relation to policies, strategies and implementation
processes. Reviews, evaluations and audits were the vehicle suggested for informing
policy, strategy, regulation and monitoring mechanism amendments and adjustments.
Policies and strategies were critiqued in terms of their own principles as well as the
principles and rights set out in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996)
and Bill of Human Rights (1996). Fundamental flaws in policies and strategies ignored
the socio-economic constraints and special considerations effecting low-income
households. All relevant information, grassroots' experience and the input of all role
players were not adequately synthesised in policies and strategies and decisions were
made on an uninformed basis. Political platforms for engagement were lacking or
inappropriate for ensuring input into water service delivery processes. Political will and
the mobilisation of finances were inadequate in promoting an equitable, accessible,
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affordable, efficient, effective and sustainable water service delivery framework for
low-income households. National and local monitoring and regulation mechanisms
were absent or inadequate.
Chapter seven provided insight into what should be done to reform policy, strategy and
implementation contraventions,. inconsistencies or inadequacies. The suggested reforms
were beyond the scope of this study: they required further assessment based on
extensive data and experience; however they provided a starting point, on which far-
reaching reforms should be based. Chapter eight outlines the strategies that can be
adopted to support the necessary reforms to be implemented.
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CHAPTER 8
RESULTS: STRATEGIES TO SUPPORT REFORMS
Chapter eight addresses sub problem 4: what strategies can be adopted to support the
implementation of the necessary reforms to South Africa's water service delivery
policies and strategies? Community mobilisation, consistent with the community action
research design, is at the locus of all strategies to support the implementation of the
necessary reforms (as indicated in chapter 7) and is supported by aggressive
networking. Lobbying and advocacy strategies are targeted at the 'inside' level hence,
direct engagement occurs with policy and decision makers as well as with the 'outside'
level through civil actions and use of the media. This two-pronged approach is valuable
in ensuring information exchange as well as promoting significant public pressure.
8.1 Community mobilisation
The following discussion on community mobilisation is based on the community action
research (CAR) process as used in the study. The statements and activities are based on
pre- and post-research documentation and evaluation (by the researcher, community
researchers and community stakeholders). The CAR process was a valuable mechanism
for attaining community control of the water-related issues and promoting community
mobilisation. The activities involved in the community mobilisation process promoted
the capacity, self-confidence and assisted in equalising the power differentials of the
stakeholders. The community mobilisation process, as used in the study, is presented in
figure 8.1.
• Survey by community action researchers to elicit community experiences
• Analysis of outcomes by community researchers and researcher
• Information and experience sharing on issues (cause-and-effect diagrams, policy and
wider national and global paradigms) through workshops
• Workshop issues (based on survey outcomes) with community researchers and
communities
• Community task teams elected and terms of reference, roles and procedures decided
• Awareness programme initiated (community newspaper publications, flyers, door-to-
door information campaign, scholars' information programmes and workshops)
• Public meetings called to prOVide information and formulate issue priorities
• Community priorities synthesised with all task teams
• Joint task team strategy workshop (information and strategy development)
• Strategies fed-back to communities for additions, adaptations and community buy-in
through community meetings
• Joint task team advocacy workshop (feeding strategies into advocacy channels)
• Joint strategy and action plan coordinated by the Water Action Campaign
Figure 8.1: Community mobilisation process as followed in this study, in Msunduzi.
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The following community mobilisation process activities are presented to clarify the
activities presented in figure 8.1. After the surveys were completed, a two-day analysis
workshop was held by the researcher with the community researchers. The workshop
was valuable to evaluate the survey experience, identify survey shortcomings and
provide suggestions on how the survey could have been improved upon. This was
useful as the survey experience provided the community researchers with insight that
could be used in their own future research exercises. The major water-related outcomes
were discussed and consensus was sought to provide a common picture of the water
service delivery situation (the technique of rich picturing was used, refer to section 3.6).
Capacity was built on the outcomes through information and experience sharing;
breaking the issues down into 'cause and effect' concepts (Woodhill and Robbins,
1999); engaging with the issues through debates and discussions; interpreting and
unpacking policy into simple understandable concepts and linking the local water
service delivery situation with national and global paradigms. This was followed by two
workshops in each of the study areas with interested community members, which were
facilitated by the researcher and supported by local community researchers. The
processes involved in the community workshops were not prescriptive. The major
issues were sourced from the floor (similar to the issues emerging from the surveys) and
supplemented by the study outcomes. The issues and outcomes were debated until a
solid comprehension of what the issues and outcomes meant to individual households
and the wider communities was secured. Furthermore, the workshops provided a
platform where information could be disseminated to the groups to increase the
knowledge base, which was critical for advocacy processes. Hence, efforts were made
to ensure that all groupings could explain issues and not just chant slogans. This step
was critical, as the communities had to decide that the issues and outcomes were
important (or not) before they committed themselves to supporting the process to
reform the water service delivery situation. After commitment was shown in all areas,
it was decided that the community researchers and community members should form a
more formal structure to drive and support the reform process and create platforms
where issues could be debated. It was decided that community task teams should be set
up, which excluded the individual ward water committee members and community
councillors to ensure that the community members had full control of the organisation
and activities of the community task teams. Each of the community task teams decided
their own terms of reference, roles and procedures (how to operate, communicate,
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reporting mechanisms, involve the wider community and initiate feedback systems) to
suit their environments and operate with optimal effect (see figure 3.2).
It was decided that awareness programmes should be initiated to raIse the public
consciousness to the issues at hand. Meetings were held with the community task teams
to organise and plan the awareness programmes. The awareness programmes included
information flyers (refer to appendix F), door-to-door information campaigns,
information published through free local newspapers (refer to appendix G), street plays
and scholars' information programmes. Each activity was used to promote awareness
to the water service delivery situation as well as the need to act collectively to support
its reform. The community task teams ensured that they were visible and that they
could be contacted with information queries. Thereafter, broader public meetings were
organised in each study area whereby the wider community could voice their own
issues, compare them with. those of the community task teams issues and research
outcomes and prioritise them and join the community task team, if desired. Once this
had occurred, community task teams linked with one another, synthesised and co-
ordinated their priority issues.
Four community mobilisation activities were still pending at the time of the research
report: a joint task team strategy workshop, community feedback into joint strategy,
joint task team advocacy workshop, and joint strategy and action plan. It is envisioned
that the process will be as follows. A strategy workshop will be initiated, providing
specific lobbying and advocacy information (e.g. communication channels in municipal
structures, identifying departments, individuals and roles, who and how to target) as
well as a platform whereby community task teams can utilise relevant information to
develop a strategy to address their issues. These strategies will be fed-back to the
communities for additions, adaptations and to ensure a wider community buy-in. A
joint task team advocacy workshop will be conducted with the community task teams
and facilitated by the researcher to fine tune the community strategies and synthesise
them into an all-encompassing joint community strategy co-ordinated by the Water
Action Campaign. The Water Action Campaign will be managed and controlled by
representatives of the community task teams. The joint strategies adopted by the
communities will draw on and link up with similar civil society social advocacy
strategies (see 'networking,' section 8.2).
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The community mobilisation process, as employed in the research, was successful. The
reasons for success were the following: community researchers were involved in the
community mobilisation process from the initial stages of community action research
(CAR) thereby providing the passion and direction for all activities; communities in
Msunduzi faced very real concerns regarding the water service delivery framework and
therefore were committed to the process of supporting reforms; and the community
mobilisation process was organic and receptive to community processes and
requirements. Moreover, efforts were made by the researcher to build capacity \\'ithin
the community task teams and 'step-back' wherever possible to promote the community
ownership and control of all processes. Hence, very early on in the process, the
researcher became a co-ordinator, supporter and advisor versus an actor or controller.
The community mobilisation process was implemented along the same principles of
CAR, thereby ensuring that all stakeholders were learners, information sharers and
supporters which ensured individual and group respect, self-realisation and group
cohesion (consistent with De Vos, 2000, see section 3.1.1). Regardless of the
documentation of the above-mentioned community mobilisation activities, perhaps the
best success indicators of the CAR community mobilisation process would be that of
community-driven water service delivery reforms, which are still in their fledgling
stages.
The community mobilisation process as followed in this study is not a blue print for
community mobilisation and need not be applied systematically. However, an organic
process could be adapted and used for similar research-based community mobilisation
processes. Its benefits to the researcher, the community researchers and the emergent
process of community mobilisation are numerous. Community control and full
participation in the process of advocating for reforms is imperative. It is the researcher's
opinion that informed communities are the strongest mechanism to push for reforms.
The key issues raised in the study, after numerous consensus building and participation
exercises, should form the core rallying points for a wider community action to support
reforms. However, it is important that the research outcomes be seen as just one tool in
advocating for reforms and should be subservient to the emergent mobilisation process.
Moreover, the mobilisation process need not be approached on a large scale. It can be
initiated in a few areas with a few people, thereby ensuring high levels of
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understanding, which create the knowledge base on which passion and momentum can
be raised.
8.2 Networking
Networking during the research period was aggressively advocated in the support of the
process of community mobilisation and the reform of the water service delivery
paradigm. Networking was not a systematic process; rather it took place during all
research and advocacy processes. Because community task teams were initiated in
different areas within Msunduzi, networking was initially localised. However, the
community task teams optimised opportunities to network with Msunduzi and Durban
organisations and the researcher networked with national social movements, networks
and organisations. Networking was seen by all stakeholders as an oppo'rtunity to learn
and to share information and was not isolated to water-related issues. Hence, it became
a tool to acquire diverse resources (tangible and intangible) and support, which provided
the benefits of increasing the researcher's and community researchers' perspectives on
the water delivery paradigm and the different stakeholder dynamics and strengths.
From the research and consumer mobilisation process, it was found that networking
provided a valuable source of experience, information, resources and support and
should be aggressively sought. Networking is fundamental in building a strong
advocacy strategy (consistent with Ife, 1995). The community task teams suggested
that networking should be strategic and link with local, national and international social
movements, campaigns, civil society organisations and research institutions. It was
acknowledged by the community task teams that the principles of the potential alliance
partners should be comparable with the Water Action Campaign to ensure that activities
were engaged in were acceptable to all campaigners. Furthermore, as indicated by a
campaign partner, networking increases the scope of advocacy and ensures that local
struggles are able to access national and international platforms, even if the populace or
spokesperson of the particular advocacy issue is not present (NGO, 2003). If networks
are successfully captured, then local issues can be embraced by a united national and/or
international voice, which are effective in pressurising for the implementation of
reforms.
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Networking is essential when engaging with government and municipal officials and
when taking action to raise awareness on issues/causes. 'Inside' and 'outside' lobbying
and advocacy strategies are also necessary for the support of reforms and although not
fully operationalised, through the research, are important and will be discussed below.
8.3 Inside and outside lobbying and advocacy strategies
Although a joint advocacy plan has yet to be adopted by the stakeholders in the
community action research process, it is envisioned that an 'inside' and 'outside'
lobbying and advocacy strategy will be adopted by the Water Action Campaign (vehicle
for the support of reforms). An 'inside' approach lobbies and advocates within the
decision-making system and the 'outside' approach lobbies and advocates outside the
decision-making system (ETU and The Black Sash, 2002). Hence, direct
communication with decision-makers or pressure from civil society organisations or
movements influence decision-makers. The chief aim of the lobbying and advocacy
strategies at the local and national level should be in targeting policy and decision-
makers (NOG, 2003). Hence, high-ranking officials in the relevant departments who
have both the political clout and ability to implement reforms should be lobbied. The
community task teams may find it difficult to identify such officials; therefore it is
envisioned that advocacy workshops will be organised thereby affording the benefits of
experience sharing and the joint-identification of key departmental or government
officials by the community task teams and invited stakeholders (based on previous
experience and engagement) and can be used to optimal effect by advocacy groups. In
choosing such strategies, it will be essential to grasp a thorough understanding of
available and accessible channels for advocacy and the merits of each in forwarding the
objectives of the struggle for reform. Because the CAR process, as employed in this
study, had not reached completion at the time of writing this report, the 'inside' strategy
was utilised primarily by the researcher and the 'outside' strategy was still to be
implemented. The inside lobbying and advocacy strategies document the experiences
of the researcher in engaging in such processes and the outside lobbying and advocacy
strategies present a course of future options and actions that may be taken by the Water
Action Campaign.
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Figure 8.2: Lobbying and advocacy strategy framework that may be employed in this
study, in Msunduzi.
Figure 8.2 provides a possible framework for the Water Action Campaign's lobbying
and advocacy strategy, in Msunduzi. It builds on the community action research
foundation, the community mobilisation process (presented in figure 8.1) and links joint
community strategies into the inside or outside lobbying and advocacy strategies. It is a
simple framework that is founded on the solid understanding of issues, how they are
linked to local, national and international paradigms and draws on community
solidarity, resources and networking.
8.3.1 Inside lobbying and advocacy strategies
The 'inside' strategy is based on the experience of the researcher, who attended various
workshopslhearings which provided the platform to advocate for reforms to the
Msunduzi and national water service delivery paradigm (as the elected spokesperson of
the Water Action Campaign). From the researcher's experience, it was ascertained that
where direct communication is possible, it is essential that a well-formulated argument
is presented and backed with community experience and hard-core data. Direct
communication with national officials can prove elusive, despite government rhetoric
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that communication channels do exist. However, the opportunities to engage with
municipal officials are more probable. Such channels should therefore be strategically
utilised and could be favourable to local objectives in that local officials have a greater
access to government channels and could lobby national departments on their behalf.
Municipal officials are obliged to meet and speak with their citizens and may also be in
a more favourable position to comprehend the issues at hand.
From the researcher's own experience, direct engagement with national departments is
accessible through platforms such as the parliamentary civil society and portfolio
committee workshops, public consultation meetings or public commentary on draft
policies. Unfortunately, however, government officials often limit civil society input as
they determine what questions are to be asked thereby confining public input to an
answering forum rather than rigorous debate (based on the opinion of the researcher,
representing the Water Action Campaign at such civil society and government
workshops/hearings). It is essential therefore, that civil society formulate an input
strategy prior to their involvement on such platforms. Lobbying selected officials that
may empathise with the specific cause of the advocacy group could be valuable in
ensuring that the correct information is relayed to officials and the space is provided to
the public to clarify the issue at hand. This type of approach can work in the favour of
advocacy groups (despite their disempowerment), as the Department of Water Affairs
and Forestry may be more likely to be receptive to challenges raised by its own
members than civil society groupings. Political space is essential if the voice of the
public is to be heard. Platforms should be in the control of the public and government
should realise their value and importance to democratic decision-making. It is the
researchers' opinion that platforms should not simply satisfy pseudo-participation but
should encourage fundamental debate between all stakeholders (consistent with Pretty,
1995). Civil society can advocate for the mobilisation of such platforms and can
pressurise government to ensure that they are available, accessible and approachable on
an equal footing. Civil society engagement should not be limited to simply providing
input at government or parliamentary meetings; they should be lobbying for increased
control of decision-making structures through the adoption of a similar approach to that
implemented in Porto Alegre through a high level of citizen involvement in allocating,
prioritising, administering and managing the local government budget and services
(Menegat, 2002). Public control of the water service delivery process was indicated by
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the communities involved in the research as essential for the improvement of water
service delivery (consistent with section 5.4 and table 5.7). Platfonns are therefore
essential to ensure that infonnation is exchanged between communities, stakeholders
and decision makers and public control secured. Such a 'public control' process would
challenge the political, administrative and economic system and would have to be
thoroughly conceptualised- however; the Porto Alegrecase and other examples could be
drawn on (Keet, 2000b).
8.3.2 Outside lobbying and advocacy strategies
Outside strategies are approaches that culminate in civil action that raise the prominence
of the issue/cause and raise public consciousness and government awareness to the issue
at hand. Such approaches are imperative in pressurising decision-makers to address the
issue/cause. Actions such as the following can be initiated for such a purpose:
protesting, pickets, civil disobedience (as successfully used by the Treatment Action
Campaign in advocating for an HIV/AIDS national treatment plan in 2003, [Treatment
Action Campaign, 2003]) and the presentation of memorandums. Such actions should
optimise the available alliance networks. Use of the media in highlighting the
issue/cause is essential. Various media methods can be utilised for this end: television,
radio, newsprint, press statements, letters and articles; documentaries; public debate on
radio or television and public information campaigns. Actions that receive full press
coverage, backed by a popular support base are valuable in pressurising decision-
makers to address issues decisively.
8.4 Summary of sub problem four
Chapter eight has presented a strategy that can be adopted by communities to support
the refonns, as suggested in chapter seven. It is a grassroots approach, which relies on
building the capacity of communities through experience sharing, developing an
infonned knowledge base and the development of organisational skills to take control of
the advocacy process and pressurise decision-makers to implement refonns. It relies on
building strategic alliances and extensive networking. The strategy engages at both
'inside' and 'outside' levels to ensure that sufficient pressure is exerted on government
departments to address the issue/cause. Chapter nine presents the study conclusions,





The study sought to reveal whether South Africa's water service delivery policies and
strategies were equitable, accessible, affordable, efficient, effective and sustainable for
Msunduzi low-income households. The chief objective of the study was to elicit the
community experience of local and national policy, strategy and implementation
processes and to link these experiences to a broader analysis and interpretation of policy
and strategy to identify water service delivery contraventions, inconsistencies and
inadequacies. The secondary objective was to initiate community-based platforms for
engagement with water-related issues and to build capacity within the local community
task teams to initiate lobbying and advocacy strategies to support community-suggested
and research-outcome reforms to policy, strategy and implementation mechanisms,
thereby returning popular control to the locus ofcommunities.
The study was conducted in Kwa-Zulu Natal, within the Msunduzi municipal
jurisdiction, under the uMgungundlovu district municipality (DC22) in the period from
October 2002-ApriI2003. Households in five low-income urban areas were included in
the study: Imbali (units 1 and 2), Sobantu, Haniville and Thembalihle. A community
action research design using non-probability sampling was employed in the study.
Community researchers participated in the research process and contributed to the
methodology, synthesis and collating of surveys, data collection, analyses of the results,
suggested reforms to policy and strategies and formulated community strategies to
support the reforms. Community researchers conducted surveys with 314 low-income
households. Community focus groups, community meetings, community visitations
and informal engagement with local government departments and non-governmental
organisations complemented the surveys. The Water Action Campaign and community
task teams were initiated to create a platform for engagement and advocacy on pertinent
water-related issues based on the outcomes of the research.
The results of sub problems one and two indicated that South Africa's water service
delivery policies and strategies were not equitable, accessible, affordable,efficient,
effective or sustainable to Msunduzi low-income households. Sub problems three and
four identified necessary policy, strategy and implementation amendments and
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adjustments, and proposed community-based strategies to support the suggested
reforms. The hypothesis that South Africa's water service delivery policies and
strategies were not equitable, accessible, affordable, efficient, effective nor sustainable
to Msunduzi low-income households, was supported. Study conclusions follow.
9.1 Conclusions
The experiences of Msunduzi low-income households to local and national water
service delivery policies and strategies and the implementation of the said policies and
strategies supported the hypothesis. The study conclusions implied that local and
national policies and strategies that were purported to ensure that the basic service
requirements and rights of low-income households were upheld, actually compounded
the socio-economic constraints and compromised the human rights, justice, equity and
dignity of Msunduzi low-income households. Citizens were no longer viewed as such
but were regarded as consumers of basic services. Because local and national policies
and strategies had failed to promote low-income household affordability and access to
basic services, the financial ability of households to pay for their services determined
their access. This might have been acceptable if low-income households were able to
pay for their services and influence the way in which water services were delivered and
managed, but limited financial flexibility and restricted political maneuvering space
impeded the input of low-income households into decision-making platforms. High
unemployment levels, medical expenditures (compounded by HIV/AIDS), rising. basic
food costs, large families, school fees and transport charges made it difficult for
households to afford basic service expenditures. Concurrently communities were being
increasingly marginalised from decision-making and engagement processes. Local and
national policies and strategies should have provided a framework in which low-income
households were able to secure basic services to sustain their livelihoods. Instead,
policies and strategies contributed to the financial quandary that low-income households
were struggling to overcome.
The free basic water policy failed to meet the basic water requirements of Msunduzi
low-income households, with the implication that low-income households were unable
to obtain the FBW utility thereby compounding access and affordability constraints.
This was because low-income households were then expected to pay the full cost of
their water consumption at poorly equated tariffs without receiving the benefits of
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cross-subsidisation because household consumption levels generally exceeded 6kl per
month. The Msunduzi municipality's limited stepped tariff structures ensured that low-
income households fell into the steep second block thereby paying the same amount for
their water as richer consumers who had superior in-home connections. There was no
cross-subsidisation between domestic and industrial users. In fact, industrial tariffs
rewarded users for high consumption by providing industry cheaper per unit rates
thereby compromising social and environmental sustainability. Meters were
ineffectively monitored and managed by the Msunduzi municipality. Water service-
related information and the value of household monitoring was not transferred to
households. Water demand management was poorly prioritised with the implication
that the financial and environmental sustainability of the resource was compromised and
compounded the financial constraints of the Msunduzi municipality and households.
Information management systems were lacking, inadequate or inaccessible which
restricted reporting and querying channels and delayed the prompt address of issues.
The water service delivery problems faced by Msunduzi low-income households were
attributecrtc>ooth the implementation supp~rting mechanisms selected by Msunduzi
municipality and policy and strategy flaws. Local and national policies and strategies
prioritised the economic considerations of full-cost recovery above social and
environmental considerations thereby compromising the Draft White Paper on Water
Service's (2002) principles of equity, accessibility, affordability, effectiveness and
sustainability. Regulation and monitoring systems to identify and address
implementation contraventions through punitive measures were not explicit in policies
and the t.ext of the policies did not always support or were inconsistent with policy
principles. National policies generally failed to integrate all socio-economic ~pects,
public experience, broad stakeholder consultation and scientific bases into synthesised
documents with the implication that policies lacked the information-base and public
acceptance necessary for their conversion into effective and workable policies.
Furthermore, the support needed to mobilise the necessary finances and secure the
political will for the effective implementation of effective policies was lacking. This
had the implication that policies became mere papers with little use but to satisfy
legislation and to serve as tools to justify the limitation of rights.
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The study revealed two significant findings. The first finding, related to policy, strategy
and implementation mechanisms, showed South Africa's water service delivery
policies, strategies and implementation mechanisms were inconsistent with the
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry's sector goals as stated in the Draft White
Paper on Water Services' (2002): of equity, affordability, efficiency, effectiveness and
sustainability. They contained serious flaws and inequitably promoted economic
considerations above social and environmental ones. They did not account for diverse
variables and scientific investigation and were therefore incomplete. They lacked
regulation and monitoring systems to identify and address implementation
contraventions. They were not receptive to the socio-economic situations of low-
income households and should be fundamentally re-worked. The second finding,
related to popular involvement and engagement, showed community consultative
processes for input into local and national policies and strategies were inadequate and
often pseudoparticipatory. The political platforms for communities to engage with or
influence decision-makers (locally and nationally) were lacking, and the community
control, ownership and acceptance of the Msunduzi water service delivery institution
and its mechanisms was low.
9.2 Recommendations
Recommendations are suggested for local and national policy, strategy and
implementation reforms relating to. the following issues: amended free basic water
policy and implementation strategies, low-income household affordability constraints,
affordability mechanisms, credit control policies, monitoring mechanisms and water
demand management, administration and financial mobilisation. Recommendations
highlight popular approaches through public consultation, engagement and information
dissemination, extensive data collection, reviews, evaluations, audits, amendments,
adjustments and the implementation or intensification of regulation and monitoring
mechanisms. It is recommended that the suggested reforms be promoted through
community-based lobbying and advocacy strategies, networking with strategic alliances
and engaging in both 'inside' (municipal, government and Department of Water Affairs
and Forestry) and 'outside' processes (outside the official lobbying framework), as used
in the research process. Community researches should be provided direct channels to
engage with policy makers and implementation strategists (engineers, water sector and
administrative officials) to inform and assist in timely and amicable policy changes.
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A national free basic water (FBW) evaluation should be implemented to determine the
accessibility of the FBW utility and the experiences of low-income households to the
policy. Hence, the numbers of low-income households per municipality actually
consuming less then 6kl per month (thereby receiving their water for free) should be
determined. Basic water requirements should be scientifically and socially assessed and
a diverse and integrated approach should be adopted, incorporating all factors
culminating in the increase of the FBW allocation e.g. allocation should be
commensurate with household size, number of dependants, illness status and household
resource usage for food security or other economic survival activities. The spirit of the
FBW policy should be upheld, that is, increasing the access to a basic supply of water
for all people. It may be necessary to target the amended FBW policy specifically to
low-income households thereby ensuring that low-income households are the
beneficiaries and not households that can afford to pay the full-cost for their water
supply. The free basic sanitation policy should be integrated with the FBW policy for
indigent households. Monitoring systems and criteria should be implemented by the
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry to verify if free basic water and free basic
sanitation efforts are meeting accessibility targets and policy objectives to ascertain if
their mandates, as a department, are being met.
There should be a national review on the affordability constraints facing low-income
households. Such a review should assess the income and service expenditures, current
payment trends, willingness and ability to pay, social acceptance of tariffs and the social
circumstances of low-income households as identified by this study but implemented on
a wider basis. Affordability constraints of low-income households should be alleviated
through implementing equitable tariff structures and amicable crosscutting cross-
subsidisation measures e.g. this could be achieved by implementing a differentiated
tariff related to the level of service (in-home or in-yard connections). Progressive
redistributive tariff systems should be implemented that meet social, equity and
affordability objectives, while promoting. the sound use of the resource and ensuring
amicable cross-subsidisation from high to low volume users in Msunduzi. Stepped
tariff structures could be modelled on the following system: 15t block, amended FBW;
2
nd
block (upper limit 25kl per household per month), lifeline tariff; 3rd and 4th block to
account for high volume consumption. The FBW allocation should be calculated at
zero cost to low-income households; the lifeline tariff should be calculated at an
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affordable and socially acceptable rate and the 3rd and 4th blocks should be much steeper
thereby providing disincentives for high or wasteful consumption and be calculated at
an economic rate. Only if the citizen falls into the 3rd or 4th tariff - hence high volume
consumers, higher than the amended FBW and lifeline tariff, should they pay for the
FBW tariff. A national review of municipal tariff structures should be initiated to assess
if municipal tariffs are in accordance with the tariff principles stated in the Draft White
Paper for Water Services (2002) and the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry
should enforce tougher regulations on municipal defaulters.
The indigent policy should be reviewed and the low-income socio-economic constraints
should be factored into the amended policy with special attention to the benefits of per
capita calculations. Indigent households should not be restricted to less water than their
basic water requirements or be subjected to the 'trickle washer' delivery of water. The
amended indigent policy should be fast-tracked and all qualifying households should be
assisted in registering for the subsidy. The indigent policy's relationship with the FBW
policy should be reassessed and the scope of the indigent policy should be expanded to
include per capita income (derived from total household income and household size),
number of dependants, illness status and household resource usage (e.g. for food
security or other economic survival activities).
Municipal credit control policies should uphold constitutional rights and national
guidelines and ensure that the socio-economic well being of households is not
compromised. Arrears on low-income household water bills should be scrapped or
addressed through socially acceptable mechanisms to promote household payment
regardless of the meagreness of contributions. A socially acceptable credit control
policy (after high levels of participation by community members is secured) should be
implemented to ensure that the environmental sustainability of water is met.
Conservation and 'water wise' information documents should be distributed to assist
households to regulate their water usage. Creative warning systems could be initiated
by municipalities to help citizens use water more wisely e.g. a red light that flashes after
a daily consumption limit (household set) has been reached (just a warning not a
restrictor). Credit control policies allowing for the restriction of water supply below
basic water requirements, repossession of movable property or eviction from houses for
inability to pay for services should be prohibited. Monitoring and regulatory powers of
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national government should be increased and municipalities in breach of fundamental
social-rights should face punitive measures.
There should be a national audit revIeWIng the type, utilisation, value, cost and
acceptance of meters and their value in terms of cost-benefit to municipalities and
households. The value of bulk meters should be debated and its cost-benefit should be
assessed. Information programmes should promote the use of meters as a household
monitoring tool and provide information to households on municipal consolidated bills.
A national household water audit and household water demand management plan
should be implemented to limit the environmental and financial loss of the resource.
Information management systems should be implemented to ensure that leakages are
promptly reported and addressed. Community water leaks projects should be initiated
and supported by municipal technical and finance resources to ensure that communities
are able to acquire skills to address and control water demand management. The
Municipal Income Grant should be mobilised specifically to address leakages, upgrades
and maintenance. A complementary 3 year grant could be initiated that serves the same
purpose as the Municipal Income Grant, but is substantially larger and moves onto other
municipalities after 3 years; hence providing a financial boost for municipalities to
ensure that their water systems are effectively managed and maintained. Monitoring
and regulatory mechanisms should be initiated to ensure quality workmanship, water
system implementation and maintenance.
The Department of Water Affairs and Forestry should dedicate sufficient resources to
municipalities to ensure that public administrative systems are ready and capacitated for
their new decentralised roles. A skills and technical audit should be initiated and the
gaps in public administrative systems should be bolstered, with a sufficient and
diversified technical and personnel base. Administrative systems should be accessible
and receptive to the public. Municipal plans should be implemented to promote
popular administration through public consultation, participation and information
dissemination. Public systems will need to restructure to ensure the 'recapture' of
public institutions by the public (the viability of Porto Alegre's public administration
model should be assessed to determine its potential implementation success for South
African municipalities). The political space should be available and accessible to all
citizens. Community structures should be capacitated, apolitical and their powers should
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be transferred to apolitical community service offices and community task teams. There
should be a national review on the political nature of community structures and systems
should be adapted to ensure that all people, regardless of political affiliation, are
regarded and attended to equally.
National to local government transfers should be increased to ensure that municipalities
are able to implement 'funded mandates' of water service delivery equity, accessibility,
affordability, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability. The equitable share should be
changed to a conditional grant covering the full costs of the provision of free basic
water. The equitable share should be increased, predetermined and included in budget
forecasts. Municipalities should be accountable for the use and allocation of the
equitable share and face punitive measures if it is misused. There should be an
investigation into the circumstances whereby the bulk of municipal households are not
accessing the FBW utility to determine where the equitable share is reallocated. Public
finance should be mobilised to cover capital investments and social protection where
users cannot afford the full costs of basic services. Public sector options are more
favourable in meeting the needs of low-income sectors of society and securing access
goals and should therefore always be considered above private sector options.
References to 'full cost recovery, privatisation and restructuring' should only apply to
sectors that can afford these costs; it should not accompany so-called 'pro-poor policies'
as is evident in the FBW policy. Public sector options should be adhered to, as stated in
the South African Municipal Systems Act, and criteria developed to determine if all
options are adhered to prior to considering any private sector and outsourcing options.
Private sector options should be comprehensively regulated and should be abandoned if
fundamental social and human rights are compromised. The allocation and use of
grants should be annually audited and monitoring mechanisms should be implemented.
Recommendations for improvement of the study follow.
9.3 Recommendations for improvement of the study
The recommendations for improvement of the study consider study sampling, control,
analysis, assumptions and possibilities to improve the study.
The household sampling criteria (known water payment difficulties and general water
service-delivery dissatisfaction) was purposively selected for the objectives of the study.
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However, randomisation may have provided a more realistic picture of the Msunduzi
experience to South Africa's water service delivery policies and strategies.
Furthermore, the survey should have included at least three rural communities for a
rural-urban comparison, which would have been particularly valuable when tackling the
FBW issue and the basic water requirements of low-income rural households. The
control of the study could have been enhanced if the sample size had been increased,
thereby providing a greater comparative and representative value to the study results.
If households could have provided more accurate household income, expenditure and
arrears data, affordability models could have been produced. This would have
enhanced the studies' recommendations on pricing water services affordably. If
households' monthly water consumption had been elicited through accessing household
municipal consolidated bills, the consumption of low-income households would have
been more accurate and would have enhanced the study results. Unfortunately, the
researcher miscalculated the difficulty of extracting accurate monthly water
consumption figures from households. The significant low-income household
consumption determinants and activities could also have been elicited· thus providing
insight into how to determine the free basic water allocation per household. If the basic
water requirements of low-income households had been available, comparisons between
the free basic water allocation and the basic water requirements would have been
valuable in determining the adequacy of the free basic water allocation. Tariff models
could also have been provided if accurate basic water requirement data were available.
If a subjective rating had been included in the survey to determine the degree of
household satisfaction with the municipality, satisfaction levels would have been more
accurately ascertained. The analysis of policies and strategies could have been
improved if more water-related policies and strategies had been analysed. Perhaps the
most significant improvement to the study could be in accessing municipal and national
statistics on how many people are actually accessing the free basic water utility (using
less than 6kl per month) as this would provide the most telling indicator of whether the
free basic policy is successful or not. Unfortunately, these statistics could not be
obtained.
The assumptions of no political interference occurring during the data collection period
and municipal officials being accessible and willing to participate in interviews and
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provide relevant data were not wholly true. A significant amount of political
interference occurred in endeavouring to stop the study taking place. Many of the
community researchers were threatened and certain households were prevented from
participating in the study. Certain municipal officials were unwilling to participate fully
in interviews, were vague and were unwilling or unable to provide detailed data. This
had the implication that study data could not be effectively triangulated and
compromised the accuracy of results.
The study could have been substantially improved if no political interference had
occurred and municipal officials were willing to participate comprehensively. Political
platforms and opportunities to engage with municipal officials and community
structures would have greatly enhanced the study. If community expression had been
freer, the study could have elicited truer and more honest inputs. If the boundaries of
the study were extended to incorporate diverse jurisdictions, the study could have
provided a national voice to the study outcomes. The study could have benefited from a
broader consultation, engagement and input from NGOs, especially regarding reforming
South African policies, strategies and implementation processes.
The study would have been improved if the activities involved in the community
mobilisation process had been completed. This would have provided a powerful
indicator into the success of such a community action research design for the support of
reform through community advocacy. The study implications for further research
follow.
9.4 Implications for further research
The reforms (presented in chapter seven) to and recommendations (presented in section
9.2) for policies, strategies and implementation processes, were suggested through the
vehicle of reviews, evaluations and audits to inform the necessary amendments and
adjustments and required in-depth and integrated research. The basic water
requirements, income and expenditures of low-income households should be researched
to provide information necessary for amicable free basic water allocations, pricing
policies, adjusted tariff structures and input into the indigent policy. Municipal and
national statistics on the number of households accessing the free basic water utility are
essential in assessing if the free basic water policy is successful or not. A national
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affordability model for services specifically required by low-income households should
be assessed. An investigation into the impact of households being restricted to only 6kl
should be initiated to determine health, community stability, gender equity and
psychological implications. The free basic water policy and implementation
mechanisms should be thoroughly and aggressively researched.
Further nationwide research is necessary and could be based on the approach of this
study to elicit a national analysis of water-related policy, strategy and implementation
processes. Studies sourcing the experience of low-income households to local and
national policies and strategies could be valuable in ascertaining if the socio-economic
constraints of low-income households, as in Msunduzi, are adequately addressed
nationally.
Public participation mechanisms and popular administration systems should be
researched to provide insight into engagement channels and the value of eliciting the
popular voice. Research into the accessibility, effectiveness, efficiency and democracy
of community structures is necessary, as well as investigating alternative structures to
enhance such structures. Community research methodologies should be researched to
ascertain how communities, themselves, could research issues and contribute to the
implementation of the necessary reforms based on research outcomes. Community
action research, as approached in the study, should be substantially researched to
provide insight into the value and effectiveness of such a research design. Community
lobbying and advocacy strategies should be researched to provide usable frameworks to
assist communities in influencing government. Information dissemination, acquisition
mechanisms and channels should be researched to detennine how communities are able
to access information, and use it successfully to engage in fundamental debate.
1
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APPENDIX A: COMMUNITY ACTION RESEARCH WORKSHOP
PROCEEDINGS
Community Action Research in Water
15 -16 October 2002
DAY ONE: Introduction to Community Action Research in Water
AGENDA FOR DAY ONE
• Introduction to workshop
• Introduction of participants - ice-breaker
• Objective of w/shop and future actions
• Water themes/issues (groups and flipcharts, report back and discussion)
• Why the need for community research and community researchers
• What is community action research




• Data collection and analysis
• After analysis- what to do with results?
• Evaluation of day one (round the room)
1 WHY THE NEED FOR COMMUNITY RESEARCH AND COMMUNITY RESEARCHERS?
• Research not just for academics but for communities to get hard-core data
to forward own advocacies and struggles
o Communities in best position to research what is important, how to
research and collect data (trust with communities already there)
o Communities in better position to use and analyse data and take
collective action (academics often collect data and than leave with
data)
"In a given country with an oppressive social structure, organised struggle by the
oppressed classes may bring down the prevailing social order. But unless the masses
can take a leading role in rebuilding the society they will be liable to become
subordinate again to some other social class or classes and lose the power to
participate in the process of social reconstruction and development as full subjects.. ."
(Raman, 1993, cited by de Vos, 2000).
Community Action Research to stimulate initiatives and struggles by oppressed people,
aimed at promoting the participation of these people as builders of a new society,
should focus on their own collective action to conceptualise their own situation and
find collective alternatives and action to take their struggles forward and challenge the
prevailing norms.
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2 WHAT IS COMMUNITY ACTION RESEARCH (CAR)?
• Research by community members in their own communities
2.1 Characteristics of CAR
• Mutual respect and trust
• Access to information, skills, ownership, sense of purpose and selfreliance
• Share experiences, mutual aid, constant feedback and evaluation
• Quantitative and qualitative research
• Researcher acts as facilitator, co-learner and team~builder
3 PROCESS OF RESEARCH
• Strategic thinking- start thinking about why and how the research will be done.
It is useful to get input into the proposal by affected, interested or experienced
individuals
3.1 First step: PROPOSAL
• Introduction to research problem (situation now)
• Importance of study (use, value, change)
• Research problem (e.g.) Pricing water for low-income households
• Sub problems (e.g.) 3#: Affordability; income/expenditure; alternatives
(help you to answer research problem)
• Conceptual framework (identify links and issues)
• Delimitations (can't investigate everything- state what will and what will not
include) NARROW IT DOWN .
• Assumptions (what will be taken for granted)
• Methodology (how data to be collected e.g. interviews)
• Budget (funding; always ask for more than need)
• Work plan/ time frame
3.2 Second step: RESEARCH BEGINS
• Literature review - current situation/ ideas/previous research (municipal,
government or other relevant documents, internet, other community groupings,
informal discussions (neighbours, friends, and community meetings).
Depending on if an academic report is to be compiled; the literature review may
be as informal/formal as necessary e.g. just reading or documenting
• Involve interested individuals in research processes (strategic selection of
individuals to forward the process)
• Methodology: who are you going to interview (community members, municipal
officials, councillors, service providers), how many people (sample size)
• and how you are going to collect data- PLANNING PHASE
• Identify possible research techniques- survey, interview (face-to-face),
focus groups, community meetings, documentation-government, municipal
records and community records (meetings)
• Choose your technique/technique- may use a number of different
techniques concurrently
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• Input into technique chosen (interviews), use the core issues that came out
of the water theme discussion (on f1ipcharts), as a base
• Form questions out of the core issues (from a workshopped group)
• Compile the questions (with 3-5 activists) into an interview sheet (be sure
to add demographic indicators). Evaluate the interview sheet with the
group
• Pilot your technique- test the interview with a selected number of
households to see if you get the types of responses you need (adjust if
necessary for clarification etc)
• Control of study- standardisation of interviews (same time, activists etc)
3.3 Data collection and analysis
• Planning- time schedule/frame- standardisation; who does what, when,
how and when completed data to be collected
• Data collection- collect the data
• Data analysis- workshop the results of the research with all researchers
(computer analysis (statistics)? what are the general responses and short
report write-up)
• What does the data mean (painted picture)?
• Gaps- in research (maybe more information is needed for c1arification-
more interviews or different stakeholder input)
3.4 AFTER ANALYSIS- what to do with results
• What to do with the results/ painted picture?
• Strategic action thinking with researchers. Does the group want to take
these results forward (if so, how?)?
• Disseminate information to relevant communities (pamphlets, flyers,
community meetings). Findings expanded on and get input and buy-
in/commitmentfrom the wider community
• Community action on results and Plan of Action (strategic action).
Community solidarity- do affected individuals want to take action, if so-
HOW?
• Evaluate and adapt action plan; tailor-make or generic actions (selected
communities or all)- participants to review progress collectively and
formulate future course of action
• May need to initiate ACTION COMMITTEE
• May need to workshop certain issues- facilitate understanding (e.g. link
local to national and international policy and more information on relevant
issues)
• May want to share results and actions with other similarly affected
communities (get wider solidarity)
• Extend research (if necessary)
4 EVALUATION OF DAY ONE
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DAY TWO: INITIATING COMMUNITY ACTION RESEARCH FOR WATER STUDY
AGENDA FOR DAY 2
• Where are we now?
• Methodologies
• Data collection techniques chosen
• Objectives- information and actions
• Themes to include and specific questions to be asked
• Basic tips on how to ask questions
• Basic tips on how to conduct technique
• Additional items
• Time frame/schedule (who does what, when, how)
• Where do we want to take the results, how do we get there, want do we
want to do - Water Action Campaign and/or organization
• Evaluation of day two (round the room)
1 WHERE ARE WE NOW?
How are we feeling as a group?
Where are we at in terms of the workshop (technique formulation, collection stage)?
2 METHODOLOGIES
Discussion on how to conduct research
3 DATA COLLECTION TECHNIQUES
• Semi-structured interviews, focus groups (and 'life stories') were decided on
Objectives of research
• To make municipality aware of problems with regard to service delivery and
rectify wrongs
• Investigate communication between communities, councillors, ward committees
and municipality
• Bridge gap between communities, councillors, ward committees and
municipality
• Look at service delivery framework (community and municipality structures)
• Find out were the information gaps are re: water issues
• Revisit major water themes (as discussed in community groupings).
• In community groups decide what questions you need to ask (each group write





Basic tips on setting out questions
Ask generic demographic questions (number of people in household, ages,
genders, occupation etc)
Interview structure- easy questions first (demographics) to instill confidence,
trust and comfort; than difficult, controversial ones (income and sensitive
issues); than easy ones to end off comfortably
Ask one question at a time
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• Keep 'yes/no' questions to a minimum and if deemed necessary ask them BUT
ask for explanations as to why they say 'yes/no.'
• Don't ask leading questions
• REMEMBER: the person who asks the questions determines the type of
responses so try and ensure that you do not limit the responses by your own


















Basic tips on how to conduct an interview
Introduce yourself (who you are, what grouping/organization you represent,
why you are conducting the interviews)
Ask permission to conduct the interview and state how long the interview will
take (you may have to re-negotiate the time)
Make the interviewee feel at ease and comfortable- be honest and open
Emphasise that the interview will be confidential
Be neutral- do not indicate that you disagree by shaking your head etc.
Be interested and ask for clarification if necessary
Record exact responses
Probe if there is a silence (try and read the interviewee)
Know your questions well, familiarize yourself beforehand
STOP the interview if it is going badly. Evaluate why it went badly and move on
to the next household
Thank the interviewee and end the interview.
Additional items
Sampling
Discussion on councillor influence
Time per interview sheet: 1 hour and 30 minutes per sheet
Number of sheets per person: 15pp
4 TIME FRAME
Who Activitv Bv when
Selected researchers Svnthesis, translate and collate interview sheet 17/1 0
Team leaders and researcher Evaluate interview sheet (make changes if 18/1 0
necessary)
Make the copies. Give the interview sheets to
team leaders
Team leaders and teams Go through interview sheets with team. Explain 21/10
certain questions and elicit clarification
All teams Conduct interviews 21 28/10
All teams meet with team Discuss and hand interview sheets to team 28/10
leaders leaders
Team leaders and researcher Discuss and hand-in sheets 29/10
All researchers Analyse data 05/11
All researchers Decide on future POA 06/11
5 WHERE TO NOW?
6 EVALUATION OF DAY 2
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APPENDIX B: WATER·RELATED NATIONAL AND LOCAL WORKSHOPS
ATTENDED
• South African Civil Society Water Caucus (June 2002, November 2002 and
March 2003)
• Cape Town Water Caucus (Monthly meetings from February 2002-July 2002)
• Parliamentary Civil Society DWAF portfolio committee meetings (March 2002
and March 2003)
• Parliamentary Free Basic Water Hearings (6 June 2003)
• *World Summit on Sustainable Development (26 August-4 September 2002)
• Cape Town Sustainable Water Forum (Monthly meetings from April 2002-July
2002)
• Cape Town Civil society water-related workshops (February 2002-July 2002)
• *Msunduzi pre-World Summit on Sustainable Development Workshop (July
2002)
• *Msunduzi water workshop (September 2002)
• *National Water Resource Strategy hearings in Durban (October 2002)
• *Globalisation and water workshop in Msunduzi (April 2003)
• *National Water week community workshops organised by the Water Action
Campaign (March 2003)
* Workshops attended by selected community researchers.
APPENDIX C: SURVEY SHEET (ENGLISH)
Water Survey
~
Name of Interviewer: _
Area/community: _
Form number: _
Date of interview: _
Person(s) interviewed: _
Street address:
Number of people living in house: _
1. Gender: Age Occupation _
2. Gender: Age Occupation _
3. Gender:_____ Age Occupation _
4. Gender: Age Occupation _
S. Gender: Age Occupation _
6. Gender: Age Occupation _
7. Gender:_____ Age Occupation _
8. Gender: Age Occupation _
Race of househ 01 d: _
2 Are you the land owner or a tenant? _
3 How many people living in the household are employed?: _
4 Who brings in this income (father, mother, sister, uncle etc)?: _
5 Is there any other source of income (non-work; disability grant, pension, child
support grant, remittance)?
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6 Who brings in this income?:
7 Number of people who are chronically sick: _
8 Description of sickness:
10 What is your current source of water (stand pipe, outside tap, inside tap)?
12 How far is it from your household?
13 How much water do you use per day?
14 How much water do you use per weekend?
15 Is the water that you receive enough?
16 Why/why not?
17 How much do you need per day?
18 How important is water to your household?
19 Do you think that the money you pay each month for your water is affordable?
20 Why/why not?
Appendix e, Page 2
21 How much are you willing to pay for your water each month? _
22 Are you in arrears now?:
Dyes 0 No
23 How much do you pay towards arrears each month? ~_.-
25 Is your water metered?
26 If yes:




28 Do you think meters are a good tool in service delivery?
29 If not, what other options do you think will work?
30 . Do you receive free basic water?
DYes 0 No
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32 What is the total monthly income of the household:
o o o o o o
less R600 R600-R1200 R1200-R2000 R2000-R3000 R3000-R4000 +R4000
33 What are the typical values for monthly bills/expenses:
Rent: _
Water (excluding arrears paymentsL Arrears paymenL _






34 How do you receive your bill?







36 Who in the household is responsible for water payment? _
37 Where do you pay your water bill (place and distance)?
38 Are you experiencing any water leakage problems?
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39 What is the water quality like?
40 Why do you say this (include health issues)?
41 Are you satisfied with the water pressure?
42 Are you satisfied with the Water Service Provider?
DYes 0 No
43 Why/why not?
44 If you have a problem (leakage, meter, billing); who do you contact and how
quickly do they (municipality, ward committee, councillor) respond?
45 How do you think water service delivery can be improved?
46 What information do you need on water (service provision, conservation,
education)?
47 Would like to support an action for improved water delivery?
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APPENDIX D: SURVEY SHEET (ISIZULU)
Water Survey
Name of Interviewer: _
Area/community: _
Form number: _
Date of interview: _
Igama lophendule ifomu: _
Ikheli:
._-------





Iminyaka Umsebenzi awenzayo _
Iminyaka Umsebenzi awenzayo _
Iminyaka Umsebenzi awenzayo _
Iminyaka Umsebenzi awenzayo _
S. Ubulili: Iminyaka Umsebenzi awenzayo --------
6. Ubulili:_____ Iminyaka Umsebenzi awenzayo_. . _
7. Ubulili: Iminyaka Umsebenzi awenzayo _
8. Ubulili:_____ Iminyaka Umsebenzi awenzayo _
Uhlanga: _
2 Umnini womhleba/okanye uqashile? _
3 Bangaki abahlala lapha ekhaya abasebenzayo?: _
4 Ubani oletha imali phakathi kwalebe abalandelayo (ubaba, umama, usisi etc)?
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5 Ngabe ikhona enye indlela inithola ngayo imali kungabe (impesheni/ imali
yolebubezekile/isondlo sengane noma usezintabeni osezintabeni onilethela imali?
6 Ubani oholayo?
7 Bangaki abanesifo esingalapheki?
8 Chaza indlela ogulangayo
10 Nisebenzisa luphi uhlobo lukampompi )? _
12 Aqhele kangakanan i? _
13 Nisebenzisa angakanani ngosuku? _
14 Nisebenzisa angakanani ngempelaso? _
15 Lamanzi owatholayo kungabe ayakwenelisa?
1:::1 Yebo 1:::1 Ch.
16 Uma engakwanelisi kunga?
17 Udinga angakanani ngosuku? _
18 Abaluleke kangakanani amanzi emzini wakho?
Cha1:::1
19 Ucabanga ukuthi lemali okumele uyikhokhe ngenyanga ungakwazi
ukuyikhokha?
1:::1 Yebo
20 Uma ungeke kungani?
21 Imalini othanda ukuyikhokha? _
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22 Unayo yini imali isilele?
D veba D Cha
23 Ukhokha malini ngemali isilele ngenyanga? _
25 Unawo amamitha kwakho?





28 Nibuka kuyindlela elula yini ukusebenzisa amamitha?
D Veba D Ch.
29 Uma kungenjalo ubona kuyiyiphi indlela engasetshenziswa?
30 Uyawathola amanzi amahhala?
D Veba D Ch.
31 Wazini ngamanzi amahhala okumele uwathole?
Ngiyazi lutho
o
Ngiyazi kancane Ngiyazi kakhulu
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32 Imalini imali engenayo lapha ekhaya?
DD o o o o
less R600 R600-R1200 R1200-R2000 R2000-R3000 R3000-R4000 +R4000
33 Ngiphe izilinganiso uma nikhokha
Imal i yeRent: _
Amanzi (ungayibal i es ileleL 1mal i isi1ele _
Ugesi ( ungayibali esileleL lmali isilele _
Imali yobuninimuzi (esilele): _
Ukud la: _
Imali yesi kole: _
Imal i yezinto zokuhamba: _
Okunye _
34 Usithola kanjani isikweletu sakho ngenya? (Incwadi yesikweletu noma
bayakufonela)







36 Ubani okhokha isikweletu samanzi? _
37 Usikhokhaphi isikweletu samanzi? Isho indawo nebanga olihambayo.
38 Kuyekwenzeke nibe nenkinga yokuqhuma kwamapayipi?
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39 Amanzi asezingeni eligculisayo yini?
40 Ushongani, bala nezifo uma kwabakhona owathola isifo ngenxa yokuvalwa
kwamanzi?
41 Uyeneliseka ngendlela amanzi aphuma ngayo empompini?
ChaYebo





44 Uma unenkinganzi) Ukuvuza kwamapayipi, amamitha, nezikweletu) uthintana
nobani ushesha kangakanani ukuphendula?
45 Ucabanga ukuthi kungathuthukiswa kanjani ukuletha kwamanzi?
46 Uluphi ulwazi ofuna ukulwazi ngamanzi?
47 Uyathanda ukuba ingxenye yomkhankaso wamanzi ahlanzekile?
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APPENDIX E: DATA CODING SHEET
? Catoaorie cd Item le< item led item cd item cd Item cd item Icc item cd item eel Item
Area o Imbali 1 11mbali 2 2 Haniville 3 Sobantu 4 Thembalihle
Plhh 0 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 9 10 ' 10
p/sloner 0 o 1 1 2 2 3 3
Employed 0 o 1 1 2 2 3 3
Unemplo 0 o 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4
Child 0 o 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4
Scholar 0 o 1 1 2 2 3 :3 4 4
Student 0 o 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4
2 owner o Owner 1 tennant
3 no.emplov 0 o 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4
4 breadwln o familymem 1 relative 2 noone
50ther$ o pension 1 grant 2 remittance 3 other 5 itoho
6 $ bringer o family mem 1 pensioner 2 grant rec
7 sick 0 o 1 1 2 2 3 3
8 whatill o cancer 1 HIV/AIDS 2 TB 3 Diabetes 4 BP 5 mental 6 other 7 n/a
10 ItvDeH20 o standpipe 2 outside tap 3 neighbours
12 distance o nla 1 close 2 far
13 amntdav actual fig
14 amntwend actual fig
15 enufH20 Ono 1 yes
16 enufwhy o do everything 1 more needed 2 too expensivE 3 comes out slowly 4 cutoffs 5 other
17 H20need actual fig
18 NBh20 o notNB 1 NB 2 VNB
19 afford Ono 1 yes 2 dontknow
20 afordwhv o Rsstretched 1 sick/old 2 don't pay 3 too much/1 income 4 no working 5 affordable 6 poor serv
21 willDay actual fig
22 Arrears' . Ono 1 yes
23 Payarrea actual fig
25 meters Ono 1 yes
26 happymet Ono 1 yes
27 whyhappy o efficient 1 don't rd fre 2 inaccurate 3 education needed 4 awaycheck 5 other 7 leaks
28 toolmete Ono 1 yes
29 options',,' ' o flatrate 1 info/educ 3 FBW 5 arrangements for pay
? Catogorie cd item ce item Ice item cd item cd item cd item Ice item cd item eel item
30 fbw o no 1 yes
31 infofbw o nothing 1 heard 2 a lot
32 toincome o 600-1200 1 1200-2000 22000-3000 33000-4000 44000+ 5 less R600












34 billlng o post. 1 hand 2 No receipt
35 adminbil o poor 1 ok 2 bad
36 payh20 o father 1 mother 2 female mem 3 pensioner 4 owner 6 noone
37 payplace o m offices 1 paypoint M 2 payptscom 4 Post office
38 leaks o no 1 yes
39 QH20 o poor 1 ok 2 good
40 Qwhy o noone sic 1 p old/rusty 2 H20 dirty 4 ppl sick 5 clean
41 pressure o no 1 yes
42 wsp Ono 1 yes
43 wspwhv o poor service 1 no comm 2 old taps/pipe 3 don't want $ 4 good service 5 other 6 too exp 7 cut-off 8 have H2O
44 problems o mrespfast 1 mrespslow 2 councillor 3 wardcom 4 s-mainten 5 noone 7 call someone
45 improved o meters 1 local com 2 service 3 repair pipe 4 afford/pay 5 info/educ 6 Flatrate 7 access 8 Prepaid 10 Fine 11
46 Info o fbw 1 purifyh20 2 systemwk 3 conserve 4 sanit 5 metres/pay 6 pollution 7 e/thing 8 Nothing
47 action" :", Ono 1 yes
APPENDIX F: COMMUNITY INFORMATION FLYERS (AWARENESS
PROGRAMME)
MPHAKATHI
Umphakathi uthuleleni ngomasipala, enganiki abantu amanzi amahhala (Free Basic
Water)
Kungani ikhansela lingaxoxisani nomasipala mayelana namapayipi amadala aqhuma
mihla le. Amathoyilethi ayavuza.
Yini lena eyenza kuflke izikweletu zamanzi bengakaflki abafunda amamitha (meter
readers).
Kungani ukulungiswa kwamathoyilethi kumele kukhokhelwe, kodwa ama rates ebe emba
eqolo.
IZIPHAKAMISO
Umasipala akenze izinhlelo zokuxhumana nabantu abakhele nomkhandlu
(communication).
EMPUMALANGA ngase Hammarsdale, abantu bakhona basanda kuphuma ngobuningi
babo befuna kukhokhwe RI0.00 flat rate ngamanzi. Ngoba abantu abasebenzi, kanti
abanye bahola impesheni.
Nathi njengomphakathi kumele sisukume. Phansi riokukhokhiswa izinto zingalungile.
Akucishwe izikweletu ezindala ngoba ngo 1996, uHulumeni washo ukuthi izikweletu
ezindala mazicishwe ezenzeka ngaphambi ko 1993 zamanzi.
Umasipala kumele abe nezinhlelo zokufundisa abantu ngokongiwa nokubaluleka
kwamanzi, kanye nezinhlelo ezifana namanzi amahhala (free basic water), nokongiwa
kwemvelo (nature conservation).
Amakhansela kumele afundiswe kabanzi ngezinhlelo zikazwelonke, ezibandakanya
ukuthunyelwa imisebenzi yabantu kubona (service delivery)..
Oflsa ukuba yingxenye yalomkhankaso akathintane nabanye abayibonayo lempicabadala.
Ikhishwe yizakhamuzi ezikhathezekile.
15/11/02
Lolu hlelo Iusebenza kanje:
Amakhaya asebenzisa amanzi angaphansi
kwamalitha awu 6000 ngenyanga eyodwa
akumele bakhokhe. Abantu abasebenzise
ngaphezulu kwamalitha awu 6000 ngenyanga eyodwa
kumele bawakhokhele wonke lawo manzi.
Sonke siyawadinga amanzi ukuze siphile.
Baningi abantu abahluphekayo abangakwazi
ukukhokhela amanzi abawosebenzisayo.
Uhlelo lwamanzi amahhala lwaqala
ngomhlaka 1Januwari 2002. Loll! hlelo
lunikezo wonke umuntu owongayo amanzi
ithuba lokuthola amanzi mahhala.




Yonke imininingwane yomnikazi ishintshiwe.
Msunduzi Municipality
CONSOllOATED BILL




Uke usihlole nje isitatimende sakho samanzi ukuze ubone
ukuthi uyawathola yini amanzi amahhala? Hlola isitatimende
sakho samanzi ngoba uma usebenzisa ngaphansi kwamalitha




Imali yamanzi oweqe ngawo
emakhilolitheni awu 6 (R5,52 ikhilolitha)
~}~:~~e~o~u=~t~~ICTION
k-· .'
THS HO,,"OUHAlJlE;PHor, C,1_ H~'" Mfl.P.1RS Ui::'S
Isitatimende sakho sikhombisa amanzi owasebenzisile
ngamakhilolitha. Ikhilolitha elilodwa lilingana namalitha awu
1000. Kusho ukuthi amakhilolitha awu 6 enza amalitha awu 6000.
Ekuqaleni kwenyanga bhala phansi izinombolo
ezisemitheni !:)akho. Zibhale futhi ekuphelenikwenyanga.
Uma ususa inombolo yasekuqaleni kwenyanga kuleyo
yasekupheleni, uzothola inani lamanzi owasebenzisile.
i 1
~ ~L~ ;0~i''i}l) 1Kubalulekile kakhulu ukuthi izisebenzi
~ 1M8AL! I zikamasipala ezifundo omamitha zikwenze
; ~ 1'<;'~3 r:'L,ALI i lokhu ngemfanelo nyanga zonke. Abanye
~ "'.,.. ALLDCATIONO<d6 »»»> 9 1840 3686 4420 031
~ ACCOU>lTNW3ER ~~~;-~ CUI1A~Nrj;c0~X • • • , j abasebenza ukufunda amamitho abawafundi
:.~ 3 36~644 ZO 8836,21 .238,36 9074,571 nyanga zonke bese bebhala sakuqagela
·'-__.~~~sw~·_,~~.·.·.""",,,,·.· ,." ,~,=;.."._"."'".,..~~~.." k.~'<~'".,",, "·J.n -'''--''~ ..1 besondezela kokujwayelekile. Kungaba into
enhle ukuba uzifundele isitatimende samanzi
ukuze ulandele ukuthi ukhokhiswa ngokufanele
yini. Lokhu kungakusiza kube ubufakazi uma .
usebenzise ngaphansi kwamalitha awu 6000







Water Action Campaign (WAC)
Uma ninezinkinga zamanzi endaweni yangakini. nifuna ukulusukumela
1010 daba, ningashayela abakwa-WAC. Ningakhuluma noNonono
Mbambo (0732322306) noJulie Smith (072 4176749).
Inombolo yamahhala ongayishayela: 0800"001868
Ukufunda imitha yakho ngokufanele






·,2,..' . . . . .
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Le mitha iveza amalitha awu- 4 153 625,9 amanzi
asetshenzisiwe. Imitha yakho ibhaIa kupheIa
amakhilolitha, Iezi izinombolo ezine zokuqala, 4153.
Mangaki amakhilolitha avezwa imitha ngayinye?
~ ----
Le mitha iveza amalitha amanzi awu-1 526 918,9.
Lokhu kusho amanzi angaphezulu kwesigidi nohhafu
asebenzile. Isisebenzi sikamasipala esifunda
amamitha sifunda amakhilolitha kuphela. ngakho-ke
sizobhala 1526 kuphela.
Lolu hlobo lwemitha alufundeki kalula. Kumele uqale
ubuke izinombolo ezibhalwe ngenhla bese ubuka
indilinga ngayin!:Je, bese uthola ukuthi imicibisholo
ikhomba ziphi izinombolo. QaIa ngendilinga
ephezuIu ngasesandIeni sokudIa.
Kungaba into enhIe ukuba uzifundele
isitatimende samanzi ukuze ulandele ukuthi
ukhokhiswa ngokufanele yini.
i.N~i~~]~b~!hr?lT}:a~zi esebenza endlini yakho, izinombolo
/i.j~~lqk,ht::~(~hi~tsha 'zikhombis'e' amanzi asebenzile
•••,,' '....~~ . '. ~. , ... "••• ;;.0. • • ..' • •
·'~go.~u,rican~'bawo.' K~ama~ye' amamitha lezi zinombolo
·,~.tk~~;nji~.~~;~g~l<\yesokUdla' kan'ti k\yamanye zikhonjiswe
-:----~ _I :,ezi,n~i1ingenieZinca1l8 ngakwesobunxele.
Water Action Campaign (WAC)
Uma ninezinkinga zamanzi endaweni yangakini, nifuna ukulusukumela
1010 daba, ningashaye!a abakwa-WAC. Ningakhuluma noNonono
Mbambo (0725465869) noJulie Smith (072 4176749).
Inombolo yamahhala ongayishayela: 0800 001868 _m!liIIm!lt!!I)~~r:!r2.'IIrA'Il2,5,~.. """""'.-:~=."""'f"""'j!;
Vala bonke ompompi emzini wakho. Qikelela ukuthi
akekho oshaya ithoyilethi noma osebenzisa amanzi
ngesikhathi wenza lokhu. Hamba uyohlola imitha
yakho ngesikhathi sebevalwe bonke ompotnpi. Uma
kungekho ndawo econsayo, akumele izinombolo
zishintshe noma zihambe ngoba bonke ompompi
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',', Umaslpala kumele uwena ozokhokhela'<\ alungise mahhala ukulungiswa kwepayipi
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Vma ungakwazi ukuzilungisela leyo ndawo
econsayo, ungacela umasipala eze
kokwenzela kodwa uzokukhokhisa imali J
uma ukuconsa kungale kwemitha. Le mali ~




Vma amanzi econsa kusukela kwimitha
kuza emzini wakho, uwena ozokhokhela
lawo manzi aconsayo. Kufanele wenze
imizamo yokulungisa ipayipi noma
umpompi. Kanti uma amanzi econsa
emitheni qobo noma epayipini eliza .
kwimitha yakwakho, umasipala uyena
ozolungisa akhokhele Iowa msebenzi.
Baningi abantu abanompompi noma
amapayipi aconsayo emizini yabo. Vma
kwenzeka lokhu emzini wakho kusho
ukuthi kunamanzi amosekayo. Lokhu
kuphinda kumose imali ngoba kufanele
kube khona owakhokhelayo la manzi
aconsayo. Vma uwakhokhela amanzi
kusho ukuthi uzokhokhela namanzi
ongawasebenzisanga. Vma ungeyena
umuntu okhokhayo kusho ukuthi
siyakhula isikweletu sakho. Kuyinkinga
lokhu ngoba vele uyogcina ukhokhile.
Ukuconsa kwamanzi
Abafakela amapayipi aya endlini kuba abantu
abazimele okungebona abakamasipala. Kuyenzeka
bafake amapayipi ashibile asheshe aconse. Kumele
bakupheshele mahhala kuze kuphele iminyaka emibili.
Ukuconsa kwamanzi kungadalwa
izinto ezehlukene:
• Vmpompi ongavaleki kahle. Kungenzeka ukuthi
umpompi wakho awuvaleki kahle nje ngoba
usudinga irabha entsha. Le rabha ayibizi,
ungazithengela yona. Qaphela ukuthi~
ompompi abalingani, ngakho-ke thola
usa!:jizi ofanele werabha.
• Kungaba neconsi lapho kuhlangana khona
amapa!:jipi.
• Kungaba neconsi ngenxa !:jepayipielibhobokile
noma eselithombile. Kungenzeka ukuthi livuza
nje lingaphansi komhlabathi alivele obala.
Vma kunendawana elokhu inotshani obuluhlaza
nobukhula kakhulu kunobunye kungenzeka ukuba
kunokuvuza epayipini elingaphansi.
Kubalulekile ukuwalungisa amapayipi avuzayo. Vma
engalungisiwe kulukhuni ukuthi umuntu
angasebenzisa amanzi angaphansi kuka 6000 litha
ngenyanga. Lokhu kusho ukuthi uzokhokha kakhulu.
Amanzi a!:jisipho semvelo esiyigugu, ngisho ngabe
akuwena ozokhokha akufanele uwamose amanzi.
Water Action Campaign (WAC)
Abomkhankaso wezamanzi bazohambela imiphakhathi kusukela
ngomhlaka 17 ku 21 Mashi. Thola ngalokhu ekhasini lokuqala noma
ubashayele ucingo.
Uma ninezinkinga zamanzi endaweni yangakini. nifuna ukulusukumela
1010 daba, ningashayela abakwa-WAC. Ningakhuluma noNonono
Mbambo (0725465869) noJulie Smith (0724176749).
Inombolo yamahhala kamasipala: 0800 001868
. .r: ;: ,I·
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ngawo emakhilolitheni awu 6 (R5.62 :
ikhilolitha) .~'
9 Y
ngenyanga. Amanzi asebenza kakhulu-ke uma
kunezingane, kunabantu abadalci noma uma
kunabantu abagulayo ikakhulukazi
asebeguliswa yingculazi. Baningi abathi ayikho
indaba yaffianzi amahhala, wena uthini?
-l:Jl,';
Lolu hlelo lusebenza kanje:
Uma usebenzisa amanzi angaphansi
kwamalitha awu 6000 ngenyanga eyodwa
',akumele ukhokhe. Uma weqile ku 6000
ngenyanga kumele uwakhokhele wonke lawo
manzi, aWuwatholi amanzi amahhala.
Hlola isitatimende sakho ukuze ubone ukuthi uyawathola yini
amanzi amahhala? Xhumana nomasipala uma unenkinga.
Uma ikhona indlela, ungalokothi uyeke isikweletu sakho
sikhule, xoxisana nomasipala ukhokhe kancane kancane.
, TAX INVOICEj
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CONSOLIDATED BILL
VAT REGISTRATION No, 46COI078J5
R RE STRIC TION
SUPPLY Isitatimende sakho sikhombisa amanzi owasebenzisile
... '-.' ... . , - - ._ 0- - .- - .- ...
NO'JRA8L£JPROFiDRiREV,;MR.;MRSAllSS. ngamakhilolitha. Ikhilolitha elilodwa lilingana namalitha awu
1000. Kusho ukuthi amakhilolitha awu 6 enza amalitha awu 6000.
igama nekheli \
Ng'abe umndeni wakho usebenzisa rigaphezulu
.. '
kuka 6kl ngenyanga? Ngabe kudalwa yini
ALLOCATION 0486
lokhu? Abantu abaningi bathi amanzi awu 6kl
»»»> 9 1840 3686 4420 C3
ACCOUNT NUMBER .... ,ARREARS>:: '!;\IF\RENT ACCOUNT';_Ui,..l IiI 11 I 1:jJ>I , ngenyanga mancane, awenele ukupheka,
'" .......
8836,21 , ;,:,238~}6 " 90743j ukuwasha, ukugeza, ukuphuza nokunye., 3 45629875" '
~~\"ooo-.;~-IC~~. ' . " . , Imindeni eminin i isebenzisa 20kl ku a ku 25kl
Msunduzi Municipality
Isibonelo se-akhawunli yangempela.
Yonke imininingwane yomnikazi ishintshiwe.
Uhlelo lokuthola amanzi amahhala uma
ungeqile ku 6kl ngenyanga, lwaqala ngonyaka
odlule. Usebenzisa amanzi angakanani? Ngabe
uyakhona ukuwakhokhela lawo manzi?
Ungakwazi yini ukwehlisa indlela osebenzisa
ngayo amanzi? Ngabe ukwehlisa ukusebenzisa
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Ekuqaleni kwenyanga bhala phansi izinombolo,
ezisemitheni yakho: Zibhale futhi ekupheleni kwenyanga.
Uma ususa inombolo yasekuqaleni kwenyanga kuleyo '
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Water Action Campaign (WAC)
Uma ninezinkinga zamanzi endaweni yangakini, xhumanani nekhansela
kanye nomasipala njengomphakalhi. Ningasibhalela ekhelini lelhu
elingenh~a ukuze izincwadi zenu sizidlulisele kwabakwaWAC.
lwamanzi amahhala iukuvumela ukuthi lk?ay? lakho lingakwazi yini ukuphila
2ise amanzi awu 6kl kuphela ngenyanga. ngamanzi awu 200 litha ngosuku?malitha awu 200 kuphela ngosuku. Abaningi bathi bayehluleka ukuphila
zisa amanzi angakanani ekhaya lakho ngo 200 litha ngosuku. Wena uthini?
? Niwasebenzisela ukwenzani amanzi?
AIpanzi asebenza kangakanani uma





Esikwenzayo ngamanzi Mangaki amalitha lzikhathi ezingaki Sekukonke
Ukugeza izitsha 30 litha 2 60
Ukupheka 8litha 2 , 16
Ukugeza endishini encane 30 ~. 50 litha 5 abantu kanye ngosuku 150 (30 litha)
ukuwasha 50 litha 1 50
Ithoyilethi 9litha 5 abantu kathathu ngosuku 135
Ukuhlanza indlu 5litha 1 5 ..
Iketela 1,5 litha 2 3
Amanzi okuphuza l.!-hhafu welitha. 5 . - -, . 2.5









Amanzi asetshenziswayo kulo mndeni a't'(U 421.5 litha. Uma ususa u 200 litha wamahhala kusho ukuthi
ngosuku basebenzisa 221.5 litha. Sekweqile esikalini sam~hhala, bazowakhokhela wonke.
Gcwalisa leH thebula uzibalele ukuthi angakanani amanzi owasebenzisayo ekhaya ngo5uku:
Esikwenzayo ngamanzi Mangaki amalltha lzikhathi ezingaki Sekukonke
Isamba samam;i asebenzile ngosuku ukwenza yonke imisebenzi
